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Infrastructure projects are particularly vulnerable to corruption due to the complexity 
of processes and relationships between private and public entities, and the large-value 
contracts involved. Corrupt agreements can affect any phase of an infrastructure 
project, and the outcomes include reduced competition, poor-quality construction or 
infrastructure that does not meet value-for-money criteria. This PhD thesis brings 
together insights from economics, sociology and psychology to develop a broad 
framework of corruption with the focus on individuals, their actions and the settings in 
which corruption occurs. This framework is then applied to the bidding phase of 
physical infrastructure procurement. The method used to consolidate and analyse 
disparate theories and models of corruption across different disciplines is Elinor 
Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Key variables of the 
corruption phenomenon are identified and organised using the IAD framework, and 
two models are developed. The first is a game-theoretic model analysing the 
importance of social networks and trust between corrupt partners and the 
intermediaries who facilitate corrupt exchanges. The second is a simulation model of 
decision-making processes in corrupt agreements based on a conflict of social norms 
and individual self-interest. The second model proposes a method of linking legitimacy 
of institutions, group behaviour status quo, and social network connections, with self-
seeking behaviour. Case studies are then developed based on documents filed to 
support prosecutions under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977. The proposed 







This thesis offers a number of insights that can inform public policy design. These 
insights are mainly aimed for public policy makers designing methods of preventing 
corrupt practices in infrastructure procurement, but can also inform companies 
developing internal systems aimed at detecting and preventing corrupt practices. 
Collective action in reducing corrupt practices, with more robust anti-corruption 
systems in both public organisations and private infrastructure delivery companies, 
can improve trust between the parties. The insights offered in this thesis are applicable 
globally and the long-term impact of the thesis can manifest itself in improved 
competition in the infrastructure market, fairer practices and increased value-for-
money of infrastructure services.  
Corruption in infrastructure projects bidding processes tends to be grand in nature and 
often involves politicians, multiple institutions and government organisations. 
Therefore, for anti-corruption measures to be effective, they may require re-designs 
of multiple institutions including political organisations. A culture change towards fair 
competitive practices is required for anti-corruption measures to be successful, and 
this process can only happen gradually. Institutional changes need to be accompanied 
by the development of social norms supporting the new systems aimed at reducing 
corruption.  
The thesis showed how institutional processes of detecting and preventing corruption 
that have been put in place in infrastructure delivery companies can be ignored and 
circumvented. For these processes to be effective, they must be perceived as 
legitimate and right by those expected to apply them. The processes need to be 
consistent with the wider organisational culture, developed impartially and need to 
allow the appropriate level of discretion in rule application.  
The models developed in the thesis will benefit future academic research. In particular, 
the novel method of analysing social norm conflict and its resolution proposed in a 
social simulation model offers a method of linking legitimacy of institutions, group 
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behaviour status quo, and social network connections with self-seeking behaviour. 
This method can be applied to other research questions where behaviour is driven by 
multiple factors, including social norms, as well as monetary payoffs considerations. 
The model can be adapted to study social norm conflicts which involve breaking rules 
and where social connections play an important role in decision making. 
A paper with an early version of the model analysing social norm conflict was 
submitted for peer review and consideration for presentation at the Social Simulation 
Conference 2015 (Groningen, Netherlands, September 2015). The work was 
allocated a poster presentation and was awarded Best Student Poster.  
The model presented in this thesis discussing strategies used by the corrupt to 
establish a successful corrupt agreement was presented to an international audience 
of academic researchers and social network analysis practitioners (Sunbelt XXXV, 







Declaration ...................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ........................................................................................................... 3 
Impact statement ............................................................................................. 4 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 12 
1.1 Overview of the problem ................................................................... 12 
1.2 Vulnerability of infrastructure projects to corruption .......................... 13 
1.3 Aims of this thesis ............................................................................. 14 
1.4 Summary and structure of the thesis ................................................ 17 
2 Literature review ..................................................................................... 19 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 19 
2.2 What is corruption? ........................................................................... 20 
2.2.1 Corruption definitions ................................................................. 20 
2.2.2 Types and manifestations of corruption ..................................... 23 
2.3 Theories and models of corruption ................................................... 29 
2.3.1 Overview .................................................................................... 29 
2.3.2 Theories and models based on correlation analyses ................. 33 
2.3.3 Macro-level theories and models ............................................... 34 
2.3.4 Micro-level theories and models ................................................ 37 
2.3.5 Meso-level theories and models ................................................ 41 
2.4 Corruption reduction measures ........................................................ 43 
2.4.1 Overview .................................................................................... 43 
2.4.2 Anti-corruption measures based on correlations ........................ 44 
2.4.3 Smaller state solutions ............................................................... 45 
2.4.4 Principal-agent solutions ............................................................ 48 
2.4.5 Monitoring and punishment ........................................................ 51 
 7 
 
2.4.6 Organisational controls solutions ............................................... 52 
2.4.7 Collective action solutions .......................................................... 54 
2.5 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 56 
3 Research questions and methods .......................................................... 58 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 58 
3.2 Research questions .......................................................................... 58 
3.3 Methods used in previous research .................................................. 61 
3.4 Discussion and choice of methods ................................................... 65 
3.5 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 70 
4 IAD framework and its application to corruption ..................................... 71 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 71 
4.2 Summary of the IAD framework ....................................................... 71 
4.3 Application of the IAD framework to corruption ................................ 79 
4.3.1 Overview .................................................................................... 79 
4.3.2 Activities affected by corruption ................................................. 80 
4.3.3 General positions in activities affected by corruption ................. 83 
4.3.4 Actions constituting corruption ................................................... 85 
4.3.5 Additional positions present in corrupt activities ........................ 87 
4.3.6 Exchanges of benefits in corrupt activities ................................. 88 
4.3.7 Corruption phenomenon ............................................................ 89 
4.3.8 Summary of corruption components .......................................... 91 
5 Model 1. Triad-based corruption games under uncertainty: bribes or gifts? 93 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 93 
5.2 Review of literature ........................................................................... 95 
5.2.1 Framing of a corrupt offer .......................................................... 95 
5.2.2 Intermediaries in corruption ....................................................... 97 
 8 
 
5.2.3 Social networks and trust ........................................................... 98 
5.3 Model Version 1.............................................................................. 100 
5.3.1 Model assumptions .................................................................. 100 
5.3.2 Model formulation .................................................................... 101 
5.3.3 Model Version 1 Analysis ......................................................... 107 
5.3.4 Discussion of Version 1 of the Model ....................................... 111 
5.4 Model Version 2.............................................................................. 113 
5.5 Discussion and conclusions ........................................................... 123 
6 Model 2: Social norm-based simulation model of decision-making processes in 
corrupt agreements ..................................................................................... 126 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 126 
6.2 Review of literature ......................................................................... 128 
6.2.1 Economic interests and temptation .......................................... 128 
6.2.2 Conflicting norms ..................................................................... 131 
6.2.3 Negative externalities of corruption .......................................... 132 
6.2.4 Separating the two corrupt acts ............................................... 134 
6.2.5 Institutional rule legitimacy ....................................................... 137 
6.3 Model formulation ........................................................................... 140 
6.4 Model simulations ........................................................................... 150 
6.5 Discussion ...................................................................................... 156 
6.6 Conclusions .................................................................................... 160 
7 Corruption in infrastructure projects. Case studies ............................... 163 
7.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 163 
7.2 Infrastructure sector corruption. ...................................................... 163 
7.3 Case studies ................................................................................... 168 
7.3.1 Data sources ............................................................................ 168 
 9 
 
7.3.2 Choices of court cases for case studies ................................... 171 
7.3.3 Summaries of case studies ...................................................... 174 
7.3.4 Case studies discussion .......................................................... 189 
7.4 Application of the IAD framework to case studies .......................... 195 
7.4.1 Positions, actors and actions ................................................... 195 
7.4.2 Types of corruption .................................................................. 198 
7.4.3 Activities affected by corruption ............................................... 199 
7.4.4 Evaluation of the action situations............................................ 201 
7.5 Conclusions .................................................................................... 204 
8 Discussion ............................................................................................ 206 
8.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 206 
8.2 Methods of analysing corruption in this thesis ................................ 207 
8.3 Validity of model assumptions ........................................................ 209 
8.4 Case studies insights into enforcement actions .............................. 212 
8.5 Corruption reduction measures ...................................................... 216 
8.6 Conclusions .................................................................................... 219 
9 Conclusions, recommendations and further research .......................... 220 
Appendix A. Corruption Definitions ........................................................... 227 
Appendix B. Simplifications of equations in Chapter 5 .............................. 230 
Appendix C. Model 2 Matlab scripts .......................................................... 233 
Appendix D. Case studies selection .......................................................... 236 





Figure 1 Summary of corruption mechanisms and recommendations for corruption 
reduction across different types of theories ............................................................. 32 
Figure 2 The IAD framework levels of enquiry. Simplified diagram, based on Figure 
2.3 in Ostrom (2005, p. 59) ...................................................................................... 74 
Figure 3 Structure of an action situation. Based on Figure 7.1 in Ostrom (2005, p. 189)
 ................................................................................................................................ 77 
Figure 4 Flows of benefits between actors in corrupt transactions .......................... 89 
Figure 5 Model Version 1 decision tree ................................................................. 102 
Figure 6 Minimum levels of goodwill trust required for the Representative to choose 
the Intermediary to deliver the Incentive (x1=0.2) .................................................. 109 
Figure 7 Minimum levels of goodwill trust required for the Representative to choose 
the Intermediary to deliver the Incentive for varying levels of competence trust. ... 111 
Figure 8 Model Version 2 decision tree ................................................................. 114 
Figure 9 Model decision tree with payoffs π .......................................................... 144 
Figure 10 Functions in equations E6.3.2 to E6.3.5 showing relationships between 
weights of relevant factors affecting DM’s decisions (w1, w2, w3 and w4) and 
determinants of factors’ weights (p1, p2, p3 and p4). ............................................ 148 
Figure 11 Results of simulation 1 .......................................................................... 151 
Figure 12 Results of simulation 2 .......................................................................... 153 
Figure 13 Simulation 2 Minimum Acceptable Bribes ............................................. 155 
Figure 14 Change in variables p1, p3 and p4 after the first successful corrupt 
agreement ............................................................................................................. 159 
Figure 15 Changes in Minimum Acceptable Bribes (MAB) in repeated corrupt 
agreements ............................................................................................................ 160 
Figure 16 Corrupt agreements, case study 1: Alstom, Indonesia - Tarahan .......... 180 
Figure 17 Figure 16 Corrupt agreements, case study 1: Alstom, Saudi Arabia - 
Shoaiba ................................................................................................................. 183 






Table 1 Theories and models reviewed in Section 2.3 ........................................... 31 
Table 2 Criteria for outcome evaluation. Summary based on texts in Ostrom (2005, 
pp. 66-67), McGinnis (2011) and Ostrom (2011). ................................................... 78 
Table 3 Links between the IAD framework’s levels of activities and the associated 
types of corruption .................................................................................................. 82 
Table 4 Factors relevant to DM’s choices and the determinants of factors’ weights
 ............................................................................................................................. 143 







1.1 Overview of the problem 
Despite views that corruption is mostly a problem of developing nations, some 
developed countries also face issues of endemic corruption (Bicchieri and Duffy, 1997, 
Brandt and Svendsen, 2013). Corruption has been shown to cause numerous 
negative economic impacts through, for example, reducing expenditure on health and 
education (Mauro, 1998), its contribution to poverty and inequality (Gupta et al., 2002) 
and by reducing private investment (Mauro, 1995).  
Corruption in infrastructure projects can have particularly damaging impacts on the 
economy and even disastrous consequences for the population. Financial losses due 
to corruption in the infrastructure sector vary widely, and have been estimated to range 
between 5% and 20% of construction costs (Wells, 2015). However, economic costs 
of corruption can exceed financial costs because corruption can skew spending 
priorities and result in substandard quality of infrastructure that is costly to maintain 
(Kenny, 2006). 
Projects can be chosen based on the potential for bribe extraction rather than 
according to national priorities. For example, new infrastructure projects tend to be 
more lucrative than maintenance projects and, therefore, are preferred by corrupt 
governments looking to extract bribes. This diverts funding away from maintenance of 
existing infrastructure and presents risks for public finance and distorts the allocation 
of resources (Tanzi, 1998b). The result are ‘white elephant’ projects, with little or no 
social benefit, and excess capacity (e.g. electrical distribution system with capacity in 
excess of projected demands, creating redundancies) (Wells, 2015). The objective of 
delivering value-for-money infrastructure is, therefore, undermined. 
Corruption in construction can exacerbate or even cause earthquake-precipitated 
disasters (Green, 2005) through lack of adequate engineering, industry inspection or 
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quality assurance (Olson et al., 1999). Inferior materials, methods of construction, or 
lower quality contractors are sometimes used to increase profits from projects (Olken, 
2009, Sohail and Cavill, 2008). Structural components are often concealed (e.g. roof 
structures are concealed by cladding), and this creates reliance on supervising 
engineers to certify that earlier work was carried out according to standards. Bribery 
of supervising engineers to certify substandard work can lead to dangerous structures. 
In regions prone to natural disasters, the outcome is construction that creates higher 
risks of predictable loss of lives (Green, 2005, Alexander, 2005). 
1.2 Vulnerability of infrastructure projects to corruption 
The Transparency International’s 2011 Bribe Payers Index, which reflects the 
perceived likelihood of companies from different sectors to pay bribes, shows that 
companies involved in public works contracts and construction are thought to be most 
prone to engage in corruption (Transparency International, 2011). Developed 
countries, where the general corruption levels are perceived to be lower compared to 
transition or developing countries, are not immune to corruption in the construction 
industry. The CIOB survey (The Chartered Institute of Building, 2013) reports that 43% 
of respondents believe all stages of construction projects in the UK to be prone to 
corruption. 
Infrastructure construction projects are particularly vulnerable to corruption. A number 
of factors, relating to industry-specific characteristics, and the types of projects and 
parties involved, have been identified to explain this vulnerability (Stansbury, 2005, 
Hawkins, 2013). In particular, projects are created infrequently and at irregular 
intervals. For companies in the infrastructure sector, winning a project can become 
critical for a company’s continued viability, creating strong incentives to bribe the 
relevant decision-makers. The costs of bribes are generally not borne by the bribe-
paying companies, but are passed along to the entities financing the projects (usually 
the taxpayer) through inflated bids, or through reduced quality or quantity of materials 
used (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). Other reasons behind the particular vulnerability of 
the sector are limitations on competition (Zanella, 2013) and the general lack of 
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transparency in construction projects’ development and execution procedures (WEF, 
2013). 
Infrastructure projects tend to be large and high in value, and each project is unique, 
with costs usually hard to benchmark based on comparisons with other projects. This 
makes it easier to hide large bribes. Each project involves a large number of 
organisations, including contractors and subcontractors, consultants carrying out 
feasibility studies, environmental impact assessments and designs, governmental 
departments and officials approving the projects and issuing the necessary permits, 
and supervising engineers certifying the quality of work. Each contract, approval or 
certification process can be affected by corruption. The number of project phases and 
the complexity of systems involved make it difficult to establish systems of oversight 
to prevent corruption. 
1.3 Aims of this thesis 
As discussed above, corruption in infrastructure projects can have damaging 
consequences, ranging from negative economic impacts, to safety risks for the 
population. The high-level incentives for infrastructure companies to engage in 
corruption are perhaps intuitive: to gain projects in an unpredictable and high-stakes 
sector, and to increase profits from these projects. The motivations underpinning the 
choices of public officials in this context are less clear-cut. For example, it is not clear 
whether officials awarding projects to the less competent companies in exchange for 
bribes take into account the potential repercussions of their actions.  
Similarly, little information is available in the public domain about how corrupt 
agreements are established. One reason for this is the clandestine nature of 
corruption. The problem is compounded in the context of infrastructure projects by the 
particular lack of transparency in the sector (WEF, 2013).   
Developing a better general understanding of how decisions leading to corrupt 
agreements are made can help for the development of new methods of corruption 
prevention. For example, knowing how individuals connect and negotiate a bribe can 
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help in the detection of corruption. Corruption as a phenomenon has a few 
characteristics that are most commonly recognised and associated with the term. For 
example, bribes, corrupt officials and companies looking to cut expenditure through 
reduced quality of materials are a few of the characteristics that come to mind in 
association with the above examples. The first aim of this thesis is to develop a broad 
concept of corruption within which different factors and characteristics commonly 
associated with corruption are gathered and linked. The purpose is to provide a 
broader view of what corruption means and how individuals make decisions leading 
to corruption. 
Of course, the choices of individuals and the way the corrupt operate can be context-
specific. It is, therefore, important to bear in mind the setting to understand how 
specific circumstances frame corrupt agreements, and what additional factors are 
crucial in such environments. The second aim of this thesis, therefore, is to use the 
developed broad concept of corruption in application to the infrastructure sector.  
It is prudent to establish at the outset what is meant by infrastructure in this thesis, 
and what specific activities are focused on. There is no single definition of 
infrastructure that encompasses all uses of the term (Buhr, 2003). For example, the 
UK’s National Infrastructure Commission sets out sectors of economic infrastructure 
as energy, transport, water and wastewater, waste, flood risk management and digital 
communications (HM Treasury, 2017). According to Nijkamp (2000), infrastructure 
can mean either material public capital such as roads, bridges and energy grids, or 
immaterial public capital such as culture, education and communications. It can also 
include data, as well as different types of facilities (material, institutional and personal) 
available to economic agents (Jochimsen, 1966).  
In this thesis, the term infrastructure is used in the narrow meaning of material or 
capital goods. Specifically, infrastructure projects in this thesis mean the delivery or 
construction of the capital goods that enable or support services, in the way that rail 
tracks and tunnels support transportation services, telephone exchanges support 




The reason behind the choice for the narrow meaning of infrastructure is to bring the 
focus on the specific activities related to large construction projects thought to be 
particularly vulnerable to corruption (Transparency International, 2011, The Chartered 
Institute of Building, 2013). This meaning of infrastructure is also compatible with the 
Institution of Civil Engineers' definition, namely “the physical assets underpinning the 
UK’s networks for transport, energy generation and distribution, electronic 
communications, solid waste management, water distribution and waste water 
treatment” (Rhodes, 2015).  
Infrastructure projects delivering such physical assets often take several years to 
complete, and involve multiple phases, including preparation and planning, financing, 
tendering and construction, followed by operation and maintenance. Each of these 
phases can be affected by corruption in a different way. The use of inferior materials 
and methods at the point of construction can be accompanied by payoffs to the 
supervising and certifying engineers to approve the work. At the earlier phases of the 
project, a company intending to bid for it would be interested in the project’s initiation 
and could stand to gain if the project is allocated a larger budget. Therefore, the 
company may attempt to use corrupt methods to achieve these objectives. The way 
corruption manifests itself can be very different in each of the above scenarios, and 
the individuals and the level of decision-making involved would vary. Therefore, in 
developing a broad concept for the study of corruption, bearing in mind a specific type 
of activity it is developed for would help in focusing the purpose of the work.  
Corruption during the earlier phases of an infrastructure project may lead to corruption 
later in the project cycle (Wells, 2015). For example, a company may look to recoup 
the amounts spent in bribes through reduced quality of materials, followed by payoffs 
to the certifying engineers. On the other hand, if a company engages in corruption 
before being awarded the contract, it can become even more crucial for this company 
to win the contract. Otherwise, the earlier expenditure in bribes is not justified. 
Corruption at the tendering phase of infrastructure projects, therefore, can explain 
corruption in earlier or later phases. During the tendering phase, a company might 
also engage in corruption for a number of reasons. It might attempt to manipulate the 
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tender processes in its favour, to gain access to the information contained in another 
company’s bid, or to pass the pre-qualification criteria (GIACC, 2008).  
Therefore, the bidding or tendering phase of an infrastructure project is a particularly 
crucial stage for infrastructure delivery companies. As noted above, winning a contract 
can determine the company’s viability in an uncertain market with infrequent and 
irregular project initiations. Corruption at earlier and later phases can also be the result 
of, or the reason for corruption at the tendering phase. Therefore, the tendering phase 
of infrastructure projects will be the focus in this thesis. 
1.4 Summary and structure of the thesis 
To summarise, the overall aims of this thesis are to develop a broad concept of what 
corruption means and how individuals make decisions leading to corruption, and to 
apply this concept to the tendering phase of infrastructure projects, to offer insights 
into potential methods of corruption reduction in this sector.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis reviews past literature on the topic of corruption, with the focus 
on the definitions, types, theories and models of corruption, and the proposed 
methods of corruption reduction. Based on this review, Chapter 3 then refines the 
overall aims of this thesis and sets out the research questions and the methods used 
to tackle them.  
Chapter 4 explains the key method used in this thesis and develops a broad general 
concept of corruption, incorporating the different factors and characteristics of 
corruption identified in past literature in Chapter 2, and links these factors together. 
Based on this general concept, two models are developed, to analyse decision-
making processes of bribe-givers (Chapter 5) and bribe-takers (Chapter 6).  
Case studies of corruption in infrastructure projects are developed in Chapter 7 based 
on the documents filed in support of prosecutions under the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977. This chapter also applies the general concept developed in 
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Chapter 4 to these specific cases of corruption. Several proposals for corruption 
reduction in the tendering phases of infrastructure projects are then offered. 




2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Various measures to reduce corruption have been offered by anti-corruption scholars 
and practitioners: increased sanctions against corrupt individuals or organisations; 
improved accountability in public spending; decentralisation and privatisation, to name 
a few. The proposed packages of anti-corruption measures depend on what the root 
causes of the problem are theorised to be. These theorised causes range from 
complicated bureaucracies with inefficient institutions, to certain societal cultural 
backgrounds, to simple greed and opportunism. 
What is sometimes overlooked is that corruption takes many different forms, each with 
its own causes (De Graaf, 2007, Ashforth et al., 2008, Hodgson and Jiang, 2007, 
Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009). Corruption-reducing solutions, therefore, need to be 
developed based on the type of corruption under consideration, and need to address 
the causes underlying this precise type. For example, if corrupt behaviour is sporadic, 
caused by individual characteristics such as greed, it is logical to battle corruption at 
micro level, dealing with individual instances of corruption through the system of 
monitoring and punishment. If, on the other hand, corrupt behaviour is thought to be 
the product of the environment, stemming from the organisational or societal culture, 
norms or values, solutions that tackle individual behaviour would only deal with the 
outcomes, leaving the actual causes intact. Examples of measures that may be more 
appropriate in this case are establishment of organisational controls, training, and 
awareness campaigns.  
It is, therefore, necessary to first assess the type of corruption being tackled, and 
ascertain whether corruption is unorganised and opportunistic, or whether there are 
deeper causes and complex structures guiding individual behaviour. Similarly, 
reforming entire organisations or systems that are not corrupt overall is unnecessary 
if corruption originates in a small group of individuals, who identified and took 
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advantage of opportunities for self-enrichment, without spreading the culture of 
corruption through the system.  
This chapter provides an overview of literature on the topic of corruption. First, it 
discusses what is understood by the term ‘corruption’ (Section 2.2) by reviewing its 
definitions (Section 2.2.1) and the commonly identified types and manifestations 
(Section 2.2.2). Second, it sets out and categorises theories and models of corruption 
(Section 2.3) according to the level of analysis used: macro-, micro- or meso-level. 
Third, measures of corruption reduction that follow from these theories and models 
are evaluated (Section 2.4), and Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 What is corruption? 
2.2.1 Corruption definitions 
Publications on the topic of corruption often start with providing a definition of 
corruption. Literature containing critiques of definitions has burgeoned in the past 20 
years, yet a single definition has not been agreed upon. Although corruption can also 
be thought of as a state and a process (Ashforth et al., 2008), the focus here is on 
what is understood by corruption as actions or behaviour. The definitions discussed 
in this section are numbered and listed in Appendix A. 
One of the most widely-cited definitions is “the abuse of public office for private gain” 
[1] (World Bank, 1997). Hodgson and Jiang (2007), Thompson (2013) and Begovic 
(2005), among others, have set out three main contentions with this definition. First, it 
confines the setting to public office, whereas corruption can occur in the private sector 
without the involvement of public officials (Hodgson and Jiang, 2007). Indeed, through 
the process of privatisation and development of public-private partnerships, the 
distinction between the public and the private spheres has blurred, with some 
responsibilities delegated by public institutions to private companies (Kurer, 2005). 
Accordingly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
extends the setting to both public and private offices [5] (OECD, 2008). Transparency 
International addresses this issue by focusing on the abuse of “entrusted power” [2] 
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(Transparency International, 2009) rather than narrowing the scope to any specific 
setting or sphere.  
The second contention with definition [1] above is that it defines corruption as being 
driven by private gains. Gains from corruption, however, are not only diverted to 
private individuals, but can manifest themselves as benefits for entire organisations, 
including political parties (Thompson, 2013). The Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (Norad) shifts the emphasis from who gains, to how these gains are 
obtained, referring to “illicit gain” [3] (Disch et al., 2009). Likewise, the definition used 
by Bicchieri and Duffy (1997) centres around breaches of legal norms of behaviour, 
conceptualising corruption as “the illegitimate use of public roles and resources for 
private benefit, where ‘private’ often refers to large groups such as political parties” 
[8]. 
Third, the term “abuse” in definition [1] is broad and can include other misconduct, 
such as embezzlement that may not be commonly understood as corruption (Begovic, 
2005). To identify the types of abuse that constitute corruption, the scope can be 
narrowed to acts violating the law. However, due to differences in legislations across 
countries, what is considered corrupt under one legal system, can be a legitimate 
practice under another, even if it is harmful to public interests (Gardiner, 2007). For 
example, until recently, payments to foreign officials in some countries were 
considered tax-deductible commissions (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). OECD reviewed 
its member countries’ legislations on tax treatment of bribe payments as recently as 
2011 (OECD, 2011b). Political donations by industries are sometimes thought to 
create conflict of interest for politicians who are entrusted to uphold public interests. 
Despite these concerns, donations continue to be legal means of financing political 
campaigns, albeit there are suggestions of strengthening regulations of political 
donation systems (Thompson, 2004). 
To some anti-corruption researchers and practitioners, corruption “is not at bottom 
simply a matter of law; rather it is fundamentally a matter of morality” [17] (Miller, 
2005). Definitions such as “despoiling of the moral character of a role occupant” [18] 
(Miller, 2014) and “breaches of legal, moral, or social norms” [19] (Misangyi et al., 
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2008) are subjective, relying on public opinion to identify what is to be considered 
immoral. Hence, what is corrupt under such definitions varies across cultures and time 
(Kurer, 2005). Indeed, the rules of institutions may themselves be immoral, but actions 
of breaking these rules could still constitute corruption. One such example is the 
special case of ‘noble cause’ corruption where, for instance, an individual bribes a 
Nazi prison guard to release a prisoner (Hodgson and Jiang, 2007). 
Definitions set out with a view to specify a set of actions that fall under the term 
corruption focus on the type of behaviour expected from individuals occupying the 
roles of responsibility, and the motivations for transgressions. For example:   
“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private-regarding influence.” [9] (Nye, 1967, p.419) 
Other writers, recognising that rules or duties may not always be clearly set out, 
creating ambiguity leading to corruption, refer to principles guiding individual 
behaviour, such as the impartiality principle and non-discrimination norms (Kurer, 
2005). According to such principles, an individual’s decision-making processes should 
comply with the expectations of neutrality, and resist “the wilful subversion (or 
attempted subversion) of a due decision-making process with regard to the allocation 
of any benefit” [11] (Sole, 2005).  Similarly, the arm’s-length principle, requiring “that 
personal or other relationships should play no part in the economic decisions that 
involve more than one party” (Begovic, 2005, Tanzi, 1996), is at the core of the 
concept of corruption defined as “the intentional non-compliance with the arm’s-length 
principle aimed at deriving some advantage for oneself or for related individuals from 
this behaviour” [12] (Tanzi, 1996).  
All of the above definitions focus on individuals who abuse their powers and, as 
touched upon in definition [12], provide some unfair advantages to others. However, 
to fully understand corruption, it is necessary to consider both supply and demand 
sides of it (Tanzi, 1998b). Yet, most corruption definitions largely ignore those 
benefiting from such unfair advantages, who provide incentives to officials in the form 
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of bribes. Perhaps because of this focus on the bribe-takers, enforcement actions tend 
to be tougher on the bribe-takers than the bribe-givers. Nell (2007) shows that some 
countries’ penal codes provide leniency clauses, offering exemption from punishment 
for those parties involved in corruption who come forward and self-report to the 
authorities prior to the official investigation. In an analysis of legal statutes of 56 
countries, Nell found 26 that contained such leniency clauses for bribe-givers, but only 
three countries provided leniency for bribe-taking officials.  
Every definition creates its own contentions and there is no single definition that fits 
all corruption cases. The next section turns to the types and manifestations of 
corruption to illustrate the many forms it takes.  
2.2.2 Types and manifestations of corruption 
This section discusses the phenomenon of corruption by reviewing the commonly 
identified types and manifestations of corruption. Corruption occurrences differ across 
settings, and, as noted in Section 2.2.1, can occur in both private and public sectors. 
It varies in objectives it fulfils; the types of gains attained though corruption; in how 
benefits are allocated or shared; and the level of organisation and incidence.  
In the public sector, two types of corruption are identified. The first is high-level political 
or grand corruption, occurring at top levels of the public sector. In this case, a bribe-
giver attempts to influence policy formation in such a way that it provides an advantage 
to them or their industry. One example of this type of corruption is state capture 
(Hellman et al., 2003) where firms influence policy on issues such as access to 
resources and labour. A related but distinct example is regulatory capture (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1991), concerned with industry or natural monopoly regulations. The second 
type of corruption in the public sector is lower-level bureaucratic or petty corruption, 
where the issue at stake is the implementation of regulations or policies. The value of 
advantages that can be provided at this level, and the potential harm caused to 
society, are thought to be lower than with political corruption (Kenny, 2006). Using 
their discretionary powers over policy interpretation, a bureaucrat can sell benefits by 
acts of omission (e.g. allowing embezzlement from public or project funds to go 
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unnoticed), or commission (e.g. providing driving licences to candidates who did not 
pass the test).  
One of the purportedly redeeming features of corruption is concerned with the type of 
corruption known as facilitation payments that “smoothen the process of transaction” 
(Mandal and Marjit, 2010) and correct for the overly cumbersome bureaucratic state 
and bad public policies (Rose-Ackerman and Truex, 2012). This notion was widely 
explored in the mid-20th century and led to the development of literature on efficiency-
enhancing corruption (Leff, 1964, Lui, 1985, Beck and Maher, 1986, Lien, 1986). 
Instead of being a solution to the unnecessary red tape in government processes, 
corruption can be interpreted as its cause. Observing the potential to profit from slow 
processes, bureaucrats can further complicate the system, creating new incentives 
for individuals requiring their services to circumvent the system by paying bribes 
(Banerjee et al., 2012, Aidt, 2009).  
These perverse incentives to complicate the system can spread to higher levels of 
government. By designing inefficient institutions, politicians can provide opportunities 
for bureaucrats to collect economic rents, who in turn share the proceeds with higher 
echelons of government. Thus, individual unconnected sporadic instances of 
corruption can be replaced by systemic corruption with organised sales of influence 
over decision-making processes (Kaufmann, 1998). In such cases, corruption 
becomes the norm, and the proceeds from corruption are shared among officials in all 
levels of government.  
The sales of advantages in individual corruption cases are thought to be motivated by 
personal gain, whereas institutionalised corruption can benefit the institution itself 
(Thompson, 2013). An example of institutional corruption is found in the political 
sphere, where policies benefitting particular interest groups are sold in return for 
political donations, which in turn finance election campaigns, helping the party to 
obtain or retain government office. Corrupt decisions in such cases often become 
centralised, with each member of the institution following the leading position, such as 
voting on legislative issues as dictated by corrupt payments made to the central 
institutional fund. Individuals systematically providing corrupt services in exchange for 
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promoting interests of their institution can indirectly benefit from enhanced institutional 
ability to meet certain objectives, but at the cost of institutional legitimacy (Thompson, 
2013). Ultimately, the ability of institutions to fulfil their purposes can be undermined. 
This is the case with organisational corruption, which is understood as violation of 
organisational rules which were laid down to enable the organisation to meet its goals 
(Hodgson and Jiang, 2007).  
When corruption becomes systemic, it often relies on complex networks that underpin 
its existence and supports its survival. Whereas unorganised ‘market’ corruption is 
based on demand and supply of advantages and favours (Cartier–Bresson, 1997), 
long-standing large-scale systemic corruption relies on power networks to organise 
exchanges (Carvajal, 1999). Corrupt networks can be based on social networks, such 
as social clubs that foster trust and cooperation (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009). 
Where corruption is organised through networks, exchanges become more 
predictable and corrupt relationships more stable because opportunism (i.e. promising 
an advantage, but not delivering after receiving a bribe) is more difficult. Members of 
a corrupt network can monitor each other’s behaviour and sanction opportunists by 
exclusion from both the corrupt network exchanges, and the social network. Because 
of the reliability corrupt networks offer, the timing and the nature of corrupt reciprocity 
may not be specified, creating a “futures market of favours and privileged information” 
(Cartier–Bresson, 1997).   
Systemic corruption can lead to a contagion spreading through the entire public sector 
and beyond, into other spheres of society. The phenomenon of ‘revolving doors’ 
between the public and the private sectors refers to movements of individuals between 
the public-sector roles, and positions in private companies. Although, by itself, the 
transfer between roles does not necessarily involve corruption, it can present a conflict 
of interest for individuals and impact on how they understand their roles (Wilks-Heeg, 
2015). Additionally, a promise of a future lucrative position on the board of directors is 
one of the corrupt incentives that can be used to motivate public officials to look after 
the interests of the company or the industry. For this reason, transfers from public to 
private-sector jobs are often monitored by organisations such as the UK Advisory 
Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA).  
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There are many types of benefits that can be exchanged in corrupt agreements. 
Besides the most commonly recognised incentive of a monetary bribe, other financial 
offers can be made, such as guaranteeing a loan, or selling goods at below-market 
price (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009). A corrupt agreement can also take the form of 
a barter – an exchange of goods or services (Cartier–Bresson, 1997). In fact any kind 
of resource can be offered, including information, power, or loyalty (Carvajal, 1999).    
The institution an agent belongs to, and the position they occupy, dictate the powers 
they are entrusted with, and the potential advantages they could offer for sale. In many 
cases, the distinction between private-sector and public-sector corruption blurs or 
even becomes irrelevant. For example, where a company is partially or fully privatised, 
the powers of its employees to provide preferential treatment to certain clients remain 
the same. A governmental organisation may delegate some functions, such as 
overseeing the project bidding procedures, to a private company. If a bidding company 
bribes the company responsible for the bidding process, the content of the corrupt act 
remains the same as if the governmental organisation itself carried out this function. 
However, corrupt exchanges between private companies without involvement of 
public officials attract less focus because it is thought that the private sector is better 
able to look after its own interests, and the impact of corruption entirely in the private 
sphere is sometimes thought to be less damaging to society (Argandoña, 2003). As 
examples above illustrate, the damage of private-to-private corruption can be identical 
to private-to-public corruption, but legal suits are less likely to be brought, and are less 
likely to be successful (Argandoña, 2003). Additionally, a fall in public-sector 
corruption may mean an increase in private-sector corruption (Rose-Ackerman and 
Truex, 2012) that can be attributed to factors such as revolving doors, privatisation 
and delegation of roles to private-sector companies.  
Public attitudes to corruption vary depending on its manifestations. If an official 
initiates a corrupt transaction and extorts a bribe, they are likely to be judged more 
harshly than if they accept a bribe where the other party was the initiator (De Graaf, 
2007). Officials are judged more severely the greater is the amount of the accepted 
bribe, and corrupt officials are treated more leniently if they are appointed rather than 
if they are elected (Malec, 1993). Corruption occurrences can be categorised as black, 
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grey or white (Heidenheimer, 1970) according to the extent to which public opinion 
would condemn them (Gardiner, 2007). The attitudes towards corruption, and how 
each action is classified depend on the political culture (Collier, 2002). For example, 
nepotism and patronage can be classed as white corruption in collectivist societies, 
and such behaviour is unlikely to attract strong calls for punishment. In an 
individualistic culture, the same actions would be considered grey corruption and 
some people would call for disciplinary action. Yet in egalitarian societies nepotism 
and patronage would most likely evoke popular disapproval, and would be considered 
black corruption. 
Corruption occurrences differ across institutions, individuals’ positions, and the types 
of advantages traded. It can affect policy formation or implementation, depending on 
the level of government influenced by corruption. Where an individual has power over 
recruitment and promotion, it can take forms of nepotism and cronyism, allowing them 
to buy loyalties and allow their other transgressions such as embezzlement to go 
unreported.  
Embezzlement from project funds and collusion between firms in bidding processes 
are sometimes understood as forms of corruption (Sohail and Cavill, 2008), and 
literature on embezzlement is included in the sections that follow. In this thesis, 
however, corruption is interpreted as an exchange of some types of benefits between 
agents. This can include reciprocal exchanges which are not time-bound (i.e. “futures 
markets of favours and privileged information” (Cartier–Bresson, 1997)), with the 
benefits including power, loyalty and information (Carvajal, 1999). Therefore, 
embezzlement and collusion are breaches of organisational and institutional rules, but 
are not corruption in this sense, as exchanges of benefits between agents would not 
usually take place1. However, forms of nepotism and cronyism described above, as 
well as cases of bribery such as payments or other benefits given to monitoring agents 
                                            
1 Collusion could be better described as individuals or companies agreeing to coordinate their actions 




as incentives to overlook other transgressions fall under the interpretation of 
corruption adopted for this thesis.  
The nature of incentives used varies with the level of organisation of corruption. The 
most basic form of an incentive used in sporadic decentralised corruption is a financial 
reward, or bribery. For more organised social exchanges of favours, a corrupt network 
is required, and such exchanges are based on higher levels of trust. It has been 
suggested in past literature that, unlike corrupt social exchange networks, economic 
exchange corruption involved in market corruption is characterised by lack of “rules of 
the game” (Cartier–Bresson, 1997). There is certainly a lower level of organisation, 
but every corrupt agreement has its own identifiable steps and rules of negotiation 
(Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009).  
Finally, the benefitting parties are not necessarily the agents directly involved in setting 
up a corrupt agreement. They certainly derive some benefit from it, but the motivation 
for actions may be the promotion of institutional or organisational interests.  
To summarise, this section reviewed literature on the definitions and types of 
corruption, illustrating the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon. The lack of 
agreement between scholars on a definition of corruption means that there is no 
consensus around the kinds of behaviour that come under the term ‘corruption’. The 
first narrowing down of the meaning of corruption in this thesis has been made in this 
section to the types of corrupt behaviours involving an exchange between agents. 
Chapter 4 develops this further and looks in more detail at the types of agents, 
exchanges and benefits present in such types of corruption. 
The next two sections review theories of corruption causes, and the proposed 




2.3 Theories and models of corruption 
2.3.1 Overview 
This section reviews key strands of literature examining causes of corruption. 
Understanding the root causes is necessary for developing methods of corruption 
prevention, and these will be reviewed and evaluated in Section 2.4. Each academic 
discipline offers its own view on what the causes are, and what mechanisms lead to 
corrupt behaviour. The categorisation of theories in this section and their associated 
recommended anti-corruption policies follows the works of De Graaf (2007), where 
the focus is on public-sector corruption causes, and Ashforth et al. (2008), where the 
analysis is provided for the private-sector counterparts. Theories and models from 
different disciplines are reviewed and arranged according to the classifications offered 
in these two papers. Analyses and models often do not fit neatly under one 
classification. However, every effort has been made to make clear distinctions 
between the different causes, and illustrate a broad range of mechanisms leading to 
corruption.  
Broadly, there are three levels of analysis: micro, meso and macro (De Graaf, 2007). 
Micro-level analyses often consider corruption to be a problem of a few bad apples 
existing in otherwise non-corrupt environments. Rational choice and ‘bad apples’ 
theories provide explanations for corrupt behaviour at the micro level, focusing on 
individuals, their characteristics and decision-making processes. Organisational 
culture theories belong to meso level, analysing organisational or group factors that 
affect or pre-determine individual behaviour. Macro-level theories explore societal 
variables that produce corrupt behaviour, either by directly influencing individuals and 
their actions (clashing moral values theories), or acting via organisational structures 
by creating emphasis on performance, combined with weakened concern for ethical 
standards (the ethos of public administration theories). Figure 1 on page 32 represents 
diagrammatically the causal links between macro-, meso- and micro-level factors that 
are theorised to bring about corrupt behaviour. The figure was developed based on 




The level of analysis chosen for modelling and analysing corruption is largely 
determined by the types of tools available within disciplines. As such, in economics, 
corruption is mainly modelled at either the level of individuals, or at macroeconomic 
level. Through applications of rational choice theory (Coleman and Fararo, 1992) and 
game theory (Osborne, 1994), corrupt behaviour is represented as emerging through 
individuals making rational choices over available actions. Macro-level causes of 
corruption, on the other hand, are analysed using econometric techniques, such as 
cross-country regression analyses (Park, 2003, Seldadyo and De Haan, 2005), to 
observe what factors correlate with high levels of perceived corruption. Unlike other 
theories reviewed in this section, ‘correlation theories’, to use De Graaf (2007) 
terminology, often do not offer hypotheses of the underlying causal links between the 
different factors and corruption. Therefore, these may not be thought of as theories in 
the same way as the other ones reviewed in this section. Nonetheless, for consistency 
with the review in De Graaf (2007), and because this strand of literature using 
regression analysis offers several often-cited anti-corruption policy recommendations, 
it is included in this and the following sections. 
There is a lack of economic analysis exploring organisational determinants of 
corruption. Sociology, on the other hand, is better-equipped than economics to 
analyse how organisational culture, norms and values bring about individual 
behaviour. Thus, studies analysing organisation-level causes of corruption mostly 
come from sociology, yet this area remains underexplored (Pinto et al., 2008). 
Additionally, psychology provides insights into environmental causes leading to 
psychological processes that, in turn, bring about individual behaviour (Chugh, 2012); 
and political science contributes to the understanding of macro-level factors such as 
economic inequality (Uslaner, 2010). Table 1 lists the theories and models reviewed 




Table 1 Theories and models reviewed in Section 2.3 
Level Theory types Examples 
Macro/ 
Societal 
Correlation theories (Seldadyo and De Haan, 2005) 
(Judge et al., 2011) 
Clashing moral values (Licht et al., 2007) 




(Lui, 1985, Kleinrock, 1967) 
Bidding models 









(Cadot, 1987, Rasmusen and 
Ramseyer, 1994, Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar, 2013) 
Principal-agent models 
(Groenendijk, 1997, Aidt, 2003, Lui, 
1986) 
Corruption as transactions 











Figure 1 Summary of corruption mechanisms and recommendations for corruption reduction across different 
types of theories 
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2.3.2 Theories and models based on correlation analyses 
The first strand of literature reviewed in this section looks for causes of 
corruption predominantly at macro level. However, correlation analyses can 
also be used to understand how variables at different levels – macro, meso and 
micro – correlate with corruption.  
In economics, regression analyses studying corruption are most frequently 
carried out with macro-level cross-country data. The causal links are not always 
identified, and the recommendations for corruption reduction are often not 
clearly set out (De Graaf, 2007). However, this literature provides an insight 
into factors that may facilitate corruption, or at least provides sets of conditions 
in which corruption flourishes.  
Macro-economic analyses can help understand economic, political, institutional 
and cultural environments in which corruption thrives (Seldadyo and De Haan, 
2005, Judge et al., 2011, DfID, 2015, Park, 2003). Among economic variables, 
income, usually measured by GDP per capita, is most often shown to be 
negatively correlated with corruption (Seldadyo and De Haan, 2005). One of 
the explanations provided for this relationship is that poverty creates incentives 
to give and receive bribes (Judge et al., 2011). Income distribution also matters, 
and higher inequality is associated with higher corruption levels. However, 
inequality is also identified as one of the outcomes rather than causes of 
corruption (Tanzi, 1998b, Mandal and Marjit, 2010). Studies focusing on 
country development generally suggest that corruption is a poor-country 
problem, and its alleviation relies on economic development. 
Another economic variable negatively correlated with corruption is international 
competition (Judge et al., 2011). The proposed solution to corruption, then, is 
to foster competition (Emerson, 2006, Ades and Di Tella, 1999). The intuition 
behind this argument is that competition reduces excess profits from which 
bribes can be paid (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997).  
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Political factors such as democracy, political accountability and civil liberties 
are also associated with lower levels of corruption (Seldadyo and De Haan, 
2005). Thus, corruption reduction measures proposed are fostering economic 
and social freedoms, decentralisation, deregulation and increased 
accountability (Park, 2003).   
Among bureaucratic and regulatory variables, the rule of law, an independent 
judiciary and the quality of the bureaucracy negatively correlate with corruption 
(Seldadyo and De Haan, 2005). Socio-political stability is identified as an 
important factor (Park, 2003). In settings characterised by high ethnic 
heterogeneity, corruption is more prevalent.  
Regression analyses provide an insight into factors associated with high 
corruption. Drawing conclusions about the directions of causality, however, is 
difficult, especially because corruption perception indexes used are weak 
proxies for the actual extent of corruption (Kenny, 2006, Olken, 2009). 
Recommendations for methods of mitigating corruption risks based on 
observed correlations, without understanding the mechanisms of corruption, 
risk misleading policy makers and creating new incentives and opportunities 
for corruption (Boehm, 2009).  
2.3.3 Macro-level theories and models 
The “clashing moral values” type of theories proposes a direct link between 
macro-level societal factors such as values and norms, and individual norm 
internalisation, leading to corrupt behaviour. Individuals occupy a number of 
roles within society, each carrying certain obligations and responsibilities. A 
conflict can arise when expectations and norms associated with one role clash 
with those of another role. Recommendations for corruption reduction in this 
case include establishment of codes of conduct and ethical training in the public 
sector, eradication of patronage systems and instilling merit-based principles 
(De Graaf, 2007). 
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An example of clashing moral values can be found in the expectations placed 
on public officials. On the one hand, an official is expected to fulfil their role as 
a civil servant with impartiality and applying the arm’s-length principle in their 
decisions (see Section 2.2.1). On the other hand, there are cultural 
expectations placed on them related to upholding the interests of their 
community. Thus, the legal or civil-service norms can conflict with the widely-
accepted social norms. In such cases, even if some practices are illegal, they 
may not be considered a wrongdoing by certain social groups if these practices 
are socially acceptable and economically beneficial (Rose-Ackerman, 2010a). 
For example, in cultures where community ties tend to be strong, such as in 
India, there is social pressure to promote the interests of the community. The 
arm’s-length principle applied in such an environment might be seen as an alien 
concept – it would mean taking the interests of the wider society of strangers 
over the wellbeing of the tightly-knit close relations. The stronger and closer the 
social relationships, the greater the potential for social pressure-induced 
corruption, and the harder it is to identify and punish such corruption (Tanzi, 
1996).  
Data analyses indeed show that cultural values have an impact on the 
prevalence of corruption. Licht et al. (2007) adopt insights from psychology to 
carry out a regression analysis testing for the impact of cultural embeddedness, 
as proxied by linguistic attributes, on corruption. They find that cultures 
promoting individual autonomy are correlated with higher levels of law 
abidingness and lower levels of corruption. Conversely, higher levels of cultural 
embeddedness and stronger community relations are associated with higher 
corruption levels.  
The “ethos of public administration” theories consider mechanisms through 
which causes of corruption at macro level permeate through the level of 
organisations and affect individuals. One such root cause is the societal 
pressure for efficiency and performance, with simultaneous disregard for 
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integrity and ethics (De Graaf, 2007). Despite the emphasis on public 
administration made by De Graaf (2007), this strand of theories is relevant both 
for public and private-sector corruption, where competitive pressures can, in 
some circumstances, support tolerance of corruption. Methods of reducing 
corruption, then, are awareness campaigns, drawing attention to the negative 
consequences of corruption (De Graaf, 2007). 
Libertarian thinkers find causes of corruption in the failures and inefficiencies 
of the state. According to this literature, corruption is a second-best solution for 
improved efficiency achieved through circumventing the cumbersome 
governmental red tape and bad policies (Rose-Ackerman, 2010a, Rose-
Ackerman and Truex, 2012). The first-best solution in this view is reduction in 
governmental interventions and liberalisation, allowing the self-correcting 
market pressures to reduce deadweight (Tanzi, 1998b).  
In the presence of weak institutions, corruption is sometimes thought of as a 
method of problem solving (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). In order to design 
methods for corruption reduction, it is prudent to take into consideration the 
types of functions corruption may be fulfilling, and find alternative methods of 
achieving the goals. Where the economic environment is characterised by 
government-imposed rigidities, investment may be undermined, leading to low 
economic growth. Corruption, then, is seen as enabling investors and 
companies to cut through the red tape and grease the bureaucratic processes, 
improving efficiency (Leff, 1964, Huntington, 2006).  
The most prevalent efficiency-enhancing models of corruption are represented 
as queuing and bidding models. Although these models may fit better with the 
micro-level models discussed in Section 2.3.4, the root causes and proposed 
solutions of queuing and bidding models are akin to those offered by libertarian 
thinkers discussed above – smaller state combined with allowing markets to 
reduce deadweight. Queuing models show how bribing an official who is 
distributing some economic good can increase efficiency by reducing waiting 
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time costs (Lui, 1985, Kleinrock, 1967). Corruption in this case can be efficient 
in the sense that it saves time for those whose time has the greatest value, and 
in some circumstances can improve the allocation of resources (Lui, 1985). 
Bidding models show that the most efficient firms that expect to achieve the 
highest profits from projects are prepared to pay the highest bribes. It is argued 
that bribes, then, promote efficiency by helping to allocate the projects to the 
most efficient firms based on their willingness to pay (Beck and Maher, 1986, 
Lien, 1986). 
Although efficiency-enhancing models of corruption are not recent, and despite 
the empirical evidence against the notion of corruption as grease for economic 
development (Méon and Sekkat, 2005, Mauro, 1995), it is worth noting them 
for two reasons. Firstly, the models and the ideas behind them are still being 
referred to (Tanzi, 1998b, Aidt, 2003, Aidt, 2009, Marquette and Peiffer, 2015), 
and secondly, evidence for corruption as efficient grease is still being sought 
and found for countries with extremely ineffective institutions (Méon and Weill, 
2010).  
2.3.4 Micro-level theories and models 
At micro level of analysis, the assumption is made that individual characteristics 
give rise to corrupt behaviour. In formal models, individuals are endowed with 
the capacity to make autonomous decisions, which are not pre-determined by 
organisational or environmental factors (although facilitating factors such as the 
existence of corruption opportunities are sometimes included in the analysis 
(Bayar, 2005, Uribe, 2012)). One type of theories at this level of analysis is the 
Public Choice Theory (De Graaf, 2007), according to which behaviour arises 
from rational decision-making processes, with individuals comparing costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action and making optimal choices that 
maximise their utility or income. Policy recommendations from this theory focus 
on increasing costs or reducing benefits of corrupt behaviour. Methods of 
increasing costs include establishing and enforcing legal sanctions for 
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corruption, levying penalties and other punishment of transgressors, 
accompanied by monitoring behaviour through audits. Reducing benefits is 
more difficult. However, as money laundering is often associated with 
corruption (Levi et al., 2007), proceeds of corruption in the form of bribes can 
be confiscated through anti-money laundering enforcement.  
Another type of theories at micro-level is ‘bad apples’ theories. In this view, the 
cause of corrupt behaviour is bad character, predisposition to criminality, or 
lack of moral values of individuals. Corruption reduction methods streaming 
from these theories are identifying and dismissing the bad apples, or instilling 
strong moral values through ethical training (De Graaf, 2007). Alternative 
causes identified in this type of theory are lack of self-control, low cognitive 
moral development or bad ethical choices made by otherwise good individuals 
(Ashforth et al., 2008).  
In psychology, individual corrupt behaviour is shown to arise from the 
processes of learning, reinforcement, desensitisation and habituation to corrupt 
acts, leading to helplessness in the face of widespread corruption, and 
development of self-serving bias that support corrupt behaviour (Chugh, 2012). 
Although environmental and group impacts on individual behaviour are 
considered in psychology, proposed methods of reducing corruption are micro-
level and focused on conditioning individuals via systems of rewards and 
punishments.  
In economics, the most prevalent micro-level models of corruption are 
developed based on principal-agent and rent-seeking theories (Begovic, 2005, 
Jain, 1998a, Jain, 1998c, Cartier–Bresson, 1997, Hopkin, 2002). Rent-seeking 
refers to “directly unproductive activities” (Jain, 1998a) that affect resource 
allocation. For example, a company might attempt to gain monopoly power in 
a region by influencing local officials in charge of operation licences allocation. 
If successful, the company is then able to charge monopoly prices for their 
services, collecting economic rents (returns to factors of production above their 
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economic costs). For this type of rent seeking to be possible, the officials 
require a) monopolistic power over the process of licence allocation; b) 
willingness to misuse this power; and c) the existence of economic incentives 
for them to do so (Jain, 1998c) (e.g. where the company is willing to provide a 
bribe in return for officials preventing entry of other companies into the local 
market). In this basic model, self-interested officials and private-sector agents 
are willing to engage in rent-seeking if benefits outweigh the costs. Rent-
seeking models have been developed to analyse corruption in areas such as 
permit allocation (Cadot, 1987), legislative vote selling (Rasmusen and 
Ramseyer, 1994), and embezzlement (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013).  
Principal-agent models build on rent-seeking models by introducing 
relationships between corrupt agents and their principals, on whose behalf 
agents make decisions. The principal-agent relationship is characterised by 
asymmetries of information. That is, agents may have incentives to abuse their 
power, but principals have no costless way of observing and controlling agents’ 
actions, and this may lead to adverse or undesirable outcomes for the principal 
(Groenendijk, 1997). Principals, however, can a) engage in costly behaviour 
monitoring of their agents, punishing transgressions; b) limit agents’ 
discretionary powers; or c) provide agents with incentives to choose actions 
leading to outcomes favoured by principals (Aidt, 2003, Groenendijk, 1997). In 
the example of licence allocation above, the agents are the bureaucrats in 
charge of allocating licences, and their principals are the politicians delegating 
responsibility for policy implementation (i.e. licence allocation) to the 
bureaucrats. The principals can be represented as benevolent actors, who are 
honest and not corruptible (Aidt, 2003, Lui, 1986). Alternatively, the population 
can represent the principals, electing non-benevolent corruptible politicians 
who are expected to represent the population’s interests and allocate resources 
on their behalf. In this representation of the principal-agent model, both the 
bureaucrats and the politicians may engage in rent-seeking activities 
(Groenendijk, 1997, Begovic, 2005, Jain, 1998c).  
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Principal-agent and rent-seeking models generally focus on the bribe-takers 
(usually, public officials) and their motivations and incentives, leaving the 
incentives of bribe-givers largely unexplored (Tanzi, 1998b, Hodgson and 
Jiang, 2007). The process of corrupt negotiations and associated decision-
making processes are not set out explicitly, and are left as a ‘black box’ 
(Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011). This detail is captured in theories and models 
viewing corruption as a type of transaction, with its own demand and supply of 
favours and transaction costs (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009, Cartier–Bresson, 
1997). Models in this strand of literature represent both the bribe-takers and 
the bribe-givers as utility-maximising agents. The outcomes for individuals vary 
depending on which side initiates corrupt negotiations, and introduction of 
facilitators, such as corruption intermediaries, reduces perceived risks of 
corruption by modifying agents’ beliefs (Bayar, 2005, Bayar, 2009). Social 
networks between agents act as facilitators, and create opportunities for 
corruption, promoting trust between actors (Uribe, 2012). However, the exact 
mechanisms and logical connections between networks, trust, and belief 
formation, and how probabilities of, for example, being denounced are formed, 
have not yet been clearly set out.  
Individual behaviour as represented in the above models mostly falls under the 
Public Choice Theory category. That is, agents’ behaviour is driven by self-
interest, and choices are made to maximise the expected payoff, income, or 
utility, subject to informational asymmetries and risk aversion. Moral costs of 
engaging in corruption are rarely taken into consideration. Where these costs 
are referred to, they are either not formally represented (Bayar, 2005, Situngkir, 
2003), or, if represented, then only as one additional cost parameter in the 
payoff functions, disregarding the content and sources of these costs 
(Groenendijk, 1997). Another method of representing norms against corruption 
common in economic literature is through the individual level of honesty. The 
causes of corruption in such models are similar to those underlying the ‘bad 
apples’ theory: bad character, whatever the source, leads to corrupt behaviour. 
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Formal models represent this through separation of actors into honest or 
dishonest (corrupt) groups. Corrupt agents make decisions solely based on 
maximising own utility, whereas honest groups are assumed to have strong 
moral values that prevent them from engaging in corruption. Decision-making 
processes of honest actors are generally not developed any further. In this 
setup, actors have no knowledge of the types of individuals they are facing, 
and base their decisions on the probability of facing an honest partner (Aidt, 
2003, Uribe, 2012, Bayar, 2005, Bayar, 2009). Alternatively, individuals are 
represented as having a degree of honesty on some scale (Situngkir, 2003, 
Lui, 1986).  
It is recognised that not all individuals are driven solely by monetary 
considerations, and moral value orientations and social norms also guide 
behaviour (Rose-Ackerman, 2010a). In contexts where moral commitment and 
norms of behaviour are important, “rational utilitarian calculations of gains and 
losses are widely regarded as insufficient for deciding behaviour” (Hodgson 
and Jiang, 2007, p. 1051), and actors may be better represented as being rule-
driven, rather than welfare-maximising.  
2.3.5 Meso-level theories and models 
Unlike corruption theories analysing the phenomenon at individual level, 
theories that identify causes of corruption at organisational and societal levels 
do not endow individuals with full control over their decisions and actions. 
Instead, behaviour is seen as the product of influences beyond individual 
control. In organisational culture theories, the culture and structure of 
organisations, and their established corrupt practices and arrangements 
determine corrupt behaviour through affecting individual mental states (De 
Graaf, 2007). Solutions to corruption in this case involve challenging 
organisational culture and instilling ethical practices through training, 
establishment of better systems of reporting and disciplining corrupt behaviour, 
and, where necessary, change of leadership (Ashforth et al., 2008).  
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Pinto et al. (2008) offer and analyse two types of organisational corruption: 
Organisation of Corrupt Individuals (OCI), and Corrupt Organisation (CO). In 
OCI, individuals are the primary beneficiaries of corruption, and often individual 
gain is obtained at the expense of the organisation. Even though individuals do 
not coordinate their actions and this type of corruption resembles micro-level 
examples outlined above, OCI manifests itself in certain organisational 
environments. When the proportion of ‘bad apples’ in an organisation is large, 
the problem is analysed at the organisational level, searching for factors that 
explain how individual corrupt behaviour is facilitated, encouraged or sustained 
within an organisation. CO, on the other hand, is characterised by corrupt 
individuals acting in consort with each other for the benefit of the organisation.  
One of the mechanisms identified in Pinto et al. (2008) that leads to both OCI 
and CO types of corruption is the process of selection, or, in other words, staff 
recruitment. That is, individuals are employed from a societal group 
characterised by low levels of integrity or ethics. Alternatively, a number of 
socialisation mechanisms leading to corrupt behaviour are offered. Corruption 
can spread through social networks, where corrupt behaviour is learnt and 
adopted through interactions with other actors. Cognitive mechanisms include 
normalisation of certain behaviour, and corrupt actions are triggered by cues 
such as reductions in salaries. The type of mechanisms more commonly 
leading to OCI than CO is through emotional triggers. For example, if 
organisational practices are considered unfair towards its employees, or job 
satisfaction levels are low (Carvajal, 1999), emotional responses can give rise 
to individual uncoordinated unethical behaviour and corruption. Social 
psychological mechanisms include social identification with a certain group. In 
the case of OCI, it is the identification with entities outside the organisation that 
triggers corruption, and in the case of CO, it is loyalty to, and association with 
the organisation itself that leads to corrupt actions on behalf of the organisation.  
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2.4 Corruption reduction measures 
2.4.1 Overview 
There are a large number of suggested corruption prevention or reduction 
mechanisms. Evidence for their effectiveness is growing, and comes from 
studies such as macroeconomic analyses, case studies of different 
interventions, surveys, and psychological laboratory experiments. Conclusions 
of different studies sometimes conflict with each other because of the level of 
aggregation of data and information.  
It is important to note that corruption can have different causes, manifestations 
and effects. Understanding the causes and mechanisms leading to corruption 
is necessary to avoid attempting to reduce corruption by treating the 
consequences, rather than the causes of corruption. Additionally, what is 
effective in reducing one type of corruption may not have the same effect on 
another, and a combination of measures should be developed backed by a 
good understanding of the context (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). Indeed, some 
corruption prevention measures can have unintended negative consequences 
such as displacing corruption from the public to the private sector, or causing 
a substitution of one corruption type for another, without reducing the problem.  
This section reviews corruption reduction measures and summarises the 
evidence of their effectiveness. Where possible, mechanisms through which 
different measures can affect corruption are provided, and any unintended 
consequences are explained.  
Anti-corruption measures based on regression analyses are discussed in 
Section 2.4.2. Macro-level solutions based on reducing the size of the state are 
evaluated in Section 2.4.3. Sections 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 cover micro-level solutions. 
Meso-level or organisational control solutions are outlined in Section 2.4.6, and 
Section 2.4.7 summarises the collective action-based recommendations. 
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2.4.2 Anti-corruption measures based on correlations  
As outlined in Section 2.3.2, one of the conclusions of macroeconomic 
analyses is that corruption is a problem of low-income developing countries, or 
countries undergoing transitions towards the market economy (Hellman et al., 
2003). Economic growth, then, is sometimes prescribed as a cure for 
corruption. This view ignores the fact that corruption is not only present in 
developing economies, but is also endemic in some developed countries  
(Bicchieri and Duffy, 1997), including the European Union (Brandt and 
Svendsen, 2013). The direction of causality can run both ways: low levels of 
growth may promote corruption, or corruption may itself be a barrier to 
economic, social and political development and growth (Rose-Ackerman, 2006, 
Sohail and Cavill, 2008). There is a lack of literature explicitly setting out the 
mechanisms through which low levels of growth can cause corruption. One of 
the suggestions is that economic need creates incentives for corruption 
(Carvajal, 1999). In contrast, there is ample literature studying effects of 
corruption on growth. For example, corruption is shown to hamper growth by 
reducing private investment (Mauro, 1995). Additionally, it increases public 
investment, whilst reducing its quality, and diverts finance away from 
maintenance of existing infrastructure, leading to its deterioration (Jain, 1998b). 
Corruption can also lower government revenue and increase budget deficit, 
through reduction in tax collected (Tanzi, 1998a).   
The observation that low corruption is correlated with high competition led to 
the conclusion that increased competition can decrease corruption (Emerson, 
2006, Ades and Di Tella, 1999). The intuition behind this argument is that 
competition reduces excess profits from which bribes can be paid (Bliss and 
Di Tella, 1997). However, Warner (2007) shows how competitive pressures 
increased corruption in the European Union. The basic incentive for companies 
to engage in corruption is profit-seeking. One of the mechanisms to achieve 
higher margins is by reducing competition. Faced with new market entrants, 
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firms are expected to invest in efficiency-enhancing systems to remain 
competitive. This requires time, effort and availability of finance. Corruption 
may be perceived as a cheaper and more attractive short-term method of 
obtaining new projects. Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006) consider 
strategic complementarities between corruption and collusion in tendering 
processes. Their recommendation is for competition authorities and criminal 
courts to coordinate their efforts and tackle corruption and anti-competitive 
practices simultaneously.  
Although socio-political stability can be one of the deterrents of corruption 
(Park, 2003), it is doubtful whether stability and the rule of law can be achieved 
in highly corrupt environments without addressing corruption and its underlying 
causes. Corruption can cause instability and security threats in countries such 
as Afghanistan by disenfranchising the population who suffer the 
consequences of the actions of corrupt officials and companies (Chayes, 
2015).  
2.4.3 Smaller state solutions 
Libertarian thinkers find the root causes of corruption in large inefficient 
governments (see Section 2.3.3), intruding in every aspect of the society and 
the economy (Rose-Ackerman, 2010a). Where economic activities such as 
production and distribution of goods and services are controlled by the state 
rather than being guided by market pressures, inefficiencies occur. Corruption 
is, therefore, viewed by some writers as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism, 
allowing individuals to circumvent the bureaucratic red tape. Regulation is 
thought to be a direct factor promoting corruption, by providing individuals with 
incentives to seek means to avoid facing costs and delays associated with 
regulatory systems (Tanzi, 1998b). Solutions to corruption, then, would involve 
reducing the size of the state and its involvement in economic activities, through 
privatisation, deregulation, and promotion of competition.  
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Corruption’s purported ability to improve efficiency by cutting through the 
governmental red tape that inhibits investment (Huntington, 2006, Leff, 1964) 
and to allocate resources to the most efficient agents (see queuing and bidding 
models in Section 2.3.3) (Beck and Maher, 1986, Lien, 1986, Lui, 1985) are 
considered redeeming features of corruption. Corruption, in this view, can be 
an acceptable practice if it involves speeding up low-level routine bureaucratic 
processes (Sohail and Cavill, 2008). Models and theories based on these ideas 
generally disregard negative externalities of corruption and ignore the 
motivation to design institutions to maximise economic rents. That is, officials 
observing the opportunities for enrichment from corruption can exploit their 
positions to create more red tape, and slow down the processes even further 
(Banerjee et al., 2012). Macroeconomic evidence generally does not support 
the notion that corruption can promote economic development (Méon and 
Sekkat, 2005, Mauro, 1995). However, there are some indications that 
corruption may act as an efficient grease for bureaucratic processes in settings 
with extremely ineffective institutions (Méon and Weill, 2010).  
Definitions of corruption focusing on transgressions in the public sector, such 
as ‘abuse of public office’, ignore private-sector corruption and the roles of 
private agents and institutions. This leads to an implicit conclusion that reducing 
the state, and privatisation in particular, can lead to reduction in corruption 
(Carvajal, 1999). Firstly, the process of privatisation itself can provide officials 
with discretionary powers and lucrative opportunities for rent-seeking (Tanzi, 
1998b, Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Secondly, although privatisation may reduce 
some types of state corruption by diminishing the economic role of the state 
(Hodgson and Jiang, 2007), it may not solve the problem of corruption overall. 
Incentives for corruption in private institutions are the same as in the public-
sector counterparts (Hodgson and Jiang, 2007). Therefore, privatisation may 
not decrease corruption, but shift it, increasing corruption in the private sector 
(Rose-Ackerman and Truex, 2012).  
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Decentralisation may reduce corruption because citizens can monitor local 
officials and hold them to account more easily than their central government 
counterparts (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). However, there is mixed 
evidence on the effectiveness of decentralisation as corruption deterrent, and 
other factors such as systems of accountability and freedom of press contribute 
to the success of this measure (DfID, 2015). Warner (2007) suggests that 
decentralisation increased, rather than reduced, corruption in the EU, by 
increasing demands for local party finance and bolstering the demand for 
bribes. 
Although a review of the regulatory system and elimination of redundant or 
unnecessary regulations can help reduce corruption in some cases (Tanzi, 
1998a), in others, it can shift the problem to another area (DfID, 2015) by 
providing incentives for officials to switch their rent-seeking activities away from 
the reformed processes to the more vulnerable regulations, providing 
opportunities for self-enrichment.  
Deregulation can mean a removal of agencies and systems that serve the 
purpose of promoting public accountability, thereby reducing capabilities to 
control corruption (De Graaf, 2007). Similarly, taking into account the private-
sector pressures to meet bottom-line demands, it is unrealistic to think that 
allowing the private sector to regulate itself by removing or reducing regulatory 
systems can lead to lower levels of corruption (Ashforth et al., 2008). Graeff 
and Mehlkop (2003) study the impact of economic freedom, measured by the 
absence of regulation, and the size of the government on corruption. Their 
macroeconomic analyses suggest that some restrictions of economic freedoms 
provide opportunities for corruption, but laws and regulations that increase 
transaction costs of corruption, such as anti-money laundering statutes, can 
reduce corruption. Additionally, in developed countries, larger, rather than 
smaller, governments are associated with lower levels of corruption. Therefore, 
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what is important is the government’s ability to monitor behaviour and enforce 
laws and regulations rather than the size of the state.  
2.4.4 Principal-agent solutions 
Principal-agent theories discussed in Section 2.3.4 are influential in forming 
anti-corruption policy recommendations (DfID, 2015, Marquette and Peiffer, 
2015, Persson et al., 2013). Such analytical approaches are concerned with 
increasing costs or reducing benefits of corruption for individuals, and, in 
particular, for public officials. Recommendations include limiting the agents’ 
discretionary powers, preventing the monopoly of decision-making, and 
improving accountability (Klitgaard, 1988).  
Some level of delegation and discretion is an important characteristic of agency 
relationships (Groenendijk, 1997, Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009). Agents 
possess information not readily available to their principals, and the latter rely 
on the former to use their judgement in the application of rules. Discretionary 
powers afforded to public officials is identified as one of the necessary 
conditions for corruption to occur (Aidt, 2003, Rose-Ackerman, 1998). 
However, reduction of discretion given to lower-level officials can create a 
complicated rigid bureaucracy, making conduct harder to monitor, thus creating 
more opportunities for corruption (Tanzi, 1996). Additionally, a certain amount 
of autonomy is an important factor in promoting self-control and an intrinsic 
motivation to avoid corruption (Lange, 2008). 
The size of public-sector wages can be one of the factors contributing to the 
problem of corruption, and this is referred to as corruption arising out of need 
as opposed to greed (Tanzi, 1998b). In some cases, officials’ wages are kept 
purposefully low because of the knowledge of corrupt opportunities available 
to officials to supplement their wages, and their illicit earnings can be 150-1100 
times their legal income (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013). Where public officials 
are paid significantly less than their private-sector counterparts, moral costs of 
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corruption are thought to be lower. Using laboratory experiments, Abbink 
(2000) tests the hypothesis that a fair wage can reduce corruption, concluding 
that this would not be an effective method of combating corruption. Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) carry out cross-country regression analyses 
concluding that higher public sector wages can reduce corruption, but the 
increase would have to be large – at least two to eight times the manufacturing 
wages – to have an effect.  
Besides the fairness aspect of public-sector wages, the threat of losing a 
position in the government in the event of being caught can, in theory, reduce 
corruption. In this case, outside options in terms of expected private-sector 
income would play a role in decision-making processes of whether to be 
involved in corruption. Monitoring systems are important in this respect, 
otherwise higher wages act as a bonus, without deterring corruption (Fjeldstad, 
2003).  
Dismissing corrupt officials, as also suggested by the ‘bad apples’ theories, 
may instead lead to higher levels of corruption. For example, in the case of 
Tanzanian taxation officials, a corruption system operated through networks, 
and the dismissed officials were recruited in the private sector, because of their 
knowledge of the taxation system, and because of their government contacts 
that facilitated corruption (Fjeldstad, 2003). 
One of the methods to prevent the formation of corrupt networks is to introduce 
a geographic rotation of civil servants (Tanzi, 1996). However, this can lead to 
unintended consequences. Rotation can increase the influence of corrupt 
intermediaries, who connect the demand and supply sides of corruption 
(Hasker and Okten, 2008). Additionally, a new incentive for corruption is 
created: officials may attempt to influence their allocation, ensuring they are 
placed in the most lucrative areas (Fjeldstad, 2003). 
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Many direct interventions by anti-corruption authorities have not been 
successful overall (DfID, 2015). Persson et al. (2013) suggest that the reason 
such anti-corruption efforts fail is because these policies are based on principal-
agent models with a benevolent principal, which is a mischaracterisation of the 
issue in cases of systemic corruption. If the principal can be assumed to be 
benevolent, designing institutions and systems of monitoring and punishment 
could be effective in reducing corruption (Aidt, 2003). However, political will and 
leadership is necessary for implementation of such anti-corruption policies, and 
the assumption that politicians do not participate in corruption and can provide 
such leadership may not be correct (Hopkin, 2002). In such cases of non-
benevolent principals, institutions are designed in a way that provides 
opportunities for corruption, and any anti-corruption strategy is not 
implemented effectively (Aidt, 2003). Legal frameworks may even be set up to 
protect corruption (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011).  
Establishment of democratic institutions is one of the proposed solutions to 
tackle corruption where politicians are corrupt (Aidt, 2003) (democracy has also 
been shown to correlate with lower levels of corruption - see Section 2.3.2). If 
certain behaviour reduces the chances of re-election, this can steer politicians 
away from practices condemned by the population. For example, in Brazil, 
mayors eligible for re-election have been shown to misappropriate 27% less 
resources than those with no opportunities for re-election (Ferraz and Finan, 
2011). However, the assumption that population has an incentive to punish 
corrupt politicians may also be incorrect (Persson et al., 2013). Where the 
state’s function of providing for the poor and distributing public goods is 
undermined, individuals in positions of power may take on the role of the 
resource distributor through nepotism. Population may also participate in 
corruption by selling their votes. Corruption, then, may be better characterised 
as a collective action problem (further discussed in Section 2.4.7 below). 
Solutions would involve revolutionary changes in institutions and country 
leadership, with the international community playing the role of the benevolent 
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principal helping to establish the necessary anti-corruption controls  (Persson 
et al., 2013). 
2.4.5 Monitoring and punishment  
Increasing costs or reducing benefits of corruption are the main proposed 
solutions offered by micro-level theories and models (see Section 2.3.4). As 
discussed in the previous section, establishing systems of monitoring and 
punishment to prevent corruption requires political will and leadership. Where 
this was successfully achieved, these interventions have been among the more 
successful anti-corruption measures (DfID, 2015, Olken, 2007).   
Monitoring and punishment of corrupt agents, both in the public and the private 
sector is one of the most direct interventions in anti-corruption policy, and an 
increase in penalties is one of the more intuitive solutions to corruption (Tanzi, 
1996). The sizes of fines should be linked to payoffs received through 
corruption to have a deterrent effect. However, as with many other 
interventions, there are potential negative consequences of increased 
penalties. A high fixed penalty and increased monitoring may reduce the 
incidence of corruption, but can increase the size of bribes demanded to 
compensate for the higher risks involved in corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 
2010b). Monitoring and punishment can also have a potential negative effect 
of crowding out intrinsic motivations and undermining incentives to self-monitor 
and behave ethically (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982, Frey and Jegen, 2001). 
Nonetheless, audits can be an effective deterrent. In Indonesian road projects, 
increasing the probability of an audit from 4% to 100% reduced corruption by 
30% (Olken, 2007). In 2015, UK’s Department for International Development 
assessed the evidence on the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures (DfID, 
2015) and found that Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms such as 
strong central budget planning, and improved oversight, monitoring and 
transparency in procurement systems were effective overall.  
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Specific PFM measures varied in their impact on corruption and using a 
combination of methods was more effective than applying any single type of 
intervention by itself. Public expenditure tracking is among the most effective 
PFM measures of reducing corruption. On the other hand, effectiveness of 
PFM’s revenue and customs systems reforms is contested. Political leadership 
and will is an important factor for the success of anti-corruption measures, and 
in countries like Afghanistan PFM measures were not successful.  
When using audits to reduce corruption, it is important to bear in mind the 
potential displacement of corruption and the temporary effects of one-off 
interventions. Because different types of corruption can be substitutes, 
monitoring of one public-service function can reduce corruption in this area, but 
shift it to another (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013). Effects of monitoring on 
corruption are also likely to be short-lived, with corruption levels returning to 
previous levels once the audit process finishes.   
2.4.6 Organisational controls solutions 
Organisational controls solutions stem from the meso-level theories of 
corruption (Section 2.3.5). The main difference between micro-level solutions 
and organisational controls solutions is that the first focus on individuals, 
whereas the second apply changes to organisational structures as a way of 
conditioning individuals. These proposed solutions are not as numerous as 
micro- and macro-level solutions discussed above, and the effectiveness of 
these measures is not well-assessed as evidence and application remain rare. 
Lange (2008) provides a detailed assessment of organisational controls to 
reduce corruption. These controls are administrative, based on formal 
organisational anti-corruption rules and structures; and social or cultural 
controls, affecting beliefs, norms and values of individuals, and creating social 
pressure to conform. The administrative controls set out in Lange (2008) mirror 
and elaborate on those developed in principal-agent theories (limiting 
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discretionary powers, punishments, monitoring, and incentive alignment). What 
measures are implemented in each situation depends on the perceived causes 
of corrupt behaviour, and a combination of controls may need to be 
implemented simultaneously for effective corruption reduction.   
If corruption is thought to arise from unethical behaviour and opportunism, 
autonomy-reducing measures are suggested. This type of measures echoes 
the principal-agent solution of reducing discretionary powers of officials. This 
can be done by bureaucratic controls of establishing formal rules, routines and 
policies within organisations, creating systems of audits, reviews and 
centralised decision-making. Alternatively, mechanisms of social controls can 
be established or promoted, shaping collective understanding of the 
organisational value systems, developing organisational norms of behaviour, 
with collective social monitoring and sanctioning.   
Where corruption is thought to arise from individual responses to anticipated 
consequences of their actions, organisations can establish internal systems of 
rewards and punishments. Punishment systems rely on monitoring to detect 
undesirable behaviour. The incentive alignment method rewards desirable 
behaviour through, for example, linking employee financial compensation to 
company performance. Although this may discourage OCI-type corruption, it 
can create perverse incentives to engage in corruption on behalf of the 
organisation, giving rise to CO-type corruption (Pinto et al., 2008) (see Section 
2.3.5).  
A related but distinct type of controls is environmental sanctioning that 
originates externally from the organisation. In this case, organisations operate 
in a certain social, normative or regulatory environment, and the expectations 
of acceptable organisational behaviour permeate through organisational 
culture and affect individual behaviour.  Legal or regulatory sanctions can be 
directed at individuals or whole organisations. Social sanctions can work 
through reputation-building, and groups or unions the organisation belongs to 
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can express disapproval or even break links with the organisation or individuals 
implicated in unethical behaviour.  
One of the mechanisms not adequately captured in principal-agent modelling, 
and in economics in general, is how intrinsic motivation may prevent corrupt 
behaviour. That is, ethical behaviour can be adopted because it is thought to 
be correct and is valued by individuals for its own sake. Individuals observe 
organisational or wider societal values and beliefs and internalise or adopt them 
as their own if individuals agree with them and consider them to be right. Unlike 
all the measures and controls discussed above, which originate from 
organisational or societal pressures through constraints and external reward 
and punishment systems, positive behaviour based on intrinsic motivations 
requires a certain amount of autonomy. Extensive monitoring or punishment 
systems can undermine (or ‘crowd out’) intrinsic motivation to self-monitor and 
act according to ethical values (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982, Frey and Jegen, 
2001).  
If an organisation wishes to maintain anti-corruption values and promote self-
controls against corruption, it can do so through the process of selection, 
employing individuals with internalised ethical values, and carry out training, 
communicating organisational values and reinforcing expected behaviour via 
praise. However, if an organisation has a pre-existing corrupt culture, vigilance 
controls would be required. Individuals should be encouraged to exercise 
‘constructive deviance’ by reporting corruption. This would require individuals 
to break away from the established corrupt group pressures for conformity with 
corrupt norms. This, again, can be done by education and training, and 
supporting whistle-blowers. 
2.4.7 Collective action solutions 
Collective action theory has not been extensively applied to corruption. This 
section outlines the few insights the theory offers on the subject. The theory 
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deals with ways of coordinating actions of individuals in a group to bring about 
a better outcome overall. Although collective action and its proposed solutions 
to corruption can be generally placed within the meso-level category of 
theories, it also incorporates macro-level variables such as cultural 
embeddedness discussed in Section 2.3.3.  
Collective action methods of corruption reduction advocate shifts in cultural 
aspects of corrupt societies, involving changes in interpersonal relationships 
through trust and reciprocity. Two types of trust are recognised to be associated 
with differing levels of corruption (Warren, 2004). Generalised trust is the 
propensity to trust strangers, including individuals from social groups other than 
their own. Societies characterised by high levels of generalised trust tend to 
promote inclusiveness within civil society and higher equity of access to 
resources.  
Particularised trust, on the other hand, is characterised by distrust of strangers, 
and relies on group affiliations, such as religion or ethnicity, for cues about who 
can be trusted. Particularised reciprocity maintains resources within groups, by 
encouraging exchanges within associations (Warren, 2004). Societies with 
high generalised trust are associated with lower levels of corruption, whereas 
particularised trust is associated with higher corruption, and restricted access 
to resources and order (Warren, 2004, Persson et al., 2013). Shift from 
particularism to universalism, and the use of both formal (monitoring and 
sanctions) and informal mechanisms (reciprocity and trust) therefore, are 
thought to promote transitions out of corrupt vicious cycles (Persson et al., 
2013). 
An example of collective action solutions is Transparency International’s 
Integrity Pacts involving formal agreements between governments and private 
companies to refrain from corruption (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). Such 
agreements are based on trust and collective monitoring and rely on 
transparency of systems. Media and civil society organisations are important 
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for providing means of oversight of government activity and monitoring of 
companies’ compliance with the pacts (Rose-Ackerman, 2010a). Although 
experimental data from the field of psychology suggests that awareness 
campaigns (also proposed in macro-level studies – Section 2.3.3) and 
publicising negative consequences of corruption may not be effective in 
deterring officials from corruption (Abbink et al., 2002), it can be an important 
tool in motivating public engagement and collective action against corruption. 
There is evidence that social accountability mechanisms can be effective in 
reducing corruption (DfID, 2015).  
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed a broad range of literature on corruption, covering its 
definitions, types, models, and solutions proposed to fight it. Corruption can 
take many different forms, which makes it difficult to settle on one all-
encompassing definition. Efforts to define corruption have been focused on the 
conduct of public officials, largely ignoring the bribe-givers, their motivations 
and actions. Even then, there is no single established and defined set of actions 
by a public official that is understood as corruption. 
Factors contributing to corruption are often analysed in isolation from each 
other, and from the wider societal or cultural context. The mechanisms of how 
different factors contribute to corruption are rarely examined. The proposed 
methods of reducing corruption, consequently, may be dealing with the 
symptoms rather than the causes of corruption and the more general solutions 
such as reducing the size of the public sector may be displacing the problem 
and increasing corruption in the private sector.  
There is a wide array of theorised causes of corruption across disciplines. 
Causes of corruption are analysed at individual (micro), societal (macro) or 
organisational (meso) levels. Whereas there is an abundance of analyses 
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focusing on macro- and micro-level causes, organisational-level models of 
corruption are less prevalent and the applications of theories of group 
behaviour (collective action) to corruption remain underexplored.  
The next chapter identifies and discusses the gaps in knowledge in the field of 
corruption based on the review of literature in this chapter. It sets out the 
research questions of this thesis, refining the more general aims outlined in 
Chapter 1. Chapter 3 also discusses possible methods of tackling these 
research questions and sets out the approach adopted in this thesis. 
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3 Research questions and methods 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter 2 revealed several areas which have been 
underexplored in past research. Section 3.2 in this chapter discusses these 
gaps in knowledge and develops three research questions for this thesis.  
Section 3.3 outlines the methods used in previous research of corruption, 
extending the discussion of studies covered in Section 2.3. Section 3.4 then 
discusses these methods and explains the methods selected to tackle the 
research questions of this thesis. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Research questions 
Chapter 2 showed that past literature on corruption focused on the role played 
by the bribe-takers, usually thought to be the corrupt public officials. This is 
especially prevalent in the efforts to define corruption. Actions and motivations 
of the bribe-givers have received less attention. This is the first research gap 
identified. 
As outlined in Section 1.3, the ultimate motivations for infrastructure companies 
to engage in corruption can be to maximise profits and to increase the chances 
of obtaining projects. However, there is limited understanding of how these 
companies achieve their objectives.  
Several past studies have provided insights such as how power networks can 
help organise corrupt exchanges (Carvajal, 1999); how different types of 
incentives, including guaranteeing a loan, can be offered in exchange for a 
desired outcome (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009, Cartier–Bresson, 1997); and 
how corrupt agreements have their own identifiable steps and rules of 
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negotiation (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009). However, such studies remain few 
in numbers, and the strategies that the bribe-givers may use to achieve their 
objectives remain underexplored.  
When a bribe-giver attempts to establish a corrupt agreement, they may face 
an outright rejection, or opportunism from the side of the official. That is, the 
official may accept the bribe, but provide nothing in return. Therefore, to 
achieve its ultimate objectives through corrupt means, the company must first 
establish a successful corrupt exchange. A better understanding of the 
strategies used by the bribe-givers to establish corrupt agreements can help in 
the development of new methods of corruption detection and, ultimately, can 
contribute to corruption reduction. Therefore, the first research question this 
thesis addresses is: 
What strategies do bribe-givers use to achieve successful 
corrupt agreements? 
The second area that remains underexplored is how corruption is affected by 
the context in which it occurs. Corrupt behaviour is often analysed in isolation 
from its social or cultural contexts. This is particularly prevalent among micro-
level studies, but some macro-level theories also do not explore cultural or 
social impacts on corruption (see Section 2.3 and, in particular Figure 1).  
As discussed in Section 2.4, misidentifying the causes of corruption can lead 
to the implementation of policies that treat the consequences rather than the 
causes of corruption. Such interventions might not be effective or might not 
produce long-lasting effects. For example, monitoring and punishment can be 
a successful method of corruption reduction if the problem is limited to a few 
‘bad apples’ engaging in corruption. In the context of a widespread corrupt 
culture such measures are unlikely to be successful. 
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Individual choices and behaviour in corrupt agreements, then, should be 
viewed in the context of the organisational culture, moral values and the wider 
societal norms. This is particularly important in understanding the choices of 
the bribe-taking officials. As outlined in Chapter 1, it is not clear whether officials 
awarding contracts to the less-competent companies in exchange for bribes 
are aware of the potential negative consequences for the economy and the 
dangers for the population, and how this affects their decisions. Additionally, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.2, attitudes towards corruption vary across political 
cultures, and the same corrupt actions can evoke different levels of 
condemnation from the public. Understanding if and how this affects the 
choices of the officials can provide new avenues of policy-making aimed at 
corruption reduction. The second research question of this thesis, therefore, is: 
How do social norms affect bribe-takers’ choices? 
The third research gap is around sector-specific characteristics of corruption. 
Past research often does not identify factors contributing to corruption specific 
to a particular sector of the economy. Corruption is often discussed in general 
terms, without references to any specific activity. However, choices of 
individuals and the way the corrupt operate can be context-specific.  
As set out in Chapter 1, this thesis aims to develop a broader concept of 
corruption to understand the phenomenon and how individuals make decisions 
in corrupt agreements. This concept of corruption is then applied to corruption 
at the tendering phase of infrastructure projects, where projects deliver capital 
goods or physical assets such as energy distribution grids. The aim, therefore, 
is to focus on specific aspects of infrastructure procurement.  
Corruption at earlier phases of infrastructure projects can lead to corruption at 
later phases, and focusing on a specific phase can provide insights relevant to 
the entire project cycle and to the sector as a whole. Therefore, the third 
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question this thesis addresses is kept relatively broad, but with a focus on a 
specific sector:  
What are the characteristics of corruption specific to the 
infrastructure sector and what measures of corruption 
reduction can be effective in this sector? 
The next section discusses methods used in past studies of corruption, and the 
following section sets out the methods chosen for this thesis to address the 
above questions. 
3.3 Methods used in previous research 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 reviewed cross-disciplinary theories and models of 
corruption in previous research, with the focus on the theorised underlying 
causes of corruption and the proposed solutions for corruption reduction. This 
section revisits these studies and focuses on the core methods used.  
At micro, or individual level of analysis, corruption is analysed using 
predominantly rational-choice-based models, such as rent-seeking, principal-
agent and game theory. At macro level of analysis, the economic general 
equilibrium model and econometric techniques are applied. Insights from 
psychology and political science are also used to develop macro-level theories 
and models, and econometric techniques are used to test the insights of these 
studies. Organisational, or meso-level studies are based in sociology, but also 
draw from other disciplines, and provide a wider view, or ‘conceptualisations’ 
of corruption.  
In addition, several studies not covered in Chapter 2 use computational 
methods such as social simulation and agent-based modelling. These models 
are based on sets of assumptions about the underlying causes of corruption, 
and the models developed then formally represent the mechanisms that bring 
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about corruption. Computational models can be used to analyse social 
phenomena at any level. These methods are discussed in more detail below. 
Rent-seeking models of corruption such as Cadot (1987), Rasmusen and 
Ramseyer (1994), Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013) analyse strategies aimed at 
increasing an individual’s or a company’s share of the available resource or 
wealth. These economic models represent agents as payoff-maximising. 
Principal-agent models (Groenendijk, 1997, Aidt, 2003, Lui, 1986) are an 
extension of rent-seeking models, with an introduction of a principal looking to 
align the objectives of the (corrupt) agents with those of the principal (see 
Section 2.3.4). Both rent-seeking and principal-agent models focus on the 
choices of bribe-takers, largely ignoring those of bribe-givers.  
Game theory models offer another method of studying strategies of payoff-
maximising individuals. However, such models allow the representation of 
potential strategies of bribe-givers as well as bribe-takers. Models such as 
Bayar (2005), Bayar (2009), Uribe (2012) analyse bribe-givers’ strategies by 
combining economic game theory with network theory (a theory that an 
individual’s position in a social network determines their constraints and 
opportunities (Borgatti et al., 2013)). Social network analysis can be used to 
describe network structures, how network links are created and how 
information or goods travel through a network (Borgatti et al., 2013).  
Queuing (Lui, 1985, Kleinrock, 1967) and bidding (Beck and Maher, 1986) 
models of corruption analyse the problem at macro level, using the economic 
general equilibrium theory. They represent corruption as a market with its own 
supply and demand for corrupt services. An equilibrium is achieved where the 
supply meets the demand, and the equilibrium price (the bribe size) is 
determined. Such models are concerned with the overall system efficiency 
rather than with how individuals make decisions.  
 63 
 
Econometric techniques such as cross-country regression analyses provide 
insights into the types of macroeconomic variables (such as socio-political 
stability and independent judiciary (Seldadyo and De Haan, 2005, Park, 2003)) 
that correlate with low levels of corruption. These studies generally do not set 
out the exact mechanisms of how different factors cause corrupt behaviour, 
and also do not provide insights into how individuals make decisions in corrupt 
agreements.  
Regression analyses can also be used to analyse the effectiveness of major 
anti-corruption programs, comparing the levels of corruption before and after 
the interventions. The key weakness of this approach lies in the measures of 
corruption used. Corruption perceptions indexes are weak proxies for the actual 
levels of corruption (Kenny, 2006, Olken, 2009) (see also Section 2.3.2).  
Additionally, regression methods are used to test the validity of theories and 
models of corruption. For example, Uslaner (2010) tests insights on the causes 
of corruption from the field of political science using regression analyses. Licht 
et al. (2007) build on the insights from psychology on value orientations and 
cultural norms to develop a theory that clashing moral values cause corruption. 
This theory is then tested using regressions on macro-level data. Although the 
clashing moral values theory offers insights relevant to the research questions 
of this thesis, this theory does not focus on the exact mechanisms of how 
individual decision making is guided by the conflicting norms. 
Chugh (2012) also draws from the field of psychology to develop a learning 
principles model of how corrupt behaviour is learnt through the process of 
socialisation. Although this model considers environmental causes of the 
individual predisposition to corruption (such as the pre-existing widespread 
corruption), the proposed solutions do not tackle the wider environmental 
causes directly, but instead focus on individual-level sanctioning and systems 
of rewards.  
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Corruption studies such as Pinto et al. (2008), Lange (2008) draw from a 
number of disciplines to develop integrative multidimensional 
conceptualisations of organisational or meso-level corruption. These studies 
use previous research to set out the various antecedents of corruption, such as 
the structure of an industry and societal norms, and outline the mechanisms of 
how different factors bring about corruption. These studies also consider 
different types of corruption, and the various causes underlying each type 
(discussed in Section 2.3.5). The resulting conceptualisations benefit from the 
multidisciplinary perspectives on corruption. 
Collier (2002) uses the institutional choice approach and applies the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to develop a theory of 
the causes of corruption, and to identify social rules commonly associated with 
corrupt behaviour. The IAD framework is based on the idea that individual 
behaviour is a product of a combination of individual choices and the rules and 
norms of organisations and institutions (Collier, 2002).  The IAD framework is 
an analytical tool for studying social phenomena at various levels of 
aggregation – at the level of individuals, groups, organisations or countries.  
Turning to the sphere of computational modelling, Situngkir (2003) used agent-
based modelling to simulate anti-corruption law enforcement measures. Unlike 
models based on the rational choice theory, agent-based models do not 
consider motivations for actions or interactions. Within such models, agents’ 
actions are represented through a simple set of rules, and the sum of all actions 
create system-wide outcomes. Therefore, agent-based models are better 
suited for analysing how interactions between individuals result in different 
social outcomes rather than how individuals make decisions and form 
strategies (Hedström, 2005).  
Voinea (2013) developed the Corruption Emergence Model, a social simulation 
model that takes into account social norms and values such as fairness and 
honesty and analyses attitude changes as mechanisms of corruption creation. 
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Social simulation models have been used to analyse social phenomena and to 
understand, explain or predict behaviour. This type of modelling can be used 
as a method of theory development and refinement or to observe behaviour as 
an output of a model based on a set of assumptions (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 
2005).  
3.4 Discussion and choice of methods  
This thesis seeks to develop a broad concept of how individuals make 
decisions leading to corruption, and then apply it to a specific setting, the 
tendering phase of infrastructure procurement (see Section 1.3). Based on the 
identified research gaps, Section 3.2 specified three research questions. This 
thesis looks to contribute towards the understanding of the strategies used by 
bribe-givers; how social norms affect bribe-takers’ choices; and the 
characteristics of corruption specific to the infrastructure sector. The key 
purpose of this work is to offer insights into potential methods of corruption 
reduction in this sector.   
The specific focus of this thesis is on the tendering phase of infrastructure 
projects. Corruption at this phase can take different forms, and can be aimed 
at, for example, the manipulation of tendering procedures or passing the pre-
qualification criteria (GIACC, 2008). The underlying causes of corruption can 
vary across the different forms. The case studies that the concept of corruption 
developed in this thesis is applied to might reveal specific types of corruption 
in infrastructure bidding processes, and the concept should be flexible to allow 
for the underlying causes to be analysed and determined through the process 
of case study analysis. Therefore, it is important that the approach used to 
develop the concept allows the consideration of different types of corruption 
causes, at different levels, micro, macro and meso.  
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The micro and macro-level studies discussed in Section 3.3 tend to either 
analyse corruption in general terms, or to focus on a particular type of 
corruption. The use of the general notion of corruption is particularly prevalent 
among macro-level studies and studies in psychology analysing the general 
individual predisposition to corruption. Micro-level studies using rent-seeking, 
principal-agent and game theory techniques tend to select a specific setting 
and type of corruption for the analysis. This is because analysing specific 
interactions and behaviour requires focus on a discrete set of assumptions. 
Meso or organisational-level studies, on the other hand, recognise the different 
types and manifestations of corruption. Despite focusing on the causes of 
corruption and the methods of corruption reduction at the organisational level, 
these studies recognise that different factors, including individual bad character 
can cause corruption. Organisational-level studies are not confined to a specific 
discipline, and benefit from a wider view afforded by drawing from multiple past 
studies across different disciplines.  
Organisational-level studies are also well-suited for analysing norms and how 
they affect behaviour because they focus on the context of organisations, their 
rules and how these affect individual choices. Therefore, this thesis looks to 
follow this approach of organisational-level studies in developing a concept of 
corrupt behaviour.  
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework used by Collier 
(2002) is a specific tool that facilitates the collection and organisation of key 
components of social phenomena and identifying the links between these 
components. The framework is flexible, and allows the analysis to be carried 
out at any level – micro, meso or macro. The basis of this framework, that 
individual behaviour is driven by both individual choices and the constraints, 
norms and rules of organisations, is particularly well-suited to the research 
questions of this thesis. This is because the first question of the thesis focuses 
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on individual choices and strategies, and the second question turns attention 
to the norms and how they affect behaviour. 
Therefore, the IAD framework is selected for the development of the general 
conception of corrupt behaviour in this thesis. This involves drawing from 
different disciplines and identifying the key components of corruption. The 
resulting concept of corruption is then used to address the three research 
questions. The focus of this work is to identify the actions and the decisions 
relevant to the establishment of corrupt agreements.  
The first two research questions focus on the specific choices and strategies of 
individuals in corrupt agreements. Therefore, they belong at the micro level of 
analysis. The concept of corruption developed at the organisational level using 
the IAD framework, therefore, will be used in this thesis to then zoom in on a 
specific context, to develop micro-level models.  
The summary of past studies and their methods in Section 3.3 shows that 
economics offers a number of tools to study individual choices and strategies. 
Because the first question of this thesis addresses the strategies used by bribe-
givers, economic tools are appropriate for answering this question. Models 
such as rent-seeking, principal-agent and game-theory come from the field of 
economics and allow the study of behaviour driven by autonomous decision 
making. Unlike the rent-seeking and the principal-agent models which analyse 
the bribe-takers’ choices, game theory methods have been used to focus on 
the choices of bribe-givers (Uribe, 2012, Bayar, 2009, Bayar, 2005).  
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, however, the rational-choice assumptions of 
welfare-maximising agents may not be applicable to every setting, and other 
motivations may drive behaviour. Hence, in developing a model of the bribe-
givers’ decision making, game theory methods are used, but the welfare-
maximising assumptions are relaxed, to allow for the analysis of different 
motivations and objectives. 
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The second question of the thesis focuses on how norms affect the bribe-
takers’ choices. Economic game theory models have not been widely applied 
to study social norms and economic tools in general may provide only limited 
insights into how norms affect behaviour.  
Psychology and sociology, on the other hand, offer the relevant tools and 
methods to analyse behaviour where social norms are thought to guide the 
choices of individuals. The clashing moral values theory, the theories of 
organisational corruption and the application of the institutional choice 
approach outlined in Section 3.3 provide insights into how norms and values 
can determine individual behaviour and the outcomes of such behaviour. These 
studies, however, represent individuals as possessing a limited amount of 
autonomy in their decisions and choices. The second question of this thesis, 
however, looks to address both how individual make choices, and how these 
choices are framed by norms. 
Voinea (2013) shows that social simulation models are suitable for analysing 
social norms and how they shape behaviour. Unlike agent-based models that 
focus on the system-wide outcomes, social simulation models can be used to 
study individual decision making. This method, therefore, can be used for both 
analysing the decision-making of autonomous agents, and representing norms 
and organisational rules that frame behaviour. Therefore, the second question 
of this thesis is addressed using social simulation methods. 
The third question deals with the application of the general concept of 
corruption to infrastructure procurement. The research questions in this thesis 
are addressed at meso level (for the development of the concept of corruption) 
and at micro level (for the models of behaviour). Therefore, methods such as 
regressions on macro-level data are unlikely to provide the relevant insights. 
There is a lack of datasets on corruption at micro or organisational levels due 
to the clandestine nature of corruption and the particular lack of transparency 
of the infrastructure sector (as outlined in Chapter 1).  
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Criminal court case materials submitted in support of prosecutions under the 
United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) are published online and 
are accessible to the public free of charge2. These materials offer detailed 
accounts of corruption cases and provide valuable insights into specific 
instances of corruption in different industries across the world. These materials 
are chosen as the data source for this thesis and are used to develop case 
studies. The general concept of corruption developed in this thesis is then 
applied to these case studies. 
To summarise, this thesis looks to address the research questions by first 
creating a broad concept of corruption at the organisational level, and then 
applying this concept to the specific questions at the micro level, in the context 
of infrastructure procurement. The methods chosen are the IAD framework, 
game theory and social simulation. These methods have been shown in past 
literature to be particularly applicable to the types of questions that this thesis 
looks to address.  
There is a certain amount of path dependence in the choice of methods, and 
other methods that have not yet been applied to corruption could have been 
appropriate. This, however, can bear greater risks of the methods not yielding 
useful insights or not answering the research questions. Therefore, methods 
that have been used in past corruption research are chosen, but with a careful 
consideration of the suitability of each one for the precise questions of the 
thesis. 
                                            





This chapter identified research gaps in past literature and set out three 
research questions for this thesis:  
What strategies do bribe-givers use to achieve successful 
corrupt agreements? 
How do social norms affect bribe-takers’ choices? 
What are the characteristics of corruption specific to the 
infrastructure sector and what measures of corruption 
reduction can be effective in this sector? 
Section 3.3 then outlined the methods used in past studies and Section 3.4 
identified the methods for this thesis. The general concept of corrupt behaviour 
is developed in this thesis at the organisational level of study. The Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework is used to organise and link the key 
components of corruption and two models are then developed. The first is a 
game theory model focusing on the strategies the bribe-givers use to achieve 
successful corrupt agreements. The second is a social simulation model that 
considers how social norms affect the bribe-takers’ decisions. Finally, case 
studies of corruption in the tendering phase of infrastructure projects are 
analysed to understand how corrupt networks are established, and what factors 
contribute to corruption.  
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4 IAD framework and its application to corruption 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis seeks to develop a broader concept of 
corruption within which specific aspects of corrupt behaviour can be analysed. 
The concept is then used to develop two models of corrupt behaviour, and is 
applied to case studies of corruption at the tendering phase of infrastructure 
projects.  
The specific analytical tool chosen for the development of the broad concept of 
corruption is the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. It 
consists of a comprehensive set of building blocks that can be used to parse 
and analyse social interactions. Section 4.2 of this chapter summarises the key 
features of the IAD framework, and it is then applied to corruption in Section 
4.3.  
4.2 Summary of the IAD framework 
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework was developed 
by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom, 2011, Ostrom, 2005) to analyse collective action 
problems. It is a versatile analytical tool for studying a wide variety of social 
phenomena. Applications of the IAD framework have mainly been focused on 
analysing natural resource allocation institutions, and, in particular, developing 
sustainable management of common-pool resources such as rivers (Heikkila 
et al., 2011), forests (Mattor and Cheng, 2015) and fisheries (Mulazzani et al., 
2013). However, the framework has also found its applications in areas such 
as interactions within households (Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2015), institutional 
rules underlying city charters (Feiock et al., 2016) and investment in waterway 
transportation infrastructure (Hijdra et al., 2015). 
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The framework’s key strength is in specifying and systematically analysing all 
relevant variables in a methodologically rigorous, but flexible manner. Its rigour 
lies in specifying the components common to many social situations and 
typifying the variables for each one in a clear and self-contained way. Its 
flexibility is in allowing the analyst to organise a study in as detailed or as 
general a way as is necessary for the analysis, depending on the phenomenon 
studied. The framework is a multi-tier conceptual map with each component 
nested within a wider or more general concept. 
The terms in the IAD framework have undergone changes through the years of 
development. For example, the term “action arena” was used in earlier 
representations of the framework, but was later abandoned (see Ostrom (2011, 
p. 9) for more information on “action arena” and why it was abandoned). In 
earlier works, Ostrom refers to individuals as “participants” (Ostrom, 2005), 
whereas in later publications they are referred to as “actors” (Ostrom, 2011). 
The summary in this section uses the more recent versions of the IAD 
framework’s terms and concepts, drawing, in particular, from the 2011 special 
issue publications on the IAD framework (the Policy Studies Journal Volume 
39, Issue 1). 
For the purposes of the IAD framework, the term ‘institution’ is defined broadly: 
it is “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and 
structured interactions” (Ostrom, 2005, p.3). In this sense, ‘institution’ 
encompasses not only formal organisations or establishments, but also 
markets, social relationships, and communities. Prescriptions refer to norms of 
behaviour, rules and strategies shared by individuals within institutions 
(Ostrom, 2010). 
According to Ostrom (2011), to investigate any social phenomenon, three 
analytical tools can be used: frameworks, theories, and models. Frameworks 
help to identify and organise the most general components or variables of the 
phenomenon studied. A theory is then developed by focusing on a subset of 
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these variables and making assumptions about causal relationships between 
them. Finally, a model presents a set of formal functional relationships between 
a limited set of variables, and creates predictions of outcomes. 
Blomquist and deLeon (2011) offer a set of initial steps for applying the IAD 
framework. First, the social phenomenon requires a working definition to 
identify its main components: actors, and the setting. Second, the scale of the 
problem should be ascertained. This aids in determining the level of 
aggregation of individual units. That is, the phenomenon may involve 
interactions between individuals, groups, firms, or countries.  Third, the 
timescales and the level of enquiry or action are chosen. In IAD framework 
applications, most social phenomena can be analysed at three levels of 
enquiry, separated by the types of activities involved: operational, collective-
choice, and constitutional (Ostrom, 2005, pp. 58-62). 
Operational-level activities involve practical everyday decisions, such as 
allocation and consumption of resources. In the IAD framework, these activities 
are governed by operational rules. These rules may, for example, dictate how 
resources are allocated across groups or individuals. Formulation of such rules 
is carried out through the process of collective-choice activities, which are 
concerned with construction of institutions and rule development. Collective-
choice activities are governed by collective-choice rules, defining who is eligible 
to participate in the processes of establishing institutions. These rules, in turn, 
are a product of constitutional activities. Additionally, there are 
metaconstitutional activities concerned with developing rules governing the 
constitutional level of activities, but, for the purposes of analysing most social 
phenomena, three levels are sufficient.  
Figure 2 summarises the IAD framework’s levels of enquiry. Generally, 
timescales increase as we move from operational-level to constitutional 
activities, because the processes of, for example, defining the governmental 
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makeup, or formulation of policy take longer periods of time than routine policy 
implementation. 
 
Figure 2 The IAD framework levels of enquiry. Simplified diagram, based 
on Figure 2.3 in Ostrom (2005, p. 59) 
The core unit of analysis in the IAD framework is termed “action situation”. It 
characterises interactions under analysis and contains seven components 
common to most social phenomena. For each social phenomenon, there is a 
number of participating actors (component 1), with their attributes. Actors can 
represent individuals or groups, and their attributes include characteristics such 
as age, gender, ethnic or cultural background, knowledge and skills. Actors 
occupy positions (component 2) such as those of an employee of an 
organisation, or a social network member. In principal-agent theories, the 
relevant positions are those of a principal and an agent, and sometimes a 
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monitoring entity, or a supervisor. This separation between an actor and a 
position is important because an actor can occupy a number of positions, and 
action choices may be guided by different and even conflicting rules prescribed 
by various positions.  
Actors make choices over sets of available actions (component 3) that lead to 
potential outcomes (component 4). Each outcome, in turn, is characterised by 
costs and benefits (component 5) for the actor undertaking the actions, and 
other actors in the given action situation. Actors have different levels of control 
(component 6) over how their actions lead to potential outcomes, and may not 
possess full information (component 7) about how their actions bring about 
alternative outcomes. For example, in situations of resource allocation, an actor 
may have control over what proportion of the overall pool of resources is 
allocated to a particular group, but no control over the distributions of these 
resources within the group. In cases of investment, an actor can entrust funds 
to an organisation, but may have incomplete information about how this 
investment may be used, and, therefore, has limited knowledge of how or 
whether this decision to invest will lead to an outcome of increased returns over 










There are several external variables that act as inputs into an action situation. 
These are attributes of the community under consideration, the nature of goods 
or resources involved (termed ‘the biophysical conditions’ in the IAD 
framework), and sets of rules applied in action situations. Attributes of the 
community provide a social or cultural context within which interactions occur. 
There are seven sets of rules, each set governing one of the seven components 
of an action situation (see Figure 3 for the links between the sets of rules and 
the components of an action situation): 
1. Boundary rules set out who can participate in an action situation, and 
define conditions for entering or leaving it 
2. Position rules define how an actor takes up a position within an action 
situation 
3. Choice rules identify sets of actions available to each actor 
4. Scope rules set out potential outcomes of available actions 
5. Payoff rules define costs and benefits for each actor in different 
outcomes 
6. Aggregation rules determine levels of control afforded to actors in their 
positions 
7. Information rules identify information possessed by each actor and how 




Figure 3 Structure of an action situation. Based on Figure 7.1 in Ostrom 
(2005, p. 189) 
Outcomes can be evaluated according to a number of criteria, such as 
economic efficiency, i.e. whether resources are allocated in such a way as to 
maximise the overall benefit. Alternatively, evaluations can focus on whether 
resources are allocated to meet distributional equity criteria, to satisfactorily 
provide for the poorest groups. Furthermore, evaluations can be done on the 
basis of fiscal equivalence, ensuring that every individual’s contribution to the 
common pool of resources is equal to the benefits derived by that individual.  
The above criteria (efficiency, equity and fiscal equivalence) can be used to 
evaluate states of the world resulting from action situations. The relevant 
outcomes can also include the set of actions taken, and these can be assessed 
against the criteria of legitimacy, accountability or conformance to norms or 
values of the community. 
Through the process of outcome evaluation, the analyst establishes whether 
the chosen criteria are met, and whether institutional changes are required to 
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improve the outcomes of institutional processes and interactions in the future. 
All the relevant criteria may not be met simultaneously, and trade-offs are 
necessary in designing institutions and proposing changes to improve the 
performance of institutions. Table 2 summarises some of the key evaluation 
criteria used in the IAD framework.  
Table 2 Criteria for outcome evaluation. Summary based on texts in 
Ostrom (2005, pp. 66-67), McGinnis (2011) and Ostrom (2011). 
Evaluation criteria Description 
Economic efficiency 
(allocative efficiency) 
Broadly, allocation of resources is efficient if it 
maximises the net benefit from these resources 
and minimises waste 
Fiscal equivalence Each individual’s benefit from a common resource 
is either equal to their contribution towards it, or is 
based on their ability to pay for it 





Flexibility of systems to cope with, and respond to 
the changing environment 
Accountability The extent to which decision-makers can be held 
responsible for their actions 
Conformance to 
general morality/ values 
of local actors 
The extent to which actions of decision-makers 
meet the commonly held norms and values 
Legitimacy The extent to which actions or outcomes conform 
to legal or normative rules 
What is common to most of the analyses using the IAD framework is the 
emphasis on improving the outcomes for all actors through collective action, or 
coordination of efforts to achieve a common objective. Development and 
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implementation of institutional changes to improve the processes and 
outcomes requires commitment from all actors involved in an activity.  
Application of collective action theories for anti-corruption policy development 
is a relatively recent avenue of research (DfID, 2015, Marquette and Peiffer, 
2015). Key recommendations for anti-corruption policy from this research are 
summarised in Section 2.4.7.  
Collier (2002) presents an example of the IAD framework application to 
corruption. The paper offers causes of corruption based on the levels of 
corruption tolerance across different political cultures. Conclusions are that 
anti-corruption policies are likely to be met with resistance from the elite 
because such policies threaten to destabilise political structures and weaken 
the elite’s position and access to power. The alternatives suggested are grass-
root institutional changes and reform of political structures and cultures. 
The next section applies the IAD framework to corruption, drawing from 
literature reviews in Chapter 2.  
4.3 Application of the IAD framework to corruption 
4.3.1 Overview 
This section applies the IAD framework to corruption. This application is 
general, and looks to identify key components that are common to many cases 
of corruption. The concept of corruption developed in this section is then used 
throughout the rest of the thesis to develop two models (Chapters 5 and 6) and 
to analyse case studies (Chapter 7).  
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, there are many types of corruption, and this 
section focuses on a subset involving interactions between different actors, in 
settings concerning allocation of some resource or benefit. The IAD framework 
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was originally created specifically to analyse these types of interactions. 
Therefore, the analysis excludes certain corruption types such as 
embezzlement where an individual abuses their position of power to extract 
benefits for themselves alone.  
The section is organised as follows. Section 4.3.2 discusses the settings in 
which corruption occurs. There is a broad range of settings, and the analysis 
focuses on the types of activities that corruption can affect or disrupt. These 
activities are classified according to the IAD framework levels of activities – 
operational, collective-choice and constitutional (see Figure 2).  
Section 4.3.3 identifies key positions occupied by actors in corruption action 
situations. The focus is on positions occupied by, on the one hand, an actor 
(e.g. government official) with certain decision-making powers over a process, 
and, on the other hand, an actor who can benefit if the decision is made in 
his/her favour. Additional positions are discussed in Section 4.3.5, to set out a 
concept for analysing corrupt exchanges involving intermediaries. At this stage, 
the level of aggregation is not defined, and the positions identified can be 
occupied by organisations, as well as individuals. 
Section 4.3.4 sets out corrupt actions. A focus is made on an exchange of 
benefits, and a quid-pro-quo nature of corrupt agreements (discussed in 
Section 4.3.6). Section 4.3.7 places the components identified (positions, 
actions and benefits) into the setting discussed in Section 4.3.2, and Section 
4.3.8 summarises. 
4.3.2 Activities affected by corruption 
As discussed in Section 4.2, an application of the IAD framework begins with 
defining the phenomenon under investigation, to ascertain the main actors and 
the setting (Blomquist and deLeon, 2011). However, the commonly-adopted 
and quoted definitions (see Section 2.2.1) are imprecise in identifying the types 
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of settings in which corruption occurs because there are many types and 
manifestations of the phenomenon (see Section 2.2.2), and it is difficult to 
develop an all-encompassing definition. Corruption can occur in both the public 
and the private sectors and can impact activities such as routine processes of 
resource allocation, policy development, or selection of candidates for the 
positions of power. 
The scale of the problem is also context-dependent and can involve isolated 
corrupt actions of individuals in the positions of power, or coordinated actions 
of entire companies, organisations or governments (see also Corrupt 
Organisation (Pinto et al., 2008), Section 2.3.5). This multifaceted nature of 
corruption makes it difficult to define the general setting and the actors present 
in most types of corruption.  
Instead, activities that constitute corruption can be set aside from activities 
affected by corruption, with the focus brought on the latter. Activities such as 
resource allocation, policy development, or selection of candidates for the 
positions of power each corresponds to a different level of enquiry in the IAD 
framework – operational, collective-choice and constitutional (Figure 2). 
Different manifestations and types of corruption affecting these activities can 
then be arranged according to these three levels of enquiry. 
First, allocation of resources or some other benefit corresponds to the 
operational level of enquiry in the IAD framework. Henceforth, this resource or 
benefit will be broadly referred to as Valuable Object. This Valuable Object can 
take different forms, such as a driving licence, a construction contract, or a tax 
rebate. Corruption occurs where the allocation of a Valuable Object constitutes 
some form of abuse of a routine implementation or policy, and where this 
allocation is made for private ends through a subverted due decision-making 
process (see definitions 11 and 15 in Appendix A). This type of corruption is 
described as petty or bureaucratic (see Section 2.2.2).  
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Second, resource allocation processes are generally guided by a set of criteria, 
rules or regulations, which are developed at the collective-choice level of 
activities. Corruption at collective-choice level can take forms of state capture, 
affecting policy formation, or regulatory capture to benefit particular groups or 
individuals. Corruption in such cases can manifest itself as bribery of officials 
deciding on policy or regulation.  
Third, the composition of institutions responsible for the development of policy 
or regulation can be affected by corruption, and this corresponds to 
constitutional-level activities. In this case, actors are assigned to positions of 
power by corrupt means, such as by bribing the electorate. Once elected, the 
officials can manipulate policy decisions to benefit the individuals or groups that 
facilitated the acquisition of power through, for example, financing the party’s 
pre-election operations. 
The types of activities that can be affected by corruption and the corresponding 
IAD framework levels of analysis are summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3 Links between the IAD framework’s levels of activities and the 
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4.3.3 General positions in activities affected by corruption 
This section identifies key IAD framework positions relevant to activities that 
can be affected by corruption. Each position can be occupied by a single 
individual, groups of individuals, or by entire organisations. Therefore, the scale 
(i.e. the aggregation level of individual units – see Sections 4.2 and 4.3.2) is 
kept flexible, to be determined for each corruption case. 
There are several actors who stand to benefit or bear costs as an indirect result 
of activities set out in Section 4.3.2. In the case of driving licence allocation, 
other drivers and pedestrians can face higher levels of injury risks if a driving 
licence is allocated to an incompetent driver. Where an IT service contract is 
awarded through a corrupt exchange, the owners of the service purchasing 
company (shareholders or investors) can bear costs if the service is too 
expensive, or if poor-quality IT infrastructure leads to the loss of clients and 
profits. Likewise, the population relies on elected politicians and appointed 
officials to represent their interests and develop policies accordingly. 
Henceforth, the group of actors who are not directly or actively involved in the 
three types of activities set out in Section 4.3.2, but who are affected by the 
decisions taken, will be referred to as Stakeholders. 
There are several actors occupying positions in which they have an input into, 
or influence over, the activities set out in Table 3: the allocation of a Valuable 
Object, the development of criteria for such allocation, or the selection of actors 
to participate in criteria development. This type of a position is most commonly 
thought of as that of a public official or a politician, but can be a post in any 
sphere, public or private. Henceforth, this position will be referred to broadly as 
that of a Decision Maker (DM). DMs do not have a claim of ownership or direct 
control of the Valuable Object, but are entrusted to allocate it on behalf of the 
Stakeholders. Likewise, DMs at constitutional and collective-choice levels are 




DMs are expected to follow a set of rules in their decision-making processes, 
such as abiding by criteria set for the allocation of the Valuable Object. For 
example, politicians are expected to base their resource allocation decisions 
according to the criteria of improving the public (Stakeholders’) welfare (Jain, 
1998a, p.6). DMs have certain flexibility or discretion in following these criteria. 
This discretion is important to ensure that DMs can use their judgement and 
take actions that lead to better outcomes for the Stakeholders, even if not all 
the criteria are met. That is, the various relevant criteria may conflict, and 
because of the context-dependent constraints, trade-offs may be necessary. In 
using their discretion, DMs are expected to uphold the interests of the 
Stakeholders, and not take their own personal interests into consideration. In 
other words, DMs are expected to apply the Arms-Length Principle (ALP) (see 
Section 2.2.1 for definition) in their decisions. Discretionary powers afforded to 
the DMs are often identified in past literature as the key precondition for 
corruption to occur (Rose-Ackerman, 1998, Aidt, 2003) (see also Section 
2.4.4). 
It has been argued in past literature that a DM must have a monopolistic power 
over a process for corruption to occur (Jain, 1998c, Rose-Ackerman, 1998) 
(discussed in Sections 2.3.4 and 2.4.4). However, in cases of corruption 
involving legislators voting on a statute, there are a number of DMs, with no 
single actor having complete control over the process (Rasmusen and 
Ramseyer, 1994). Additionally, in settings such as allocation of permissions for 
tree logging, corrupt officials from different jurisdictions may compete for bribes 
from logging companies in return for permits for wood extraction on their sites 
(Burgess et al., 2012). Therefore, a monopoly power can afford DMs greater 
(or absolute) control over the process, but it is not a necessary condition for 
corruption to occur. 
Additionally, in activities that can be affected by corruption, there are 
Candidates who stand to directly benefit as a result of favourable decisions 
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made by DMs. At operational level, Candidates compete for, or apply for, a 
Valuable Object, and stand to benefit if it is allocated to them. At collective-
choice level, Candidates can benefit from, for example, laxer regulation applied 
to their industry. Finally, at constitutional level, Candidates compete for 
positions in, for example, the government, and stand to gain power if elected. 
Thus, actors participating in activities that can be affected by corruption occupy 
three key positions: a Stakeholder, a Decision Maker and a Candidate. The 
position of a Stakeholder is generally passive, and actors occupying positions 
of DMs and Candidates take active roles. 
4.3.4 Actions constituting corruption 
Corruption is often thought of as an exchange involving at least two actors 
(Appendix A, definitions 15 and 16), occupying positions on either the demand 
or the supply side of corruption (Tanzi, 1998b). Where corruption occurs, DMs 
belong on the supply-side of corruption, providing a Candidate belonging on 
the demand-side of corruption with some Advantage over the process (the 
nature of Advantage is discussed in more detail below). 
If a DM uses his/her discretionary powers in such a way that provides any of 
the Candidates an undue Advantage over the process or activity, and this is 
motivated by the DM’s self-interest, this constitutes violation of the ALP, and is 
a Corrupt Act committed by the DM (Section 4.3.3 introduced the Arms-Length 
Principle as the rule guiding DMs’ due decision-making processes). The nature 
of the undue Advantage is context-specific and can take forms of manipulation 
of Candidate qualification criteria or disclosure of confidential information, 
enabling an otherwise ineligible Candidate to compete for, and be allocated, 
the Valuable Object. Alternatively, an Advantage can take the form of fulfilling 
a routine function of the DM, which is withheld or delayed in order to extract 




The key observation is that the Advantage helps the Candidate to secure the 
Valuable Object, but the two are separate. This separation allows the concept 
developed to be applied to corruption action situations that, for example, 
require approval of multiple DMs for the Valuable Object to be allocated to the 
Candidate. The nature of the Advantage from each DM can vary – for example, 
forging the paperwork or overlooking disqualifying characteristics. The sum of 
these actions leads to the Valuable Object being allocated inappropriately, with 
a number of Advantages being traded. 
A Candidate, knowing the potential to benefit from DM’s violation of the ALP, 
can offer the DM something of value (an Incentive) in exchange for the 
Advantage. This offer constitutes a Corrupt Act by the Candidate. This offer 
does not have to be accepted for it to constitute a Corrupt Act – attempted 
bribery is still bribery. The Incentive can be financial, such as a bribe, or barter 
in nature. That is, a Candidate may occupy the position of a DM in another 
action situation, where he/she has an input into decisions on, for example, 
allowing club membership, and can exercise his/her discretionary power to 
provide an undue Advantage to any Candidate. The two actors, therefore, 
switch their positions of a Candidate and a DM between the two action 
situations and each provides the other with an Advantage. 
Once the offer of an Incentive has been extended, and prior to the violation of 
the ALP, the DM has a choice of whether to accept the offer. Accepting the 
offer also constitutes a Corrupt Act by the DM because it indicates the intent to 
violate the ALP. The actual and intentional ALP violation and provision of an 
undue Advantage is then a sufficient, but not a necessary condition to have 
committed a Corrupt Act. The order of Corrupt Acts can also vary, and 
corruption can be initiated by the DM or the Candidate. In cases of extortion, A 
DM requests a kickback in return for fulfilling his/her regular function. These 
variations are often reflected in anti-corruption legislation to indicate that intent 
is sufficient to have committed an offence of corruption. 
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4.3.5 Additional positions present in corrupt activities 
The Incentive does not necessarily have to be given directly to the DM, but can 
be provided to a third-party Beneficiary. If the DM has an interest in the welfare 
of the Beneficiary, he/she obtains an indirect or Derived Benefit, and this 
motivates the DM to commit Corrupt Acts. By extension, there can be a party 
who is interested in the Candidate’s welfare, and can commit a Corrupt Act on 
behalf of the Candidate. Henceforth, this party will be referred to as the 
Candidate’s Representative. The Representative can, for example, be a 
company director, acting on behalf of a company in competition for a contract. 
If the company wins the contract, the Representative can gain a Derived Benefit 
from it, such as a company performance-related bonus. 
Another party that can be involved in corrupt processes is an Intermediary. For 
the purposes of this thesis, the role of an Intermediary is defined as facilitation 
of corrupt exchanges. Intermediary does not necessarily have an interest in the 
welfare of any other actor within the corrupt action situation. The Intermediary’s 
role is to negotiate and/or transfer the Incentive to the DM. The Intermediary is 
motivated by a Commission he/she receives in exchange for his/her services. 
If both the Commission and the Incentive are monetary, the value of the 
Commission is higher than the value of the Incentive, and the DM receives a 
proportion of the Commission transferred to the Intermediary.  
In some cases, the Intermediary may receive a Commission for the services of 
negotiating the corrupt exchange, with the Incentive being transferred through 
another party. The Commission would then be kept in full by the Intermediary, 
as payment for negotiating services. However, it will be assumed for now that 
the Commission includes any disbursements the Intermediary may have to 
make, including providing the Incentive to the DM.  
The key difference between a Representative and an Intermediary is in the 
level of association with the Candidate. For example, in Corrupt Organisations 
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(CO) (see Section 2.3.5), corrupt actions arise out of the loyalty to the 
organisation. Using the terms introduced in this chapter, a Representative in 
the case of a CO type of corruption commits a Corrupt Act for the benefit of the 
Candidate. The Derived Benefit for the Representative can, in this case, take 
the form of intrinsic rewards from fulfilling the objectives of the Candidate. 
Intermediaries fulfil their functions in exchange for a Commission, and they do 
not obtain a Derived Benefit from Candidate’s improved welfare. 
4.3.6 Exchanges of benefits in corrupt activities 
Figure 4 summarises the various network structures of benefit transfers 
between corrupt actors occupying positions of a Candidate, a DM, a 
Beneficiary, an Intermediary and a Representative. The figure 
diagrammatically illustrates the descriptions of corrupt exchanges set out in 
Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, and summarised below.  
Panel A in Figure 4 shows the basic corrupt exchange discussed in Section 
4.3.4 between two actors, occupying positions of a DM and a Candidate. The 
Candidate provides an Incentive to the DM who in return provides an 
Advantage to the Candidate. The exchange is carried out directly, without 
involving third parties. Panels B, C and D include additional positions of a 
Beneficiary, a Representative and an Intermediary introduced in Section 4.3.5. 
Panel B shows a case where a Candidate provides an Incentive to a third-party 
Beneficiary, with the DM deriving some indirect benefit from this. An 
Intermediary is added to the basic exchange in Panel C, with the Intermediary 
receiving a Commission and providing an Incentive to the DM on behalf of the 
Candidate. A Representative deriving some benefit if the Candidate obtains the 
Advantage is shown in Panel D. The Representative provides the Incentive to 
the DM in exchange for an Advantage being given to the Candidate. 
At this stage, the distinction between the offer and the actual delivery of an 
Incentive is not made. The purpose is to illustrate the possible transfers of 
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benefits, with the caveat that there can be more complex systems, involving 
many actors, occupying the five positions. For example, the functions of 
Intermediaries (offer, negotiation and delivery of an Incentive) may be split 
between several actors. Additionally, a Representative may offer the Incentive, 
and, if it is a bribe, negotiate its size, but the actual transfer may be made 
directly from the company’s (Candidate’s) funds, or via an Intermediary. In this 
case, the Intermediary only fulfils the role of delivering the Incentive. Such 
detailed analysis is left to Chapter 7 (case studies). 
 
Figure 4 Flows of benefits between actors in corrupt transactions 
4.3.7 Corruption phenomenon 
With the key IAD framework components of corruption set out in Sections 4.3.3 
to 4.3.6, this section returns to the three levels of enquiry discussed in Section 




Corruption, as a phenomenon occurring in action situations across the three 
levels of activities (operational, collective-choice and constitutional), can be 
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, corruption at each level can take the 
form of independent corrupt action situations, and can be thought of as discrete 
separate occurrences. In this case, all basic components remain the same 
across the three levels (static positions, the exchange of benefits kept within 
the specific action situation, not extending to other action situations). For 
example, a constitutional-level action situation involving corruption might be 
concerned with selection of a Candidate for a government position. The 
Valuable Object in this case is the government position. Each individual voter 
simultaneously occupies two positions: that of a Stakeholder and that of a DM. 
The Advantage provided by each DM is a single vote, and winning the election 
and obtaining the government position is the ultimate goal of the Candidate. As 
a Stakeholder, the individual wishes particular policies to be implemented, and 
one of the Candidates may support these policies. However, as a DM, the 
individual may be tempted to vote for the Candidate willing to pay for the vote. 
Therefore, as a DM, the individual may cast their vote for the Candidate in 
exchange for a bribe (an Incentive). As a Stakeholder, the individual then faces 
consequences of undesirable policies being implemented until the next 
electoral period. 
Similarly, at collective-choice level, an action situation could be concerned with 
industry regulation. Lax regulation represents the Valuable Object desired by 
the industry (the Candidate in this case). In exchange for the elected politicians’ 
(DMs’) support of liberal regulations, the Candidate can offer Incentives in the 
form of bribes. 
An alternative representation of corruption as a phenomenon is made by linking 
action situations across the three levels. A Candidate competing for a Valuable 
Object at the operational level can attempt to influence the development of 
criteria applied in the allocation process. For example, an operational-level 
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Candidate can supply finance to the constitutional-level Candidate to support 
him/her in government elections. This finance can represent an Incentive for 
the constitutional-level Candidate to support laxer regulation once he/she is 
elected and enters the collective-action level activities. 
4.3.8 Summary of corruption components 
In this section, the general components of corruption action situations are 
identified and discussed. These components are further elaborated on and 
used in Chapters 5 and 6 to develop models of actors’ decision-making 
processes in corrupt agreements. In Chapter 7, case studies are analysed by 
parsing the relevant factors and organising them according to the components 
identified. 
Section 4.3.2 identified the three types of activities that can be affected by 
corruption: resource allocation, policy development, and selection of 
candidates for the positions of power. 
Sections 4.3.3 to 4.3.6 then introduced the five positions occupied by actors in 
corruption action situations: a Decision Maker, a Candidate, a Representative, 
a Beneficiary and an Intermediary. Additionally, Stakeholders play a passive 
role in activities affected by corruption. However, Stakeholders can take on an 
active role in initiating institutional changes to improve the processes and 
outcomes, and addressing corruption. 
Decision Makers are endowed with power, control, discretion or influence over 
an activity. In their decisions, DMs are expected to follow the ALP, and act in 
accordance with the interests of the Stakeholders. The level of control over 
activities and the ability to provide an undue Advantage that leads to Valuable 
Object being allocated to a particular Candidate depends on the number of 
DMs and the function fulfilled by each DM in the relevant activity. 
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There are two actions that constitute a Corrupt Act by a DM: 
1. Request, agree to receive, or accept an Incentive. This Incentive can be 
provided directly to the DM, or to a third-party Beneficiary, in which case 
the DM receives a Derived Benefit. 
2. Provide the Candidate with an Advantage. 
An action constituting a Corrupt Act carried out by the Candidate, the 
Representative, or the Intermediary is to offer, promise or provide an Incentive 
to the DM or a third-party Beneficiary. As a result of corrupt exchanges, the 
Candidate receives an Advantage in an activity; the Representative obtains a 
Derived Benefit from the Candidate’s improved welfare; and the Intermediary 
receives a Commission for his/her services (less the value of the Incentive 




5 Model 1. Triad-based corruption games under uncertainty: 
bribes or gifts? 
5.1 Introduction  
Corruption is a complex phenomenon, and its manifestations are varied in 
nature. What is common to most cases is the importance of trust between 
corrupt partners. Social network ties facilitate information exchange that fosters 
trust, which is an important factor in establishing and sustaining corruption. This 
chapter looks to address the first question of the thesis set out in Section 3.2, 
and explores how bribe-givers may strategically use pre-existing social network 
connections to improve their chances of achieving successful corrupt 
agreements.  
In the broader sense of “institutions” the informal social institutions of social 
networks are important phenomena in understanding corruption. Network ties 
are pathways for flows of tangibles (e.g. goods) and intangibles (e.g. 
information, beliefs, norms, etc.) (Borgatti et al., 2013, p.3). Different types of 
networks allow formation of different types of beliefs about the characteristics 
of other individuals. As such, social network ties allow exchanging the type of 
information that fosters “goodwill” trust (trust that the other individual intends to 
perform according to agreements), whereas economic ties foster “competence” 
trust (trust in individual’s ability to perform according to agreements) (Ferriani 
et al., 2013). If two individuals do not have a direct connection, they may both 
have an acquaintance in common (an Intermediary), creating a path for flows.  
This chapter develops a game theory model of decision-making processes in 
corrupt agreements, linking economic and social network ties with formation of 
subjective probabilities over the likely actions of other actors in a corruption 
action situation. The decision-making processes are formulated under 
conditions of uncertainty. The actor is unable to assign exact cardinal 
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probabilities to the outcomes or events, but can assign ordinal probabilities and 
say which outcome is believed to be more likely to occur than another (see 
Four Cognitive Attitudes in Elster (2007, Ch. 7)). 
A sequential game with three actors (a Decision Maker (an official), a 
Representative and an Intermediary) is presented. A company Representative 
seeks to obtain an unfair Advantage over the competitors in an infrastructure 
project bidding process. The Representative chooses how to frame the offer to 
the Decision Maker (a gift or a bribe) and the method of offer delivery (directly, 
or via an Intermediary).  
Game theory models usually represent agents as utility- or payoff-maximising, 
following the assumptions of Rational Choice models. Such models largely 
ignore intrinsic motivations and social incentives to reciprocate or to avoid 
social disapproval (Fehr and Falk, 2002). As revealed by several psychological 
experiments, individual behaviour often deviates from payoff-maximising 
strategies. Participants of such experiments choose costly punishment in one-
shot games that reduce both players’ payoffs (Abbink et al., 2000, Lambsdorff 
and Frank, 2010). Hodgson and Jiang (2007) suggest that Rational Choice 
models may not be applicable in contexts where norms and morals play a key 
role in decision making. An alternative is to represent individuals as objective- 
or rule-driven. 
Therefore, version 1 of the model proposed in this chapter explores how a 
company Representative makes choices over alternative means of fulfilling an 
objective of obtaining an Advantage for the Candidate from the DM. A corrupt 
offer framed as a gift can be more readily accepted by the DM than if the offer 
is framed as a bribe. However, the expectation of reciprocity is less apparent if 
the offer is framed as a gift. If an Intermediary is used, the DM may be more 
likely to accept a bribe. However, a successful corrupt agreement depends on 
whether the Intermediary can be trusted to deliver the bribe to the DM. Version 
1 of the model provides an insight into the content of network connections 
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between the Representative and the Intermediary necessary for the latter to be 
trusted and employed. However, Version 1 includes parameters which are 
difficult to estimate and provides little insight into the choice between the gift 
and the bribe frames. 
Version 2 of the model in this chapter is based on payoff-maximising rationale 
for the Candidate and focuses on the choice between the gift and the bribe 
frames. The assumptions made are the same as in Version 1. However, 
whereas the objective of the Representative in Version 1 is to maximise the 
likelihood of the preferred outcome without weighing up the payoffs, Version 2 
introduces payoffs: the value of the contract, less the size of the bribe or the 
gift given to the DM. Version 2 allows the comparison of the sizes of bribes and 
gifts and shows that the value of the bribe is larger than the value of the gift 
under the model assumptions. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides a review of literature 
and uses the same terms as in the studies reviewed, such as agent, briber, 
bribe-taker and intermediary. Then, from Section 5.3 on, in developing the 
model, the terms introduced in Chapter 4 are used. Version 1 of the model is 
presented in Section 5.3. Version 2 of the model is presented in Section 5.4 
and Section 5.5 concludes.  
5.2 Review of literature 
5.2.1 Framing of a corrupt offer 
In order to disguise corrupt transactions from enforcement agencies, monetary 
transfers can be processed under the guise of legitimate payments for services. 
In cases of extortion or demanded kickbacks, officials can make contract 
allocations to companies conditional on payments of ‘fees’ or ‘concessions’. In 
the Iraqi Oil-for-Food contracts, such payments were termed “after sales 
service fees” and were fixed at 10% of the awarded contract value 
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(Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-For-Food 
Programme, 2005). In briber-initiated corruption, payments are sometimes 
offered as gifts, donations or loans (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009).  
The difference between a gift and a bribe is in the framing. Bribes are generally 
negotiated payments (Oldenburg, 1987) with reciprocity expectations. The 
frame of a “gift” is more subtle. The choice of the corrupt offer frame is strategic. 
The responses to the survey of Norwegian firms discussed in Søreide (2007) 
suggest that the gift frame is sometimes used by companies competing for 
public contracts, and the intention behind such offers is “similar or identical” to 
that behind bribes. Under conditions of uncertainty over the type of an official 
faced (honest or corrupt), an indirect or veiled offer (i.e. a gift rather than a bribe 
offer) provides plausible deniability in case the person is not corrupt (Lee and 
Pinker, 2010).  
However, the choice of a more subtle offer frame bears risks of the expectation 
of reciprocity not being understood as such. In the laboratory-based 
experimental corruption games with the choice of the corrupt offer frame (bribe 
or gift) left to the participants (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010, Lambsdorff and 
Frank, 2011), the choice is guided by the anticipation of how the frame is 
received by the other person. The gift frame is perceived to be less offensive 
to the potential corrupt partner, but at a cost of a less apparent quid-pro-quo.  
The participants of the Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) study who chose the bribe 
frame are thought to be more risk-loving and their choice is guided by clearer 
expectations of quid-pro-quo. There is also a slight tendency in the Lambsdorff 
and Frank (2010) study for bribe offers to be smaller in size compared to gift 
offers. There are no significant differences in the choices of the participants 
playing the roles of officials between the two frames. That is, both bribe and gift 
offers evoked responses of opportunism, whistleblowing and reciprocity. There 
is, however, a slight tendency to reciprocate more when bribed than when 
offered a gift.  
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The model presented in this chapter analyses the decision-making processes 
of a bribe-giver choosing how to frame a corrupt offer. The studies discussed 
above do not suggest that the responses of individuals playing the roles of 
officials can be predicted based on the frame used. However, the participants 
playing the roles of bribe-givers expressed beliefs that gifts are more likely to 
be accepted than bribes, but are less likely to be reciprocated. Therefore, these 
beliefs will be used to develop the bribe-giver’s decision-making processes.  
5.2.2 Intermediaries in corruption 
In formal models of corruption, the intermediaries’ role is in reducing risks 
associated with proposing a corrupt agreement. Lambsdorff (2002) and Hasker 
and Okten (2008) suggest that corrupt officials have a preference for acting via 
intermediaries because of the reduced risks of exposure. An official seeking to 
extract economic rents (bribes) can enter into an agreement with an 
intermediary, who then purports to provide a service to the population of cutting 
through the red tape and helping clients to obtain a service from the 
government official. In the model presented in Bayar (2009), the “service 
charge” is then split between the official and the intermediary. Alternatively, in 
corruption initiated by the “briber”, the intermediary is represented as being 
better informed about the types of officials, whether they are likely to accept 
bribes, and their appropriate amounts (Bayar, 2005).  
However, an experimental game of corruption with intermediaries in Drugov et 
al. (2014) shows that even when there is no uncertainty over the minimum bribe 
required to establish an agreement with an official, the number of accepted 
bribes when an intermediary is involved increases. This suggests a reduction 
in psychological costs of corruption through distancing the bribe-takers from 
the bribe-givers. The sizes of minimum-acceptable bribes set by participants 
playing the roles of officials are also somewhat smaller with an intermediary 
compared with the no-uncertainty setting (that is, when the minimum bribe is 
disclosed to the bribe-givers, with no intermediary being involved).   
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Despite the advantages of using intermediaries in corrupt transactions, there 
are some additional risks. For example, claims that intermediaries are better-
informed about government officials’ corruptibility through their network ties in 
some cases are false. Where institutions have a reputation for high levels of 
corruption, alleged intermediaries or middlemen can offer their services to a 
large number of individuals, promising to return the value of the bribe if the 
result is not satisfactory. In fact, the middlemen may keep the bribe, collecting 
a risk-free rent, as in some cases the desired outcome is achieved without any 
actions taken by the purported intermediary (Oldenburg, 1987). Some level of 
trust in the intermediary’s ability and willingness to act on behalf of the briber 
is, therefore, necessary (Zanella, 2013). 
5.2.3 Social networks and trust 
There is a large and growing literature on trust in social networks. In trust 
games, agents’ decisions on whether to place trust are determined by temporal 
and network embeddedness (Buskens, 2003). Temporal embeddedness refers 
to repeated interactions between the same pair of agents (a dyad) in a network. 
Such repeated interactions provide opportunities for dyadic and network 
learning, and control, or, in other words, punishment for breaking trust in past 
interactions (Buskens et al., 2010). Network embeddedness means the 
existence of third parties within a network, who possess information about past 
behaviour of agents. Information flows between agents then allow reputational 
sanctions by disclosing past actions (Buskens, 1998).  
Because of the illegal and, therefore, clandestine nature of corruption, 
information channels for learning about agents’ past actions are limited, if 
available at all. Sanction options, such as cancelling legally-obtained contracts 
if a company declines to pay a promised bribe, may not be exercised because 
of the risks of disclosure and punishment for attempted corruption. Although 
social networks enable the establishment of corrupt relationships lasting 
decades (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009) and taking the form of a futures 
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market in favours (Cartier–Bresson, 1997), it is poorly understood how social 
networks facilitate the development of corrupt networks.  
In the absence of credible channels for information about corruptibility of an 
official, the briber faces an identification problem, i.e. uncertainty over the 
official’s preferences over entering into a corrupt agreement. Strategic framing 
of the corrupt offer can aid in solving this problem, by sending an indirect signal 
such as framing the offer using innuendos hinting at a bribe (Lee and Pinker, 
2010). In the presence of high risks of being reported, or bribery being detected, 
and facing punishment, however, using social network channels allows bribers 
to extricate themselves from the act of bribing, and to separate the actions of 
bribing and the reciprocal provision of an unfair advantage. This further reduces 
the risks of getting caught.  
The perceived likelihood of a successful corrupt agreement made via an 
intermediary relies on high levels of trust in the intermediary’s ability and 
willingness to deliver the offer. An intermediary’s willingness to act on behalf of 
the briber, among other things, depends on how well his interests are aligned 
with the interests of other agents involved in the deal (the briber or the bribe-
taker). Intermediaries may charge for the service of providing a channel of bribe 
delivery. This, however, does not ensure that the intermediary is ‘honest’ and 
actually delivers the bribe to the intended official. Intrinsic motivations are more 
likely to produce cooperative behaviour from intermediaries than financial 
incentives (Bravo et al., 2012). 
The content of network ties between the briber and the intermediary is 
important in gauging whether the intermediary can be trusted to: 1) ensure that 
the bribe is accepted, and 2) not keep the money. The first requires for the 
briber to possess the knowledge of the level of competence of the intermediary, 
the second means relying on the goodwill of the intermediary towards the 
briber. Ferriani et al. (2013) suggest that social network (or expressive) ties 
allow the development of goodwill trust, whereas economic network (or 
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instrumental) ties create channels for information exchange that fosters 
competence trust. The study suggests that social ties have a stronger impact 
than economic ties on the development of multiplex ties (i.e. ties between 
individuals interacting with each other in multiple social contexts).  
5.3 Model Version 1 
5.3.1 Model assumptions 
The setting of the model is an infrastructure procurement process. An 
infrastructure company competes for a project contract. This company is the 
Candidate, and appoints a Representative to work on the bid and win the 
contract. There is one Decision Maker (DM) responsible for the tendering 
process and allocating the contract to the best bidder. The Candidate has 
several competitors, and the Candidate’s bid has a number of disadvantages 
compared to the competitors’ bids. The Candidate, therefore, is unlikely to win 
the contract without the DM’s support. The Representative is charged with 
securing the DM’s support and ensuring that the DM provides the Candidate 
with an Advantage over the competitors. The Representative may use an 
Intermediary to deliver an Incentive (a bribe) to the DM in exchange for an 
Advantage for the Candidate. 
Payoff structures are not considered in Version 1 of the model. The 
Representative evaluates potential outcomes of attempted bribery under 
different frames and seeks to maximise the likelihood of the preferred outcome. 
The benefits associated with corruption are not necessarily obtained by the 
actors directly involved in the transaction and, in some cases, are unspecified. 
The company Representative looks to obtain an Advantage for the 
infrastructure company (the Candidate) and they may derive an Indirect 
Benefit, such as a possibility of promotion or a bonus, contingent on a 
successful contract negotiation. In other cases, payoffs are not necessarily 
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tangible, such as a possibility of network connections development by entering 
into trust relationships. The model, therefore, considers the realm of assessing 
risks and using different means to achieve the preferred outcome.   
One of the key components of the model is goodwill trust – or the 
Representative’s trust that the Intermediary will not behave opportunistically. 
The extent of the Representative’s goodwill trust in the Intermediary depends 
on the strength of the social connection between the two. It is assumed that the 
strength of the connection increases with the period of time the two have known 
each other, combined with the frequency of interactions. Increasing trust with 
increasing strength of a social connection assumes that the Intermediary is, in 
fact, inherently trustworthy. Otherwise, if the Intermediary repeatedly breaks 
promises, the repeated interactions would reveal to the Representative the 
inherent opportunistic nature of the Intermediary. For the purposes of the 
model, however, it is assumed that the Intermediary is trustworthy; otherwise 
the Representative would have broken the tie, reduced the frequency of 
interactions, and, simply, would not have considered this Intermediary for the 
role in the corrupt agreement.   
5.3.2 Model formulation 
The proposed model unifies existing knowledge and results from experimental 
games on how individuals make choices of frames and delivery methods of 
corrupt offers, and assesses the importance of social connections between 
individuals. The model shows the Representative’s decision-making 
processes. The basic structure of the game is shown in Figure 5. When the 
Representative offers the DM an Incentive, the DM has two choices: to accept 
or to reject the offer. If the offer is rejected, the game ends. If, however, the 
offer is accepted, the DM chooses whether to provide the Advantage for the 






Figure 5 Model Version 1 decision tree 
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The Representative forms a belief over the likelihood that the DM rejects the 
offer of an Incentive framed as a bribe (b) and delivered directly (d) by the 
Representative to the DM. This belief is represented as a subjective probability 
𝑃൫𝑅௕,ௗ൯, which can take any value between 0 and 1. Provided that the offer is 
accepted (denoted 𝑅ത௕,ௗ, and 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ = 1 − 𝑃൫𝑅௕,ௗ൯), the Representative forms 
a belief of whether the DM is likely to reciprocate with an Advantage for the 
Candidate: 𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯. Therefore, the subjective probability of a successful 
corrupt contract 𝑃(𝑆௕,ௗ), where the direct bribe offer is accepted by the DM, and 
they reciprocate with an Advantage is: 
𝑃൫𝑆௕,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗ⋂𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ ∗ 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯   (E5.3.1) 
Similarly, if the Representative decides to offer the Incentive under the frame 
of a gift (g), the subjective probability of a successful corrupt contract is denoted 
𝑃(𝑆௚,ௗ): 
𝑃൫𝑆௚,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝐴௚,ௗ⋂𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝐴௚,ௗห𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯ ∗ 𝑃൫𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯   (E5.3.2) 
The Representative may choose an Intermediary to deliver the bribe instead of 
offering it directly to the DM. 𝑃(𝐾௕,௜) represents the subjective probability that 
the Intermediary does not pass the bribe along to the DM. A successful corrupt 
contract, in this case, is established if the Intermediary passes the bribe along 
to the relevant DM (𝐾ഥ௕,௜), the DM accepts the offer (𝑅ത௕,௜) and provides an 
Advantage to the Candidate (𝐴௕,௜). The subjective probability of this outcome is 
denoted 𝑃൫𝑆௕,௜൯: 




As discussed in Section 5.2.2, using an Intermediary reduces the perceived 
risk of exposure, and reduces the psychological costs of engaging in corrupt 
agreements for both the Representative and the DM. Therefore, an assumption 
is made that the Representative believes that the likelihood that the bribe offer 
is accepted by the DM when the Intermediary (i) is used is larger than if the 
offer is made directly: 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,௜|𝐾ഥ௕,௜൯ > 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯. 
Let 𝑥ଵ represent the difference in how likely the Representative believes the 
bribe offer is to be accepted if it is provided via an Intermediary compared with 
a direct offer: 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,௜|𝐾ഥ௕,௜൯ = 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑥ଵ. There is no opportunism (i.e. no 
possibility of the Intermediary keeping the bribe) in the case where the bribe is 
offered directly, and the offer always reaches the DM: 𝑃(𝐾ഥ௕,ௗ) = 1. 
Opportunism from the side of the Representative can also be included in the 
model by setting 𝑃(𝐾ഥ௕,ௗ) ≤ 1. In this case, the Candidate’s perception of the 
Representative’s trustworthiness can be included. This, however, is outside the 
scope of this model. The focus here is on the Intermediaries and their roles in 
corrupt agreements.  
Variable 𝑥ଵ is assumed to be positive, and its magnitude depends on the 
perceived characteristics of the Intermediary. An offer of a bribe requires tact, 
so as not to cause an insult to the receiving party (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 
2009). Therefore, 𝑥ଵ depends on the Representative’s trust in the 
Intermediary’s competence to perform the role of offering the bribe. Ferriani et 
al. (2013) suggest that economic connections allow the exchange of 
information that fosters competence trust. Assuming that the Intermediary is, in 
fact, inherently competent in performing this role, the Representative’s level of 
trust in the Intermediary’s ability is a function of the economic connection 
strength between the Representative and the Intermediary. Thus, 𝑥ଵ is 
assumed to be proportional to economic connection strength. 
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However, if the Intermediary is used, and even if they are perceived as 
competent, they may keep the bribe and not pass it along to the intended DM. 
The Representative forms a belief over the likelihood that the Intermediary 
keeps the bribe. The perceived likelihood of the Intermediary not behaving 
opportunistically relies on Representative’s goodwill trust in the Intermediary. 
Again, drawing from Ferriani et al. (2013), goodwill trust relies on a social 
connection between the Representative and the Intermediary. Henceforth, the 
subjective probability that the Intermediary will not behave opportunistically 
(𝑥ଶ = 𝑃(𝐾ഥ௕,௜) = 1 − 𝑃(𝐾௕,௜)) is assumed to be proportional to the social 
connection strength between the Intermediary and the Representative.  
Substituting 𝑃൫𝐾ഥ௕,௜൯ = 𝑥ଶ and 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,௜|𝐾ഥ௕,௜൯ =  𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑥ଵ into equation 
(E5.3.3): 
𝑃൫𝑆௕,௜൯ =  𝑃൫𝐴௕,௜ห𝑅ത௕,௜⋂𝐾ഥ௕,௜൯ ∗ ൫𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑥ଵ൯ ∗ 𝑥ଶ    (E5.3.4) 
Assuming that the bribe is equally likely to be reciprocated with an Advantage 
by the DM, whether it is offered via an Intermediary or directly, 
𝑃൫𝐴௕,௜ห𝑅ത௕,௜⋂𝐾ഥ௕,௜൯ =  𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯. Making this substitution in (E5.3.4):  
𝑃൫𝑆௕,௜൯ =  𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ ∗ ൫𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑥ଵ൯ ∗ 𝑥ଶ    (E5.3.5) 
The Representative would consider using the Intermediary if the likelihood of a 
successful corrupt agreement is greater or equal to its likelihood if the bribe is 
offered directly: 
𝑃൫𝑆௕,௜൯ ≥ 𝑃൫𝑆௕,ௗ൯        (E5.3.6) 
Substituting (E5.3.5 and E5.3.1) into (E5.3.6): 




൫𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑥ଵ൯ ∗ 𝑥ଶ ≥ 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯      (E5.3.7) 
The implications of (E5.3.7) are discussed in Section 5.3.3. First, a comparison 
of the perceived likelihoods of a successful corrupt contract under the gift and 
bribe frames is made. 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, a gift frame is perceived to be more subtle and 
less offensive than a bribe frame of a corrupt offer, at the cost of a less apparent 
quid-pro-quo. Accepting an Incentive framed as a gift might provide the DM 
with plausible deniability in the event the corrupt agreement is discovered. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the Representative believes that a gift offer is 
more likely to be accepted than a bribe offer: 𝑃൫𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯ > 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯. Let 𝑦ଵ 
represent the difference in how likely the Representative believes the gift offer 
is to be accepted by the DM compared with the bribe offer: 𝑃൫𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ +
𝑦ଵ. 
The Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) experiment shows that bribe offers are 
slightly more likely to be reciprocated than gift offers. Therefore, the perceived 
likelihood of the DM providing an Advantage to the Candidate is assumed to 
be higher under the bribe frame: 𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ > 𝑃൫𝐴௚,ௗห𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯. Let 𝑦ଶ represent 
the difference in how likely the DM is thought to provide an Advantage under 
the bribe and the gift frames: 𝑃൫𝐴௚,ௗห𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ − 𝑦ଶ. 
Substituting 𝑃൫𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑦ଵ and 𝑃൫𝐴௚,ௗห𝑅ത௚,ௗ൯ = 𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ − 𝑦ଶ into 
(E5.3.2): 
𝑃൫𝑆௚,ௗ൯ = (𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ − 𝑦ଶ) ∗ (𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑦ଵ)    (E5.3.8) 
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Similarly to the choice made between involving an Intermediary and offering a 
bribe directly to the DM, the Representative chooses to use a gift frame if the 
subjective probability of a successful corrupt agreement is at least as high as 
with the bribe frame: 
𝑃൫𝑆௚,ௗ൯ ≥ 𝑃൫𝑆௕,ௗ൯        (E5.3.9) 
Substituting E5.3.8 and E5.3.1 into E5.3.9: 
(𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ − 𝑦ଶ) ∗ (𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑦ଵ) ≥ 𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ ∗ 𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯  (E5.3.10) 
If the Representative makes a choice between the gift delivered directly and a 
bribe delivered via an Intermediary, the bribe-Intermediary choice will be made 
if: 
𝑃൫𝑆௕,௜൯ ≥ 𝑃൫𝑆௚,ௗ൯        (E5.3.11) 
Substituting (E5.3.5) and (E5.3.8) into (E5.3.11): 
𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ ∗ ൫𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑥ଵ൯ ∗ 𝑥ଶ ≥ ൫𝑃൫𝐴௕,ௗห𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ − 𝑦ଶ൯ ∗ ൫𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑦ଵ൯ 
          (E5.3.12) 
The next section discusses the implications of Version 1 of the model.  
5.3.3 Model Version 1 Analysis 
This section discusses Version 1 of the model. In this section, if the 
Representative has high goodwill trust in the Intermediary, this Intermediary will 
henceforth be referred to as trustworthy. If the Representative has high 
competence trust in the Intermediary, they will be referred to as competent. 






        (E5.3.13) 
As set out in Section 5.3.2, 𝑥ଶ represents the subjective probability estimated 
by the Representative that the Intermediary will not keep the Incentive. That is, 
it represents the belief as to what extent the Intermediary can be trusted. The 
strength of this goodwill trust depends on the strength of the social connection 
between the Intermediary and the Representative. 𝑥ଶ is an ordinal variable, and 
can take any value is between 0 and 1. That is, if the Representative perceives 
the Intermediary to be completely untrustworthy, 𝑥ଶ takes the value 0. This 
means that the Representative expects the Intermediary to keep the Incentive 
and not pass it along to the DM. The values of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1 represent, 
respectively, the following levels of trust: low, low to medium, medium to high, 
high, and complete trust. 
𝑥ଵ in the denominator of equation E5.3.13 represents the difference in how 
likely the Representative believes the bribe offer is to be accepted if it is 
provided via an Intermediary compared with a direct offer. If 𝑥ଵ = 0, the 
Representative believes that the DM is equally likely to accept the Incentive 
offer if it is extended directly by the Representative or via an Intermediary. 
According to equation E5.3.13, if 𝑥ଵ = 0, 𝑥ଶ ≥
 ௉൫ோത್,೏൯
௉൫ோത್,೏൯
= 1. That is, the 
Representative would in this case require complete trust that the Intermediary 
would indeed deliver the offer, for the Representative to consider using an 
Intermediary.   
If the Representative believes that the Intermediary can increase the chances 
of the Incentive being accepted, there is a trade-off between the two types of 
trust. Figure 6 shows the minimum levels of goodwill trust required for the 
Representative to choose the Intermediary to deliver the Incentive to the DM. 
In this figure, 𝑥ଵ = 0.2, meaning that the Representative believes that the 
Intermediary can increase the chances of the offer being accepted by a small 
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amount, such as 20%. The x-axis shows the probability of the direct bribe offer 
being accepted (𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯). The indifference line (the line separating the two 
areas) shows the minimum levels of goodwill trust required for the 
Representative to use the Intermediary.  
 
Figure 6 Minimum levels of goodwill trust required for the 
Representative to choose the Intermediary to deliver the Incentive 
(x1=0.2) 
Figure 6 shows that, as the subjective probability of a direct offer acceptance 
increases, the minimum level of goodwill trust also increases. In low corruption 
environments, where the probability of the corrupt offer being accepted is close 
to 0, the Representative is prepared to employ an Intermediary whose 
trustworthiness is low (level of minimum goodwill trust is close to 0). However, 
in high-corruption environments, where bribe acceptance rates are high, the 
Representative would choose trustworthy Intermediaries to deliver the bribe. 
 110 
 
There is a kink in the curve in Figure 6 in the top right-hand corner. This is 
because the denominator in equation E5.3.13 cannot be greater than 1. That 
is, the subjective probability that the bribe offer is accepted if it is provided via 
an Intermediary (𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ + 𝑥ଵ) is less than or equal to 1. This means that, if the 
likelihood of acceptance of a bribe offered directly is already high (𝑃൫𝑅ത௕,ௗ൯ ≥
0.8) and the Intermediary can increase this likelihood by a small amount (𝑥ଵ ≤
0.2), the Intermediary’s role is to make an already highly likely event almost 
certain in the Representative’s assessment. This increases the minimum levels 
of goodwill trust required for the Intermediary to be used. 
Figure 7 shows minimum levels of goodwill trust required for the Representative 
to choose the Intermediary to deliver the Incentive for varying levels of 
competence trust. As 𝑥ଵ increases, the Representative perceives the 
Intermediary to be more competent in delivering the Incentive in such a way 
that it is accepted by the DM. Therefore, there is some substitutability between 
competence and goodwill trust. However, the two are not perfect substitutes, 
and substantial goodwill trust levels are required for the Representative to use 





Figure 7 Minimum levels of goodwill trust required for the 
Representative to choose the Intermediary to deliver the Incentive for 
varying levels of competence trust. 
Unlike E5.3.7, equations E5.3.10 and E5.3.12, where the gift frame is 
considered, do not yield to the same level of simplification. That is, even after 
the equations are re-arranged and simplified, they consist of more than three 
variables, which makes the analysis and drawing any conclusions difficult.  
The next section provides discussion of Version 1 of the model.  
5.3.4 Discussion of Version 1 of the Model 
Version 1 of the model is based on comparisons of subjective probabilities of a 
successful corrupt contract under different frames and methods of Incentive 
delivery. It relies on the ability of the Representative to rank the likelihoods of 
key events: corrupt offer acceptance by the DM, DM’s reciprocation with an 
Advantage for the Company, and opportunistic behaviour by the Intermediary. 
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Although the Model offers an insight into the importance of the Representative’s 
goodwill and competence trust in the Intermediary, it is difficult to gain similar 
insights for the importance of the gift frame.  
Variables 𝑥ଵ , 𝑥ଶ,  𝑦ଵ and 𝑦ଶ are difficult to estimate. Although the concepts of 
social and economic network connections creating channels for information 
exchange fostering goodwill (𝑥ଶ) and competence (𝑥ଵ) trust have been 
discussed in past literature (Ferriani et al., 2013), both the strength of the 
different network ties and the level of trust are difficult to quantify or even order. 
In reality, multiplex ties are likely to evolve, and the separation between the 
different types of ties is not always feasible (multiplex ties mean that individuals 
interact with each other in multiple social contexts).  
Version 1 of the model requires data on how individuals estimate the likelihood 
of Incentive acceptance and reciprocity if the offer is framed as a gift or a bribe. 
Although studies such as Lambsdorff and Frank (2010) provide some insight 
into how participants respond to different frames, it does not allow extrapolation 
to, for example, how ‘bribe-givers’ compare the likelihoods of gift or bribe 
acceptance. There are no known studies estimating such subjective 
probabilities.  
As outlined in Section 5.3.1, the model relies on the assumption that 
competence trust and goodwill trust increase as the strength of the economic 
and social connections increase. Repeated interactions between individuals 
can reveal negative as well as positive characteristics. Therefore, if the 
Intermediary is inherently incompetent or untrustworthy, this will be revealed to 
the Representative through past interactions. It can be assumed, however, that 
the Representative would not keep the connections with such an Intermediary 
and would not consider them for setting up a new corrupt agreement. 
Although it is recognised that individuals can act contrary to payoff-maximising 
interests, disregarding expected payoffs in the model provides limited insight. 
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Therefore, the second version of the model takes into consideration expected 
payoffs. As the Representative’s payoff can be thought to be proportional to the 
company’s (Candidate’s) payoff, the second version of the model is based on 
maximisation of the Candidate’s profits, assuming that the Representative 
receives some fraction α of the payoff π. 
Considering expected payoffs from any action requires listing payoffs and 
probabilities of every outcome. Therefore, Version 2 of the model cannot be 
limited to considering only the probabilities of the most-preferred outcome, as 
has been done for Version 1 of the model.  
5.4 Model Version 2 
The second version of the model focuses on the framing of the corrupt offer. 
The model considers only direct Incentive offers by the Representative, without 
the involvement of an Intermediary. It is assumed that, if the Representative 
does not attempt to offer a corrupt Incentive to the DM, the Candidate stands 
a chance of being allocated the contract with probability P(S), but this 
probability is small, and close to 0. Figure 8 shows the model’s decision tree.  
This section first separately considers two subgames and evaluates: a) the 
choices of the Representative to increase the chances that the DM reciprocates 
with an Advantage, assuming that the corrupt offer has already been accepted; 
and b) the choices of the Representative to increase the chances that the DM 
accepts the Incentive, assuming that the Advantage will be forthcoming. That 
is, the Candidate’s expected payoffs are considered assuming that the DM 
accepted the offer, but it is not certain whether they will reciprocate with the 
Advantage (a). Then, separately, the payoffs are considered assuming that the 
Advantage will be forthcoming with certainty if the DM accepts the offer (b). The 






Figure 8 Model Version 2 decision tree 
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Let the contract value to the Candidate equal £C, which represents the profits 
the company expects to make from the contract. The Representative estimates 
the probability of a successful contract acquisition as P(S). If the 
Representative does nothing, and awaits the decision of the tendering 
committee, the expected payoff is 𝜋 = 𝑃(𝑆) ∗ 𝐶. 𝑃(𝑆) is assumed to be small, 
and close to 0. Alternatively, the Representative may offer one of the key 
Decision Makers (DMs) an Incentive to manipulate the tendering procedure in 
such a way that increases the Candidate’s chances of winning the tender. The 
Incentive can be framed as a gift of size £G or a bribe of size £B. In return, the 
DM can increase the likelihood of the Candidate obtaining the contract by some 
margin β, such that 𝑃(𝑆௠) =  𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽, where 𝑃(𝑆௠) stands for probability of a 
successful contract acquisition where the DM manipulates the tendering 
procedures in favour of the Candidate. Assuming that the DM does not have 
full control over the tendering process, even with DM’s support, a successful 
contract acquisition may not be certain:  𝑃(𝑆௠) ≤ 1. 
If the Representative decides to offer the Incentive as a gift, the Candidate’s 
expected payoff is: 
𝜋௚ = (𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐺       (E5.4.1) 
Alternatively, if the Incentive is framed as a bribe, the payoff is: 
𝜋௕ = (𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵       (E5.4.2) 
Equations (E5.4.1) and (E5.4.2) hold true if the DM always accepts the offer of 
an Incentive and always reciprocates with an Advantage β. That is, 𝑃(𝛽 > 0) =
1. However, even after receiving the Incentive, the DM may not reciprocate with 
an Advantage. With probability 𝑃(𝐴) the DM provides the Advantage, and 𝛽 >
0, and with probability 1 − 𝑃(𝐴), 𝛽 = 0. 
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If the Representative decides to offer a bribe, the Candidate’s expected payoff 
is: 
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ ൫(𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵൯ + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵)  (E5.4.3) 
The Representative would only consider offering a bribe if the expected payoff 
is non-negative: 𝜋௕ ≥ 0. Equation E5.4.3 simplifies to (Appendix B1 shows the 





          (E5.4.4) 
Likewise, when the gift frame is used, the payoff function  
𝜋௚ = 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ ൫(𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐺൯ + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐺)  (E5.4.5) 





         (E5.4.6) 
For the Representative to consider offering the relevant DM a bribe or a gift, 
the lowest value of the expected payoff is 0: 𝜋௕ = 𝜋௚ = 0. Therefore, the 


















        (E5.4.9) 
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Equation (E5.4.9) simplifies to 𝐵 = 𝐺, suggesting that the values of a gift or a 
bribe would be the same. However, this relies on the assumption that the official 
is equally likely to provide an Advantage whether the Incentive is framed as a 
gift or a bribe. As discussed in Lee and Pinker (2010) (Experiment 2), the overt 
rather than veiled offer of a bribe was chosen by the experiment participants 
because of the directness and the clarity this option offers. That is, it is 
perceived as being clearer that the party offering a bribe is seeking something 
in return. In Lambsdorff and Frank (2010), there was a slight tendency to 
reciprocate more often under the bribe frame than the gift frame. Therefore, if 
the probability of the DM to provide an Advantage is higher with the bribe frame,   
𝑃(𝐴௕) > 𝑃൫𝐴௚൯        (E5.4.10) 

















From equation E5.4.10, it follows that  ௉(஺್)
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𝐶ൗ − 𝑃(𝑆) >
𝐺
𝐶ൗ − 𝑃(𝑆) 
𝐵 > 𝐺 
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This suggests that, if the bribe is more likely to be reciprocated with an 
Advantage, the value of the bribe is likely to be larger than the value of the gift.  
The above discussion relies on the DM always accepting the offer of an 
Incentive. However, the DM may reject the offer outright with probability 𝑃(𝑅). 
The discussion that follows below focuses on the expected payoff of the 
Candidate assuming that the DM always reciprocates with an Advantage if they 
accept the offer of a gift or a bribe. Therefore, the focus is on the likelihood of 
offer acceptance. 
An assumption is made that, if the offer of a bribe is rejected, the Candidate 
does not pay out the value of the bribe £B. Additionally, the DM does not report 
the corrupt offer to the authorities and the Candidate is allowed to continue 
participating in the tendering process. Then, the Candidate’s expected payoff 
is: 
𝜋௕ = ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ ((𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵) + 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶   (E5.4.11) 
Similarly to the discussion above, the Representative would consider offering 
a bribe if 𝜋௕ ≥ 0: 
 ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ ((𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵) + 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0   (E5.4.12) 
Equation E5.4.12 simplifies to (Appendix B2 shows the re-arrangement and 





        (E5.4.13) 
Likewise, if the gift frame is used: 
𝜋௚ = ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ ((𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐺) + 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶    
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𝜋௚ ≥ 0  
൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ ((𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐺) + 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0    (E5.4.14) 





        (E5.4.15) 
Again, the Representative would consider using a bribe or a gift if the expected 
























       (E5.4.16) 
If the subjective probability of gift acceptance is the same as the subjective 
probability of bribe acceptance, the values of the bribe or the gift would be the 
same, 𝐵 = 𝐺. However, assuming that gifts are more likely to be accepted:  
1 − 𝑃(𝑅௕) < 1 − 𝑃൫𝑅௚൯       (E5.4.17)  
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𝐵 > 𝐺 
Thus far, it has been shown that the sizes of bribes are expected to be higher 
than the values of gifts under two separate assumptions. The first assumption 
is that gifts are less likely to be reciprocated with an Advantage than bribes. 
The second assumption is that gifts are more likely to be accepted than bribes. 
Next, the two assumptions are put together. That is, if the Representative offers 
the DM a bribe, there are three possible outcomes. The DM rejects the offer 
with probability 𝑃(𝑅), accepts the offer and provides an advantage with 
probability ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ 𝑃(𝐴), and accepts the offer but provides no advantage 
with probability ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ ൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯. The Candidate’s expected payoff is as 
follows: 
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝑅)(𝑃(𝑆)𝐶) + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ ൫(𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽)𝐶 − 𝐵൯ + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗
൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵)        (E5.4.19) 
Equation (E5.4.19) simplifies to (Appendix B3 shows the re-arrangement and 
simplification of equation E5.4.19): 
𝜋௕ = (𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵) ∗ ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ + 𝑃(𝑆)     (E5.4.20) 
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Similarly, the Candidate’s expected payoff if the corrupt Incentive is offered to 
the DM as a gift is as follows: 
𝜋௚ = 𝑃(𝑅)(𝑃(𝑆)𝐶) + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ ൫(𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽)𝐶 − 𝐺൯ + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗
൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐺)        (E5.4.21) 
Equation (E5.4.21) simplifies to  
𝜋௚ = (𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 − 𝐺) ∗ ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ + 𝑃(𝑆)     (E5.4.22) 
As above, subscripts b and g are included in equations E5.4.20 and E5.4.22 to 
differentiate between the probabilities of offer acceptance (1 − 𝑃(𝑅௕) and 1 −
𝑃൫𝑅௚൯) and reciprocation (𝑃(𝐴௕) and 𝑃൫𝐴௚൯) under the bribe and gift frames: 
𝜋௕ = (𝑃(𝐴௕)𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵)(1 − 𝑃(𝑅௕)) + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶    (E5.4.23) 
𝜋௚ = (𝑃൫𝐴௚൯𝛽𝐶 − 𝐺)(1 − 𝑃൫𝑅௚൯) + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶    (E5.4.24) 
As before, it is assumed that the Representative would consider offering a bribe 
or a gift if the expected payoffs are non-negative: 𝜋௕ ≥ 0; 𝜋௚ ≥ 0. Equation 
E5.4.23 is re-arranged to make 𝛽 the subject (Appendix B4 shows the re-


















The Representative would consider using a bribe or a gift if the expected payoff 







































Because the probability that the DM will provide an advantage under the bribe 





































Because the probability of a bribe offer being accepted is assumed to be lower 





















𝐵 − 𝐺 > 0 
𝐵 > 𝐺 
Therefore, the sizes of bribes are expected to be higher than the sizes of gifts.  
5.5 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter presented two versions of the Representative’s (bribe-giver’s) 
decision-making model. The model is based on subjective probabilities (beliefs) 
of the Representative over the chances of securing a successful corrupt 
contract with the DM when using different frames of the offer, and different 
methods of offer delivery. The model proposes a method of representing how 
pre-existing networks facilitate the development of corrupt networks. It also 
shows how company Representatives can strategically use bribe or gift frames 
to offer corrupt Incentives to the Decision Makers.  
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In version 1 of the model, the Representative is driven by the objective of 
obtaining an unfair Advantage for the Candidate in the project bidding process. 
Version 1 provides an insight into the content of network connections between 
the Representative and the Intermediary necessary for the latter to be trusted 
and used to facilitate a corrupt transaction. It suggests that in high-corruption 
environments, Representatives would choose an Intermediary they have high 
levels of trust in (who can be trusted to deliver the bribe to the DM and not keep 
it). In the absence of this trust, the Representatives would choose to deliver the 
bribe directly to the DM without the use of an Intermediary.  
Version 1 of the model is based on the assumption that the DM is more likely 
to accept a bribe via an Intermediary than directly from the Representative. If 
the Representative believes that the offer is equally likely to be accepted 
delivered directly or via an Intermediary, the Representative would require 
complete trust that the Intermediary will deliver the bribe to the DM.  
However, version 1 of the model includes parameters which are difficult to 
estimate and it provides little insight into the choice between the gift and the 
bribe frames. The payoff structures for the Candidate are introduced into the 
model to develop Version 2. This version focuses on the choice between a gift 
and a bribe frame of the corrupt offer. Under the assumptions of the model, the 
value of the bribe offer is expected to be larger than the gift offer. This is 
contrary to the results of Lambsdorff and Frank (2010), where the sizes of 
bribes offered in laboratory experiments were slightly smaller than the sizes of 
gifts. The reason for this difference in results could be that another social cue 
affected the decisions of the bribe-givers in the experimental study that did not 
form a part of the model in this chapter. This cue could be, for example, offering 
a larger proportion of the resource to the party one is attempting to create an 
affective tie with through the offering of a gift. 
The model in this chapter was developed with a view to represent the bribe-
givers as objective- or rule-driven. This was done because the payoff-
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maximising assumptions of Rational Choice models may not be applicable to 
situations where social cues, expectations and norms play an important part in 
decision making. However, developing a model based on objective-driven 
behaviour using game-theory techniques has proven difficult. Version 1 of the 
model yielded functions that could not be reduced to less than three variables, 
and it proved difficult to gain an insight into the strategic choices of corrupt offer 
frames.  
Introducing payoff functions for version 2 has produced unwieldy equations. 
Although they could be reduced to gain an insight into the differences in the 
sizes of bribe and gift offers, managing such models is challenging, and testing 
new assumptions requires lengthy calculations.  
Therefore, game theory techniques may not be the optimal method of analysing 
interactions between individuals guided by social cues, norms and 
expectations. Simulation models can be a better fit for such analyses. 
Therefore, the analysis of the decision making processes of DMs in the next 
chapter will be carried out using social simulation modelling techniques.  
The insights of this chapter and the strategies of the bribe-givers are further 
discussed later in this thesis. Section 8.2 discusses the methods used to 
develop the model in this chapter. The possible strategies that can be used by 
the bribe-givers discussed in this chapter are then revisited in Section 8.3 and 
assessed against the insights developed through the case studies analysis. 
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6 Model 2: Social norm-based simulation model of decision-
making processes in corrupt agreements 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite the large amount of attention received by the topic of corruption and 
the international efforts to combat it, the phenomenon is persistent (Mishra, 
2006). There remain puzzles about corrupt behaviour that cannot be fully 
explained by theories focusing on individual behaviour in isolation from its 
institutional and normative context. For example, the sizes of political bribes 
are well below the value of “rents” collected by the bribe-payers (the Tullock 
paradox (Tullock, 1980, Rasmusen and Ramseyer, 1994)). Although economic 
motives are thought to be at the core of corrupt transactions, it has been noted 
that social norms can also help explain such behaviour (Rose-Ackerman, 
2010a). This chapter addresses the second question of the thesis set out in 
Section 3.2: How do social norms affect bribe-takers’ choices? 
With a few exceptions, existing models of corruption represent agents’ 
decisions as a monetary utility- or benefit-maximising problem, following the 
assumptions of Rational Choice models. Such models largely ignore intrinsic 
motivations and social incentives to reciprocate or to avoid social disapproval 
(Fehr and Falk, 2002). Norms against corruption are rarely taken into 
consideration, and there are few formal models that show how monetary 
payoffs interact with the costs associated with breaking social norms. 
Corruption researchers have called for ideas, norms and culture to be taken 
more seriously in explaining corruption (Hopkin, 2002). As discussed in Section 
2.3.4, where moral costs of engaging in corruption are referred to in formal 
models, they are either not formally represented (Bayar, 2005, Situngkir, 2003), 
or, if represented, then only as one additional cost parameter in the payoff 
functions, without specifying the content and sources of these costs 
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(Groenendijk, 1997). A method of conceptualising norms against corruption 
common in past literature is through the level of honesty. This has been 
implemented by randomly separating actors into honest or dishonest groups, 
with corrupt partners making decisions based on the probability of facing an 
honest partner (Aidt, 2003, Uribe, 2012, Bayar, 2005, Bayar, 2009). 
Alternatively, a degree of honesty on some scale has been used (Situngkir, 
2003, Lui, 1986). 
This chapter presents a model of decision-making processes in corrupt 
agreements based on a conflict of social norms of behaviour. The model is 
similar in structure to Model 1 in Chapter 5, but this time the choices of the DM 
(the official) are explored in more detail. The model proposes a method of 
linking legitimacy of institutions, group behaviour status quo, and social network 
connections with self-seeking behaviour. This chapter explores the 
mechanisms left as a ‘black box’ in past modelling efforts (Boehm and 
Lambsdorff, 2009). It explores the norms of behaviour triggered in corrupt 
agreements and proposes a method of representing social norm conflict and 
its resolution. That is, an individual in the model is not only guided by narrow 
self-interest, but also by observed behaviour of others and cultural and social 
expectations towards his/her behaviour.   
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a literature 
review. Section 6.3 sets out the model formulation. The model was then coded 
in Matlab and Section 6.4 shows the results of model simulations. Section 6.5 
discusses how the model can be used to analyse repeated corrupt interactions, 
and Section 6.6 concludes. 
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6.2 Review of literature 
6.2.1 Economic interests and temptation 
Authors from the field of economics, including Rose-Ackerman, concede that 
social norms can be an important factor in corrupt agreements, but maintain 
that economic interests remain central to motivations behind corruption (Rose-
Ackerman, 2010a). This section reviews literature on how economic interests 
motivate corrupt behaviour and how the bribe amount is decided upon.  
According to corruption models based on Rational Choice Theory, an individual 
chooses corrupt actions if the rewards of doing so outweigh the costs (see 
Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.4). Higher penalties for corruption and improved 
monitoring increase the risks corrupt officials are exposed to, leading to higher 
costs and lower expected rewards of corruption. This can reduce individual 
propensity to engage in corruption if bribe sizes are assumed to be fixed 
(Banuri and Eckel, 2012). On the other hand, it can also lead officials to 
increase the minimum bribe size they are willing to accept (Boehm and 
Lambsdorff, 2009), thus incorporating the costs of higher risks associated with 
corruption within the higher demanded bribe. Therefore, the bargaining power 
of officials in corrupt agreements plays an important role in determining the 
effectiveness of monitoring and punishment interventions.  
Bribe payments can be thought of as compensation of officials for an illicit 
service they provide. Sizes of bribes, then, can be determined by a combination 
of the type of service provided and the service beneficiaries’ willingness to pay 
for it. There is some evidence that the bribe size is dependent on the type of 
service provided by the official. For example, for some routine government 
functions, the bribes are relatively stable, and “price schedules” for bribes have 
been revealed through surveys and even published in newspapers (Rose-
Ackerman, 1998). Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) report that in 1994 in 
Ukraine, the unofficial “fees” to obtain export and import licences averaged 
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$217 for export and $108 for import licences. The survey shows that over 90% 
of respondents paid these fees. Such routine nature of payoffs suggests a well-
functioning and well-routed corrupt market, with each service having a stable 
price. In cases of infrastructure delivery contracts, the bribe is likely to be fixed 
to the value of the contract. For example, in Pakistan, contractors reported 
paying 7% “commissions” (Rose-Ackerman, 1998).  
On the supply side of bribes, higher risk of corruption detection leads firms to 
expect higher returns on bribes paid, thereby reducing bribe sizes where the 
value of the illicit service is fixed (Warner, 2007, p.129). This factor can help 
explain what is often referred to as the Tullock paradox (Rasmusen and 
Ramseyer, 1994, Tullock, 1980): the values of advantages provided by officials 
are often disproportionately higher than the bribe sizes received. Rasmusen 
and Ramseyer (1994) focus on the example of lobbyists bribing legislators in 
return for their favourable vote on a statute. The authors suggest that one of 
the reasons behind small bribes in this case is the disadvantaged bargaining 
position of the legislators, with the lobbyists adopting a “take it or leave it” 
approach to offering a bribe. 
In behavioural game theory, the Ultimatum game is an example where this 
“take it or leave it” factor in dividing some resource is analysed. The Nash 
equilibrium strategy of this game is to accept an offer of even the smallest 
proportion of the resource. Experimental results, however, reveal strong equal-
payoff preference, with offers substantially smaller than half of the resource 
being rejected. This result is shown to be robust across different cultures 
(Bicchieri, 2006, p.104), with the exception of some cultures  in  Africa, the 
Amazon, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Mongolia (Camerer, 2003, p.11), 
where fairness in division did not appear to be the guiding principle.  
An experiment carried out by Gonzalez et al. (2007) applied the Ultimatum 
game to a bureaucratic corruption example, albeit the wording of the 
instructions was neutral, avoiding corruption terms. In this experiment, one 
 130 
 
participant allocates shares of the profit between himself and another two 
participants. Either of the two respondents can decline the offer, and one of 
them has the additional power to cause delays and, therefore, impose costs on 
the profit distributor. Results of the study show a preference for equal sharing. 
Most frequent division choice was for an equal share of the profit to be allocated 
between the three participants. 40% chose to give a higher share to the 
participant with additional delay powers than to the other respondent. In 90% 
of cases where an equal share between the three participants was offered, it 
was accepted without any delay imposed.   
Results of other experimental corruption games do not show the same level of 
inequality aversion as results of Ultimatum games. Drugov et al. (2014), Barr 
and Serra (2009) and Barr and Serra (2010) carried out an experiment with the 
same core structure, where participants playing the roles of officials were asked 
to state their Minimum Acceptable Bribe (MAB) in experimental monetary units. 
The mean stated MABs are below the payoff-equalising values for all three 
studies. The officials faced a cost for accepting a bribe. Drugov et al. (2014) 
report that 11% of participants stated MAB values below this cost, which means 
that they would accept a bribe that results in a lower payoff compared to if they 
rejected it. The authors explain this observation as a mistake on the part of the 
participants and omit the erroneous values from their statistical analysis. Barr 
and Serra (2009), Barr and Serra (2010) do not report such errors.  
The ability of officials to correctly calculate the payoffs and establish the correct 
‘price’ of the corrupt service is, therefore, questionable. Even when the payoffs 
from different strategies are known precisely, experimental participants can still 
set a minimum bribe value below their costs (Drugov et al., 2014). In repeated 
games with each round carrying a small (but known) probability of corrupt 
choices being detected, Abbink et al. (2002) show that participants significantly 
underestimate the overall probability of being caught. In reality, the risks, costs 
and benefits from corrupt agreements are not known.  
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6.2.2 Conflicting norms 
According to Ostrom, norms of behaviour are prescriptions for individuals, 
defining required, acceptable or permissible actions, and such norms are the 
attributes of the community under investigation (McGinnis, 2011, Ostrom, 
2005). For example, the norm of reciprocity is an important component of the 
collective action theory. Views on whether norms are reinforced through 
punishment vary across researchers. To Ostrom, norms do not contain a 
punishment clause. Instead, following a norm is intrinsically motivated, through 
feelings of guilt or shame for transgressions, and pride for adhering to it. On 
the other hand, Bicchieri posits that, for a social norm to exist, it requires for a 
sufficiently large number of people to adhere to it, and there is an expectation 
that an individual will follow the norm, or face punishment for transgressions 
(Bicchieri, 2006, p. 11).  
Elster distinguishes between four types of norms, depending on what motivates 
norm conformity (Elster, 2007). Legal norms are enforced by specialised 
agents such as the police, and transgression carries risks of a tangible 
punishment (e.g. a fine in case of littering). Social norms, in contrast, are 
enforced through informal sanctions (e.g. ostracism for disobeying the rules of 
etiquette). Both legal and social norms are triggered when others can observe 
the actions of an individual, and compliance is motivated by the threat of formal 
or informal punishment. Moral norms are intrinsically motivated, and do not rely 
on individual’s actions to be observed by others to create compliance. For 
example, the norm of helping others in distress is enforced by the individual’s 
belief that it is the right thing to do. Finally, quasi-moral norms are triggered by 
an individual observing the actions of others. This type of norms includes 
reciprocity and cooperation.    
An individual may face conflicting norms of behaviour. In cases leading to 
corruption, impartiality and the application of the arm’s-length principle (see 
Section 2.2.1) required of public officials might conflict with their cultural 
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background, which might dictate that the interests of the closely-knit community 
take precedence over the interests of the wider population (Section 2.3.3). In 
such cases of norm conflict, the action will be chosen based on which norm of 
behaviour is supported by the strongest motivation (Elster, 2007, pp.89-93).  
In formal models, norms can be incorporated into utility or payoff functions 
using a delta parameter, representing costs or benefits of following a norm 
(Ostrom, 2005, p. 212). Alternatively, a negative moral utility term can be added 
to the total utility function (Kuran, 1998). This method is used in micro-level 
models of corruption discussed in Section 2.3.4. An additional parameter often 
represents moral costs of engaging in corruption, but the source and the 
content of such costs are generally not explored further.  
6.2.3 Negative externalities of corruption 
Corruption creates an array of negative externalities. In cases of a corrupt 
acquisition of an infrastructure delivery project contract, for example, the more 
immediate costs are borne by the company which does not win the contract 
despite being the best candidate for the project. As outlined in Chapter 1, 
corruption in construction projects can exacerbate or even cause earthquake-
precipitated disasters (Green, 2005) through lack of adequate engineering, 
industry inspection or quality assurance (Olson et al., 1999). In the longer term, 
corruption contributes to an increase in inequality and poverty (Gupta et al., 
2002), it stifles economic growth (Mauro, 1995) and has been found to reduce 
expenditure on education and health (Mauro, 1998).  
Social norms evolve through human interactions, experimentation and 
adaptation (Young, 2015). They are not designed specifically to regulate certain 
behaviour that causes harm to others. When it is established that certain 
behaviour causes a negative externality (imposes economic costs on others), 
social norms against this behaviour are unlikely to develop without prior 
intervention of specialist public organisations (Elster, 2007, p.359). First, legal 
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norms are created, enforceable by law, and then social norms can develop, 
ensuring compliance even in the absence of public law enforcement.  For 
example, prohibition of smoking in public places is enforced by law in a number 
of countries across the world. Even if the law is repealed or is no longer 
enforced by public organisations, the social norms that developed can ensure 
continued compliance. 
The effect of negative externalities on individuals’ propensity to engage in 
corruption has been tested in psychological experiments. Abbink et al. (2002) 
test this effect in the context of cooperation and reciprocity between participants 
playing the roles of bribers and officials. Officials choose whether to accept a 
bribe, and whether to reciprocate with a favourable decision for the briber. The 
decision to reciprocate imposes a cost on all other experiment participants. The 
results show no effect of negative externalities on the proportion of officials 
choosing to reciprocate.  
In contrast, Barr and Serra (2009) found that an increase in costs imposed on 
others reduced the number of participants choosing corrupt actions. Their 
experimental design differs from that of Abbink et al. (2002) in a number of 
ways. Firstly, Abbink et al. (2002) focus on the importance of trust and 
reciprocity in corrupt agreements, with negative externalities playing a lesser 
role. Barr and Serra (2009) simplify the game by reducing the choices of 
officials to acceptance or rejection of bribe offers only. If the bribe is accepted, 
it means that the favourable decision is provided automatically. Secondly, the 
participants in Abbink et al. (2002) study could both impose negative 
externalities and suffer them as a consequence of decisions made by other 
participants. Therefore, participants arguably had no reason to abstain from 
corrupt choices unless they believed that other participants would choose to 
abstain as well. Barr and Serra (2009) add a role of a passive member of 
society in their experiment, who cannot impose costs, but suffer negative 
externalities as a result of the choices made by officials and bribers.  
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Although Barr and Serra (2009) suggest that higher negative externalities are 
effective in reducing the incidence of corrupt choices, this effect is only 
significant for the bribers, not the officials. The experiment is run under two 
frames. One used neutral language; the other framed the game as corruption, 
using loaded terms, to elicit the framing effect on individual choices. Under the 
neutral frame, higher negative externalities led to a somewhat smaller 
proportion of officials choosing to accept bribes (reduction significant at 10% 
confidence level). When the corruption frame was used, an increase in the 
negative externality did not have an effect on the choices of officials.  
The above studies suggest that negative externalities alone do not create 
strong motivations for individuals playing the role of officials to avoid corruption 
in experimental settings. This result supports the theory that negative 
externalities are not effective in creating self-motivation to avoid behavioural 
choices that harm others (Elster, 2007, p.359). That is, an external intervention 
is necessary to establish a system of legal norms, monitoring and punishment 
to regulate behaviour. Therefore, although negative externalities and social 
harm caused by corrupt agreements might logically be an important component 
for a social norm-based model of corruption, the above studies suggest that 
these factors do not play a significant role in decision making in corruption. 
6.2.4 Separating the two corrupt acts 
Chapter 4.3.4 outlined the two actions that constitute corruption by the public 
official (Decision Maker) in this thesis: 1) accepting an Incentive to violate the 
ALP; and 2) violating the ALP and providing an undue Advantage to the 
Candidate. The two actions are often perceived as linked and inseparable. 
However, the motivations behind the two actions – accepting a bribe, and 
providing something in return – are different. In its simplest form, the motivation 
behind accepting a bribe is self-interest, guided by economic considerations 
(discussed in Section 6.2.1). Providing an undue Advantage can be motivated 
by the norm of reciprocity in social exchanges (Abbink et al., 2002), 
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expectations of future lucrative agreements (Abbink, 2004), or fear of retaliation 
by the briber for reneging on the corrupt deal (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009).  
The extent to which accepting bribes is considered inappropriate varies across 
countries and cultures. In some cases, traditional practices are given as a 
defence for accepting payments or gifts by officials. For example, in Korea, it is 
customary to give “chonji” (a token of appreciation) in business transactions 
(Sohail and Cavill, 2008). Officials can come under considerable pressure to 
accept payments (Oldenburg, 1987), creating an internal personal conflict. The 
civil servants’ training may require them to decline offers of payments to uphold 
the public officials’ professional legitimacy, but local cultural rules and practices 
may dictate that accepting such offers is necessary for the individual official’s 
actions to be considered socially legitimate (Rose-Ackerman, 2010a).  
Accountability rules and monitoring systems can be established, but their 
effectiveness can be undermined by tacit institutional approval of accepting 
bribes, supported by strong informal secretive practices (Sole, 2005). In some 
extreme cases, a social phenomenon of amoral familism may prevail, with the 
development of social norms against complying with the law (Elster, 2007, p. 
99). 
On the other hand, despite the cultural and institutional pressures to accept 
bribes, an individual official may have strong intrinsic motivation to avoid 
corruption. This raises the question of what the source of this intrinsic 
motivation is. The laboratory experiment in Barr and Serra (2010) suggests that 
cultural background plays an important role in decisions involving corruption. 
The study concluded that individuals from countries with high prevalence of 
corruption are more likely to accept bribes. However, socialisation into the 
adoptive culture with low levels of corruption also played an important role, with 
the propensity to accept bribes reducing as the number of years spent in the 
low-corruption country increased.  
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Barr and Serra (2010) argue against holding preconceptions regarding 
individuals’ propensity to be involved in corruption based solely on their cultural 
background. The study points to the importance of assimilation effects in 
reducing individual’s propensity for corruption. However, this effect can also 
account for the reverse tendency. That is, an individual with strong intrinsic 
motivation against accepting bribes placed in a high-corruption environment 
can be expected to adjust to the new status quo. Indeed, the importance of the 
assimilation effect revealed by the study supports the view that corruption can 
only be poorly explained by rational utility- (or payoff-) maximising agents. 
Examples of alternative models of behaviour that may be better-suited are 
based on interactions between rule-driven individuals (Hodgson and Jiang, 
2007, p.1051) or imitative behaviour (Cartier–Bresson, 1997, p.470).  
This rule-driven or imitative behaviour mechanism is adopted in this chapter for 
modelling decisions of whether to accept a bribe. Group behaviour status quo 
and the pressure to conform can play a large part in determining individual 
choices. In the model developed in Section 6.3, the assumption is made that a 
large proportion of the group must comply (or thought to comply) with certain 
expected norm of behaviour for an individual to choose to comply. However, 
other factors can tip the balance in favour of an action contrary to the group 
behaviour status quo. This is discussed further in Section 6.3.     
Turning to the choice of whether to reciprocate the bribe with an undue 
Advantage, analyses offered in past literature often focus on three main factors. 
The first is the possibility of retaliation if the official decides to accept the bribe 
and provide nothing in return. Corrupt agreements are illicit, and parties cannot 
turn to legal means of enforcement. However, credible threat of violence can 
be used to ensure that the other party fulfils their side of the agreement (Boehm 
and Lambsdorff, 2009). For example, criminal organisations with reputation for 
violence might act as enforcement agencies of corrupt agreements.  
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The second factor is the reputation for reneging on a deal. Although reputation 
is difficult to establish in bribery markets because they are secretive in nature, 
with past actions of individuals rarely known by others (Rose-Ackerman, 1998), 
it is an important factor in repeated interactions. If the DM reneges on a corrupt 
deal, future lucrative corrupt offers are unlikely to be forthcoming from the same 
bribe-giver. 
The third factor is expectations of reciprocity and the importance of trust 
relationships. Corrupt agreements are often based on trust and rely on goodwill 
of the corrupt partner to uphold their end of the deal. In experimental bribery 
games, participants who received transfers from their partners in the 
experiment decide to reciprocate, even where there are no consequences for 
reneging, and despite negative externalities imposed on other participants from 
this reciprocity (Abbink et al., 2002). The model in this chapter further explores 
the nature of this motivation to reciprocate in the absence of other factors that 
can enforce compliance with the agreed corrupt deal.  
6.2.5 Institutional rule legitimacy 
Corruption thrives in certain institutional environments. For example, in 
organisations with unfair practices towards employees, or where job 
satisfaction levels are low, emotional responses can give rise to uncoordinated 
unethical behaviour and corruption (Carvajal, 1999). This type of corruption is 
termed the Organisation of Corrupt Individuals (OCI) analysed by Pinto et al. 
(2008) (see Section 2.3.5). Alternatively, the rules and the structure of the 
institution may have been put in place in order to facilitate corruption 
(Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011). This gives rise to Corrupt Organisation (Pinto 
et al., 2008), and corruption is written into the very constitution of the 
organisation.  
Corrupt practices are thought to undermine institutional rule legitimacy 
(Thompson, 2013), and illegitimate institutional rules are unlikely to be followed. 
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This raises the question of what the characteristics of legitimate institutions and 
legitimate institutional rules are.   
One of such characteristics is consistency with the wider culture of the society. 
If formal rules of institutions clash with society’s traditions, they are less likely 
to be adhered to. As discussed in Section 6.2.4, the ideals of the arm’s-length 
principle, or impersonal, professional interactions may not be easy to introduce 
and sustain in the presence of traditional practices of personalistic modes of 
interaction (Rose-Ackerman, 2010a). Despite the efforts to enforce these 
institutional rules, they may be disregarded and misconduct carefully swept 
under the carpet. That is, collusive behaviour between agents may arise to 
sustain the system of implementation of unspoken rules. Individuals use “focal 
points” (rules of thumb) when in doubt about making or justifying a decision 
(Young, 2015). These focal points evolve over time, and any anti-corruption 
efforts undertaken within institutional contexts should be designed with due 
regard to the gradual nature of institutional culture change.  
As discussed in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.7, the development of rules and 
regulations can be affected by corruption. This means that there is potential for 
designing vulnerability into rules, and creating loopholes for providing 
advantages to particular interest groups legally. For example, a model by 
(Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011) suggests mechanisms for elite’s decision-
making when faced with a problem of whether to create systems that make 
some forms of corruption legal. Therefore, the development of legitimate 
institutional rules is unlikely to arise if constitutional or collective-choice levels 
of activities (see Table 3 in Section 4.3.2) are exposed to corrupt practices and 
if the impartiality of rule development is in doubt. 
The right level of discretion over implementation of rules is also an important 
factor. As discussed in Section 2.3.4, discretionary powers in application of 
rules is important in agency relationships (Groenendijk, 1997, Boehm and 
Lambsdorff, 2009). The agent possesses information not readily available to 
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the principal, and the latter relies on the former to use his/her judgement in the 
application of rules. This existence of discretionary powers of officials over the 
rules they are entrusted to apply is sometimes thought to be one of the 
necessary conditions for corruption to occur (Aidt, 2003, Rose-Ackerman, 
1998).  
However, elimination of discretion is not a cure for corruption. If rules become 
rigid and overly specific, this creates a complex bureaucracy that is more 
difficult to manage and agents’ conduct becomes harder to monitor. 
Bureaucrats can then extract rents in exchange for helping to evade rigid rules 
that act as inefficient barriers for companies (red tape). One of the purportedly 
‘redeeming’ features of corruption is that is can increase efficiency in the 
context of government-imposed rigidities that stifle economic growth (Leff, 
1964, Huntington, 2006).    
This is not to say that reduction or elimination of rules is the solution. If the rules 
are too vague, the benchmarks against which to hold agents accountable are 
erased. To monitor behaviour, it is important to know what performance is 
expected from agents, and agents should be clear about the conduct expected 
from them. 
As discussed in Section 2.4.6, individuals internalise and adopt organisational 
rules or societal values if they agree with them. A certain amount of autonomy 
is an important factor in promoting intrinsic motivations to follow the rules and 
maintain self-control (Lange, 2008). Enforcement of strict rules and high 
penalties for misconduct can produce negative effects. Introduction of 
draconian systems of punishment can reduce intrinsic motivation to self-
regulate and self-govern within the industry (Frey and Jegen, 2001). External 
interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if individuals perceive them as 
controlling, but crowd in intrinsic motivation if individuals perceive them as 
supportive (Frey and Jegen, 2001, Ostrom, 2005, Ch.4).   
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The above factors, consistency with the wider culture, impartiality in rule 
development, and the appropriate level of discretion in rule application are a 
few of the characteristics of what is understood by legitimate institutional rules. 
The extent to which institutional rules are perceived to be legitimate is context-
dependent and relies on a variety of other factors. What is important for the 
model developed in the next section is whether the DMs who are entrusted to 
implement the rules perceive them as legitimate.  
6.3 Model formulation 
The model is based on choices of a DM faced with a corrupt offer in an 
infrastructure project bidding setting. A government decision maker (DM) 
responsible for choosing a company to carry out an infrastructure project is 
offered a bribe by a Representative of one of the companies (Candidate). The 
first choice facing the DM is whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is 
accepted, he decides whether to provide the Advantage the company seeks.  
There are a number of ways a government decision maker can provide an 
Advantage to a particular company in the context of tendering procedures. 
Examples include providing one company with information on the content of 
another company’s bid; accepting a bid from a company known to have 
previously failed to comply with industry standards; or manipulation of tender 
processes to favour a particular company (GIACC, 2008). These are the types 
of actions that constitute violation of the ALP in the model. 
There are several relevant factors for each of the two decisions the DM faces 
(accepting or rejecting a bribe, and reciprocating with an Advantage or not). 
The model focuses on two factors for each decision. When the DM decides 
whether to accept a bribe offered to them, the first relevant factor is the group 
behaviour status quo regarding accepting bribes. Assuming that there are 
existing norms against accepting bribes, this factor weighs against DM’s 
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decision to accept the bribe. The weight of this factor (denoted wi) relative to 
other factors depends on whether or not anti-corruption norms of behaviour are 
followed by DM’s colleagues. Therefore, the weight of anti-corruption norms for 
the DM’s decision of whether to accept a bribe is determined by the proportion 
of civil servants accepting bribes (p1). This proportion does not have to be 
known with certainty. What matters is the DM’s estimation or perception of how 
many colleagues are taking bribes. The model does not consider punishment 
for not following the norm. It follows Ostrom’s view that norm compliance is 
intrinsically motivated (see Section 6.2.2). 
The second factor is self-interest. Even in low corruption environments, bribe-
taking can occur, where the temptation of self-enrichment outweighs other 
factors. The weight of this factor depends on the size of the bribe offered (p2), 
and the higher is the bribe, the more this factor weighs on the side of accepting 
the bribe. As discussed in Section 6.2.1, Minimum Acceptable Bribes (MABs) 
can vary with the type of a corrupt ‘service’ provided, the bargaining power of 
the officials, and penalties for corruption. Additionally, bribes can be determined 
through market-type bribe supply-demand equilibrium, or through equal 
sharing of economic rents from corruption. However, even in laboratory 
experiments, with payoffs known or calculable, some participants choose bribe 
acceptance even if the payoff is lower than if they refused the bribe. Therefore, 
the bribe size is represented in this model in a simple form, without linking it to 
other factors such as the nature of the corrupt service.  
Similarly, there are two factors relevant to the decision of whether to reciprocate 
with the Advantage the Representative seeks for the Candidate. On the one 
hand, once the bribe is accepted, there are expectations from the side of the 
Representative that the DM will reciprocate with the Advantage. These 
expectations can be thought of in terms of fulfilment of a promise that was made 
by accepting a bribe. If the corrupt Incentive is framed as a bribe, the agreement 
is akin to an informal contractual agreement. If the offer is framed as a gift, the 
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relevant social norm is that of reciprocity. Either way, the social expectations 
weigh on the side of providing the Advantage. The weight of this factor depends 
on the strength of the pre-existing social connection between the 
Representative and the DM (p3). In cases where there are no pre-existing 
connections, the DM might not have a strong aversion to reneging on the deal, 
except for intrinsic motivations to carry out the promised actions. However, if 
the social connection is strong, the social expectation of reciprocity is a factor 
that would be given higher weight.  
On the other hand, providing an unfair Advantage means violating the Arm’s-
Length Principle. The ALP dictates that “personal or other relationships should 
play no part in the economic decisions that involve more than one party” 
(Begovic, 2005, Tanzi, 1996). In this case, if the DM provides an unfair 
Advantage to the Candidate because of the corrupt agreement made with the 
Representative, they allow this agreement to take precedence over their formal 
role and duties in the infrastructure delivery process. The DM’s neutral and 
unbiased compliance with the rules and procedures of the institution they work 
for relies on the rules themselves being appropriate and legitimate. As 
discussed in Section 6.2.5, if the rules have been designed to unfairly favour 
certain groups, this delegitimises the process and can undermine the potency 
of the ALP. Therefore, ALP as a factor weighing against providing an unfair 
advantage to the Candidate depends on how legitimate the institutional rules 
are. Table 4 summarises the factors relevant to DM’s choices and the 
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The model is based on the DM weighing up the conflicting factors relevant to 
their decisions. The conflict is between:  
1. The norms against accepting bribes (Factor 1) on the one hand and self-
interest (Factor 2) on the other; and 
2. The norms of reciprocity (Factor 3) on the one hand, and the ALP (Factor 
4) on the other. 
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This is represented as a discrete choice problem with three end-states: 
s1. The offer is rejected by the DM 
s2. The offer is accepted, the Advantage is provided  
s3. The offer is accepted, but no Advantage is provided. 
Figure 9 shows the decision tree. 
 
Figure 9 Model decision tree with payoffs π 
The payoff in each State s represents the aggregated weights of the factors 
relevant to the decision taken: 
πୱ = ∑ l୧ୱN୧୧ w୧         (E6.3.1) 
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where l୧ୱ takes value 1 if Factor i is relevant to the actions preceding State s 
and 0 otherwise. N୧ takes the value of -1 if the factor is against the action taken, 
1 otherwise. For example, if the DM rejects the bribe, they act in accordance 
with Factor 1 (norms against accepting bribes), but against temptation or self-
interest (Factor 2). Therefore, in Figure 9, the weight wଵ in payoff of State 1 is 
positive, and the weight wଶ is negative. If, however, the DM decides to accept 
the bribe, this is against Factor 1, but it follows self-interest and temptation 
(Factor 2). The signs of the two weights are reversed in the payoff of State 2. 
Factor weights w୧ are continuous variables. These depend on the proportion of 
other civil servants accepting bribes (for Factor 1); the size of the bribe offered 
(Factor 2); the strength of the social connection with the individual with whom 
the civil servant made a corrupt agreement (Factor 3) and the legitimacy of 
institutional rules and procedures (Factor 4) (see Table 4).  
The model functions specifying the relationships between factor weights w୧ and 
their determinants p୧ vary across the four factors. The extent to which self-
interest (Factor 2) plays a part in the decision of whether to accept the bribe 
depends on the size of the bribe. The higher the bribe, the higher is the 
temptation to accept it, and, hence, the higher weight given to this factor. 
However, in accordance with economic theory, it is expected that at certain 
bribe sizes, an additional monetary unit will matter less. For example, consider 
an increase in the bribe by £100 if the bribe is initially set at £1,000, compared 
with £1 million. In the second case the additional £100 will matter less. 
Therefore, the function specifying the relationship between the weight of self-
interest and its determinant, the size of the bribe, will be modelled after the 
economic individual utility function, exhibiting diminishing returns to bribe size. 
It is more difficult to specify functional relationship between the weight of 
reciprocity or social expectation norms (Factor 3) and the strength of social 
connection because this relationship has not been as widely discussed, and 
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there is no known comparative concept to the individual utility function. For the 
purposes of this model, the same functional relationship will be assumed for 
Factor 3 as for Factor 2. That is, in this model, the DM has a stronger motivation 
to reciprocate the received bribe with an Advantage if there is a stronger pre-
existing connection with the Representative, but as the connection becomes 
stronger, the increase in the weight given to reciprocity exhibits diminishing 
returns to increased social connection strength.   
The relationship between the weight of Factor 1 (norms against accepting 
bribes) and its determinant (proportion of DMs accepting bribes) is different to 
the above. At low levels of bribe acceptance, the weight of conforming with the 
norm is high. However, as the proportion of bribe takers increases, the 
motivation to reject bribes falls at an increasing rate. Analogously, if the 
proportion of bribe takers is high, the motivation to abstain from corruption is 
low. As more DMs abstain from corruption, individual DMs feel stronger 
motivation to abstain, but it grows slowly at first, and at a faster pace when a 
certain proportion follow the norm of not accepting bribes. This functional 
relationship is better captured by a sigmoid function (set out later in this 
section). 
Similarly, following the ALP relies on legitimate institutional rules. At low levels 
of legitimacy, the motivation to follow the ALP is low. A small improvement in 
the institutional rules will make little difference to the motivation to follow and 
uphold them, but at certain levels of legitimacy the motivation becomes 
increasingly stronger. The relationship between Factor 4 (ALP) and its 
determinant (legitimacy of institutional rules) is, therefore, also captured by a 
sigmoid function. 
These four functional relationships are specified as follows: 
𝑤ଵ = 1 −
ଶ
ଶାୣ(షೌ೛భశఱ) 














           (E6.3.5) 
where   
𝑝ଵ is the proportion of civil servants accepting bribes 
𝑝ଶ is proportional to the size of the bribe 
𝑝ଷ is the strength of social network connection 
𝑝ସ is legitimacy of rules of the institution 
 a, b, c, d, g and h are constants 
Functions in equations E6.3.2 and E6.3.5 are sigmoid and E6.3.3 and E6.3.4 





Figure 10 Functions in equations E6.3.2 to E6.3.5 showing relationships between weights of relevant factors 
affecting DM’s decisions (w1, w2, w3 and w4) and determinants of factors’ weights (p1, p2, p3 and p4).  
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Figure 10 shows the functions in equations E6.3.2 to E6.3.5 with the constants 
set as follows: 
a=8.6; b=0.01; c=4.5; d=0.01; g=4.5; h=8.6  
The functions are stylised examples of what the relationships between the 
variables could be, and are used to illustrate how the model works. The 
constants used in Figure 10 and in the simulations below were chosen because 
the resulting functions fit a number of criteria. First, the shapes of the functions 
fit the discussion above: two are sigmoid, and fit the intuition of how the 
motivation to follow group norms depends on the proportion of others following 
the norm; and two are logarithmic, resembling the individual utility function.  
Secondly, the model considers values of w୧ and p୧ between 0 and 1 (w୧ ∈ [0 1] 
and p୧ ∈ [0 1]). So, for example, as 𝑝ଵ approaches 1 (almost all DMs accept 
bribes), the payoff of upholding the norm of not accepting bribes tends to 0. 
This represents the tendency to follow status quo in groups. Similarly, following 
the ALP in an institution the rules of which are not considered legitimate (𝑝ସ 
approaching 0) returns 0 payoff. The constants were also chosen in such a way 
that the sigmoid functions appear symmetric, going through the point close to 
(0.5; 0.5).  
The motivation to follow self-interest is a logarithmic function of the size of the 
bribe, exhibiting diminishing returns, with the bribe size of 0 translating into 
Factor 2 weight of around 0, and the largest bribe size (set to 1 in the model) 
translates into factor weight of around 1. Similarly, the strength of the motivation 
to uphold the norm of acting to agreements (or the reciprocity factor) increases 
in the strength of social connection, at a decreasing rate.  
If constants b or d were set to 0, factor weights at 𝑝ଶ = 0 or 𝑝ଷ = 0 would be 
undefined or -∞ (minus infinity), which can present problems when running the 
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model, with payoffs calculated as -∞ for some combinations of variables. 
Setting d=0.01 prevents this problem and allows the model to be used to 
consider how corrupt agreements between strangers might be created. 
Alternatively, the constant can be set at b=0.02 or above. This would mean that 
following on promises of an Advantage is inherently important for the DM even 
if there is no pre-existing social network tie. The weight of Factor 3 (meeting 
the expectations of reciprocity) would then be greater than 0 even for 𝑝ଷ = 0. 
This raises the question of how important it is to keep promises, and how this 
can be represented within the model. This is kept outside the focus of the 
model, and, therefore, constant d is set at 0.01.  
6.4 Model simulations 
The model is coded in Matlab and run to illustrate its functionality. Each variable 
𝑝௜ is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution 1000 times for each simulation. 
The first simulation uses a simplified version of the model, limiting the choices 
of the DM to either accepting or rejecting the bribe offer. This simulation only 
considers 2 factor weight determinants: the proportion of other DMs accepting 
bribes and the size of the bribe. The second simulation includes all factors 
discussed in Section 6.3 and shows how the simulated choices of the DM are 
split between rejecting the bribe, providing the Advantage or reneging and not 
providing the Advantage. The Matlab scripts are provided in Appendix C. 
Figure 11 shows results of the first simulation. The bribe is set to be accepted 
in the model where the payoff of rejecting is larger than or equal to the payoff 
of accepting:  πୖୣ୨ୣୡ୲ ≥ π୅ୡୡୣ୮୲, where πୖୣ୨ୣୡ୲ is the same as the payoff in end-
State 1 in Figure 9, πୱଵ = 𝑤ଵ − 𝑤ଶ, and π୅ୡୡୣ୮୲ is a simplified payoff of end-
State 2, omitting 𝑤ଷ − 𝑤ସ:  π୅ୡୡୣ୮୲ = −𝑤ଵ + 𝑤ଶ. 
The number of rejected bribe offers in this simulation is 273, with remaining 
727 model runs returning the result of an accepted bribe. This rejection rate is 
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determined by the specifications of functions set out in Section 6.3. It is also 
the result of taking into account only two factors (norms against accepting 
bribes and self-interest), disregarding the expectations of reciprocity and the 
decision of whether to violate the ALP following bribe acceptance.  
 
Figure 11 Results of simulation 1 
The red circles plot the rejected bribe sizes (y-axis) according to how prevalent 
bribe taking is simulated to be (x-axis). Unsurprisingly and intuitively, low bribes 
in low-corruption environments are rejected. Even where the proportion of DMs 
accepting bribes is high (around 0.8 in Figure 11), a few of the lowest bribes 
are rejected. The blue stars plot the accepted bribes. These show that the 
model accounts for instances where even in low-corruption settings (𝑝ଵ < 0.2), 
high bribes may still be accepted.  
The blue line separating the areas with rejected and the areas with accepted 
bribes shows the Minimum Acceptable Bribe (MAB) levels. This is set in such 
a way that πୖୣ୨ୣୡ୲ = π୅ୡୡୣ୮୲ and re-arranged to make 𝑝ଶ the subject. This line 
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traces the lowest level of bribes that would be accepted for each corruption 
level in this simulation. 
Figure 12 shows the results of the second simulation, using the full model 
developed in Section 6.3. The choices between rejecting the bribe, accepting 
and providing the Advantage, or accepting and providing no Advantage are 
based on the highest payoff of the end-states under parameters generated for 
each iteration. As previously, 𝑝௜ are generated randomly 1000 times. There is 
a lower number of rejections – 193, compared with 273 in the first simulation. 
Out of 807 accepted bribes, 622 were simulated to be reciprocated with the 






Figure 12 Results of simulation 2 
The Minimum Acceptable Bribe (MAB) for this simulation is much lower than in 
simulation 1, and is shown in the bottom left corner of Figure 12. 
The MAB is plotted setting 𝑝ଷ = 1 and 𝑝ସ = 0. It shows the lowest levels of 
bribes that could be accepted in the model are where the institutional legitimacy 
is low (𝑝ସ = 0), and the social connection is strong (𝑝ଷ = 1). Any value below 
this line would be rejected in the model. 
To illustrate the lowest bribes that would be accepted in the simulation under 
different conditions, the model was run setting variables 𝑝ଷ (social connection 
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strength) and 𝑝ସ (legitimacy of institutional rules) to extreme values of 0 or 1. 






Figure 13 Simulation 2 Minimum Acceptable Bribes 
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Setting 𝑝ଷ and 𝑝ସ to extreme values pre-determines the outcome in terms of 
whether an Advantage would be provided. Top two graphs show that under the 
model formulation, if there is no pre-existing connection between the DM and 
the Representative, any accepted bribe offer is reneged on, and the Advantage 
is not provided, regardless of the legitimacy of the organisational rules.  
A strong pre-existing connection (𝑝ଷ = 1, bottom two graphs) produces no 
opportunistic behaviour from the side of the DM, and the bribe is always 
reciprocated with an Advantage.  
The MAB is the highest in the simulation with no pre-existing connection (𝑝ଷ =
0) and with high institutional rule legitimacy (𝑝ସ = 1) (top right graph). The MAB 
is lowest if the connection is strong and the institutional legitimacy is weak 
(bottom left graph).  
6.5 Discussion  
The simulations in Section 6.4 are based on individual corrupt agreements, with 
variables drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. The simulations are 
based on the assumption that this is the first corrupt agreement between the 
Representative and the DM. The two may have a pre-existing social connection 
(𝑝ଷ > 0), but each iteration considers a new set of variables, therefore it does 
not allow for the analysis of how corrupt relationships may develop over time 
and with each new corrupt agreement between the same pair of actors. This 
section discusses how the model can be adapted to make it dynamic.  
The model is based on a conflict of norms of behaviour with other factors such 
as self-interest and the motivation to follow the ALP. In the first instance, the 
DM makes an initial assessment of the situation. They form a belief of how 
prevalent bribe-taking is in their organisation, and they weigh it against the size 
of the bribe offered. They then make an assessment of how legitimate the 
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institutional rules they are expected to follow are, and weigh this factor against 
the strength of their social connection with the Representative, and whether 
they are prepared to renege on the deal.  
Whatever the chosen action is, individuals might subconsciously search for 
after-the-fact justifications for their actions. Cognitive dissonance theory 
suggests that when faced with conflicting motivations, with one being slightly 
stronger, individuals subconsciously search for further arguments in favour of 
this slightly stronger motivation (Elster, 2007, Chapter 4). If an action that might 
be considered wrong or immoral has already been taken, an individual may 
search for justifications that lessen the feelings of guilt. This can mean re-
assessing their initial estimation of the factors relevant to the decision.  
So, if the initial assessment leads the DM to accept the corrupt offer and provide 
the advantage, cognitive dissonance might lead them to re-evaluate the state 
of the relevant factors after they made the decision. For example, they may 
increase their initial assessment of the proportion of other DMs accepting 
bribes from, say, 20% to 40%. The DM may also re-evaluate how legitimate the 
rules of the institution are, to support the decision of circumventing the rules 
and violating the ALP.  
In addition, a successful corrupt agreement might increase the strength of the 
social connection between the DM and the Representative. This is because the 
bribe given by the Representative required them to place trust in the DM.  As 
the DM reciprocated with the Advantage, this trust was met, and the DM upheld 
his/her end of the deal.  
Figure 14 shows how the weights of the four factors of the model can change 
in a dynamic model of repeated corrupt interactions between the same pair of 
a DM and a Representative. First, the DM’s estimation of the proportion of other 
DMs taking bribes (𝑝ଵ) can increase, thus reducing the weight of the norm 
against bribe acceptance. Second, the strength of the social connection 
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between the DM and the Representative (𝑝ଷ) can increase, and more weight 
will be given to the norm of reciprocity in future corrupt agreements between 
the two. Third, the DM’s assessment of the institutional rule legitimacy can 
decrease, with less weight being given to the ALP.  
The above changes will, in turn, have an impact on the minimum levels of bribes 
the DM will be prepared to accept. Figure 15 shows an example of how the 
Minimum Acceptable Bribe can reduce as corrupt relationships evolve. A 
combination of parameters was chosen from one of the iterations of the second 
simulation of Section 6.4 that produced the result of bribe acceptance with 
Advantage provided: 𝑝ଵ = 0.0034; 𝑝ଷ = 0.6446; 𝑝ସ = 0.4889. For each iteration 
𝑛, 𝑝௜ were changed by a small amount: 
𝑝ଵ(೙) = 𝑝ଵ(೙షభ) + 0.05 
𝑝ଷ(೙) = 𝑝ଷ(೙షభ) + 0.05 
𝑝ସ(೙) = 𝑝ସ(೙షభ) − 0.05 











Figure 15 Changes in Minimum Acceptable Bribes (MAB) in repeated 
corrupt agreements 
Hence, Figure 15 shows how the minimum acceptable bribes could decrease 
with each new corrupt agreement between the same pair of a DM and a 
Representative, following the first successful corrupt agreement. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter addressed the second question of the thesis: How do social norms 
affect bribe-takers’ choices? Section 8.2 later in the thesis discusses the 
method used to develop the model in this chapter and Section 8.3 also revisits 
the components that formed the basis of the model. 
This chapter presents a model of a DM’s decision-making processes when they 
are offered a bribe by a company Representative bidding for an infrastructure 
contract. It explores the norms of behaviour triggered in corrupt agreements 
and proposes a method of representing social norm conflict and its resolution. 
That is, an individual in the model is not only guided by narrow self-interest, but 
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also by observed behaviour of others and cultural and social expectations 
towards his/her behaviour. For the corrupt Incentive to be accepted, the weight 
given to the temptation (or self-interest) factor has to be higher than the weight 
given to the norm of not accepting bribes. The first depends on the size of the 
bribe, and the second varies with the proportion of other DMs accepting bribes. 
For the DM to reciprocate with an Advantage, the weight given to the ALP must 
be lower than the weight given to the norm of reciprocity (or following on 
promises). These two factors depend on the legitimacy of institutional rules (for 
ALP) and the strength of the social connection between the DM and the 
Representative (for the norm of reciprocity).  
The functional relationships between factor weights and their determinants are 
hypothetical, and are used to illustrate how the model works. Calibration of the 
model would require a detailed dataset of individuals’ choices under different 
conditions, with varying degrees of prevalence of corruption, varying bribe 
sizes, under ‘strangers’ and ‘friends’ protocols, and under varying levels of 
institutional rule legitimacy. As the model is based on intrinsic motivations, 
some measurement of the level of internal conflict would also be required. An 
example of past experimental studies examining human behaviour in the 
context of conflicting motivations is Jaber-López et al. (2014). This study 
measures physiological responses (electrodermal responses) when 
participants make decisions in corruption experimental laboratory games. 
Although the assumptions of the study are different from the assumptions of 
the model in this chapter, this study shows an example of the method that could 
be used to create a dataset that in turn could be used to develop the model in 
this chapter further.  
However, the basic assumptions behind the model and the functional 
relationships between the factors considered and their determinants are based 
on past studies and theories, and are intuitive: higher bribe offers give rise to 
higher temptation, anti-corruption norms are unlikely to be followed by an 
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individual who believes that a large proportion of others accept bribes, etc. 
Therefore, even without calibration, the model in this chapter provides a 
number of insights. It shows that in institutions with low legitimacy and high 
corruption prevalence, lowest bribes might be accepted when the agreement is 
made between individuals with strong social connection. Where there is no pre-
existing connection, the bribe-taker is more likely to renege on the promises, 
especially if the rules of the institution are legitimate. The model also shows 
how repeated corrupt agreements between the same pair of individuals can 
result in progressively smaller bribe sizes.  
The model is based on intrinsic motivations, and does not account for extrinsic 
motivators such as the possibility of punishment for accepting bribes or 
retaliation tactics by the Representative if the DM behaves opportunistically and 
reneges on the deal after accepting the bribe. These factors can be included in 
the model by developing additional factor weights and setting out the functional 
relationships between the weights and their determinants. However, such a 
model would require a detailed understanding of how intrinsic and extrinsic 





7 Corruption in infrastructure projects. Case studies 
7.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the specific area of interest in this thesis is 
corruption in relation to the procurement of infrastructure. The third question of 
the thesis set out in Section 3.2 is as follows:  What are the characteristics of 
corruption specific to the infrastructure sector and what measures of corruption 
reduction can be effective in this sector? This chapter addresses this question 
and presents case studies developed using the documentation filed in support 
of the prosecutions of companies and individuals under the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977. The court case documentation describes corrupt schemes 
across the world, and case studies developed focus on examples of 
infrastructure-related projects that were subject to corruption.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 summarises the objectives 
fulfilled through corruption, such as reduction of competition and manipulation 
of project bidding procedures. Section 7.3 then presents the case studies and 
summarises the corrupt schemes. Diagrams are provided for the more complex 
corrupt networks. The case studies show how internal company procedures 
aimed at preventing corruption were ignored, and multiple consultants were 
used as intermediaries to bribe government officials to obtain projects. The 
case studies focus on corruption at the bidding stage of infrastructure projects. 
Section 7.4 uses the general application of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework in Chapter 4 to analyse the case studies. Section 7.5 
concludes. 
7.2 Infrastructure sector corruption. 
Chapter 1 summarises the potential negative outcomes of corruption in the 
infrastructure sector for the economy and the risks it can create for the 
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population. It also outlines the reasons for the particular vulnerability of the 
sector to corruption. This section focuses on the types of objectives that can be 
fulfilled through corruption in this sector. 
Although it has been noted that financial rewards from individual acts of 
corruption are highest at early phases of project cycles (Hawkins, 2013), any 
phase of an infrastructure project can be affected by corruption. Additionally, 
corruption at earlier phases may lead to corrupt agreements later on in the 
project cycle (Wells, 2015). For example, a consultant may be offered a bribe 
in exchange for manipulating the costs and benefits estimations in such a way 
that the project passes the initial feasibility appraisal. Another bribe may be 
given to consultants producing the detailed design and preparing the costs for 
budgeting, to ensure that the figures produced at earlier evaluations are not 
vastly different from the later-phase estimates. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, corruption can be perceived as a method of 
problem-solving (see also Marquette and Peiffer (2015)). If corruption is 
thought to be a method of solving problems created by, for example, 
government-imposed rigidities, it is necessary to understand the objectives 
fulfilled by corruption and to identify methods of shifting incentives away from 
corrupt activities towards alternative, legal ways of achieving these objectives. 
Although the motivations for engaging in corruption are varied, and may be 
difficult to pinpoint, this section outlines some of the key objectives fulfilled 
through corrupt means, with the focus on infrastructure projects. The examples 
used in this section to explain how corruption occurs in infrastructure projects 
are from GIACC (2008).  
For companies in the infrastructure sector, the key objectives fulfilled through 
corrupt agreements can be separated into four categories: 
1. Passing pre-qualification criteria and being selected for participation in 
bidding or tender processes 
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2. Reducing competition and increasing the likelihood of obtaining projects 
or contracts 
3. Increasing economic rents or profits from contracts 
4. Obtaining permits, certifications to operate, or gaining certification of 
completed work (especially where completed work is defective) 
If a company has an adverse track record or characteristics disqualifying the 
company from competing for projects, it may attempt to pay off the relevant 
official to overlook these and allow the company to participate in bidding. In 
cases where tender is carried out by an invitation to bid, kickbacks can be used 
to ensure that the company is included in the list of bidders. 
There are several methods for companies to reduce their competition when 
competing for projects. Bribes can be offered to officials responsible for 
selecting companies for the invitation to bid for a project or during the pre-
qualification phase. Rival companies can be excluded for superficial reasons. 
Where the design of the infrastructure is carried out prior to bidding, a 
consultant architect can be bribed to include in the design a feature providing 
one company with an advantage over others. For example, a company may 
use specific technology, and this may be incorporated into the project design 
or specifications. 
Corruption and collusion often go hand in hand (Lambert-Mogiliansky and 
Sonin, 2006). As such, several companies in the construction industry can 
collectively lobby the government to develop regulation that creates barriers to 
entry of foreign construction companies. Such regulation can purportedly be 
aimed at addressing health and safety issues, and it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the motive behind the new regulation is improving the welfare of the 
population, or creating an unfair advantage to the domestic industry. The result 
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is exclusion of foreign competitors in the medium-term, until foreign firms adapt 
their technology and methods to meet the new regulation standards.  
Another example of collusion between construction companies is participation 
in bidding processes to create an illusion of a competitive environment, but in 
fact agreeing beforehand on which company will be chosen. That is, companies 
may agree before the bidding starts on which company will be allocated each 
part of the project. In such cases, the officials managing the tender have a list 
of red flags to identify collusion. Bribes may be used in exchange for officials 
overlooking collusive practices. 
It has been observed that a low level of corruption is correlated with high 
competition, which led to the conclusion that increased competition can 
decrease corruption (Emerson, 2006, Ades and Di Tella, 1999). The intuition 
behind this argument is that competition reduces excess profits from which 
bribes can be paid (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997) (see Section 2.3.2). However, it 
has been argued that competitive pressures increased corruption in the EU 
(Warner, 2007). The basic incentive for companies to corrupt is profit-seeking 
(discussed in Section 2.4.2). One of the mechanisms to achieve higher margins 
is by reducing competition to drive up the prices. Faced with new market 
entrants, firms are expected to invest in efficiency-enhancing systems to 
remain competitive. This requires time, effort and the availability of finance. The 
2007-2008 global financial crisis already reduced company margins, and 
corruption may be perceived as a cheaper and more attractive short-term 
method of obtaining new projects. 
In order to increase profits from projects, companies can attempt to influence 
the size and value of the project, or reduce their costs through the use of lower 
quality materials, or overstating the associated time and costs. It is in the 
interests of the construction industry that large complex projects are chosen, 
for which costs are difficult to estimate with accuracy. Corruption can be used 
as a method of motivating the officials responsible for initiation and selection of 
 167 
 
projects to ensure large high-cost project pass the initial screening process. 
Where consultants are used to estimate the costs and benefits of proposed 
projects, they may be bribed to understate the costs and overstate the benefits. 
Consultants may already be in the position that incentivises them to produce 
evaluations of project costs and benefits that overstate the project’s viability. 
This can ensure commissions of further work for the consultant on the same or 
on other projects. 
During construction, companies may skimp on materials, use lower-quality 
equipment, or over-report their expenditure. These actions, by themselves, 
constitute fraud rather than corruption. However, supervising engineers 
certifying the quality of work may be offered kickbacks to overlook such 
instances of fraud. 
The objectives identified above are linked, and a corrupt agreement can be 
aimed at fulfilling several objectives. Thus far, the objectives of actors on the 
demand side of corruption outlined are the objectives of a company bidding for 
infrastructure projects. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the term Candidate is used to 
discuss this position of a company that stands to benefit from a successful 
corrupt agreement. The objectives of individuals participating in corruption on 
behalf of the companies in infrastructure projects are rarely considered. The 
term Representative is used in the preceding chapters to discuss the position 
and the role of these individuals. The Derived Benefit gained by 
Representatives can be financial such as pay raise or a bonus following a 
successful contract acquisition; or status gains, such as promotion.  
For the actors on the supply side of corruption, the often-discussed objective 
behind the corrupt agreements is self-enrichment. However, institutional 
corruption, where individual officials do not receive bribes directly, but trade 
favours in exchange for donations to political parties is an important factor. In 
the context of the EU, it has been shown that the infrastructure sector is 
particularly lucrative in terms of financing political donations. Both central and 
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local political parties require financing, and decentralisation is thought to 
increase the prevalence of corruption at the local level (Warner, 2007). 
In addition to the individuals occupying positions of Candidates, 
Representatives and Decision Makers (or officials), corrupt agreements in 
infrastructure projects can involve consultants that fulfil the roles of project 
design and evaluation. As mentioned above, the motivations of these 
consultants to engage in corruption may not be limited to self-enrichment. 
Future consultancy contracts can be conditional on  fulfilling the wishes of the 
client, and this can create incentives to adjust or even falsify data to ensure the 
lucrative projects are selected and implemented.  
Hence, there is a myriad of objectives that can be fulfilled through corruption, 
and a number of potential interested parties. The roles of different individuals 
and the types of gains obtained through corrupt agreements are not always 
well-understood. The case studies below, therefore, focus on the different 
positions occupied by individuals involved in corruption, their roles in the 
corrupt agreements and the types of benefits obtained through corrupt means. 
7.3 Case studies 
7.3.1 Data sources 
The case studies presented in this chapter are developed using criminal court 
case materials that were used in support of prosecutions under the United 
States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977)3 (FCPA). The FCPA prohibits the 
practice of making payments to government officials in countries outside the 
US for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business4. The FCPA has an 
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extraterritorial reach, and enforcement actions are usually taken on the basis 
that US currency or other US resources were used, or if US companies or 
persons were involved (Henschel, 2016). Enforcement actions in such cases 
can be taken not only against the company, but also its directors, officers or 
agents.  
The FCPA prosecution documents were chosen as the source of case studies 
because they provide detailed accounts of the corrupt cases. The documents 
provide information including the corporate structures of companies involved, 
their officers and agents implicated in corruption; information on the business 
transactions subject to corruption, their value and the manner in which 
corruption affected these business transactions; details of the foreign 
government officials’ actions; the sizes of bribes offered or given, and the 
manner in which the bribes were delivered to the government officials. The 
documents are also freely available from the US’ Department of Justice 
website5 and there are over 500 enforcement actions brought by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Department of Justice 
(Stanford Law School, 2018).   
A number of large companies in transportation, infrastructure and construction 
industries have been prosecuted under FCPA. The largest monetary sanctions 
to date (May 2018) were imposed on Alstom S.A. ($772m), Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft ($448.5m) and Kellogg Brown and Root LLC ($402m) 
(Stanford Law School, 2018).  
A comparable UK law to US’ FCPA with extra-territorial reach is the UK’s 
Bribery Act 20106. Some information on the UK prosecution cases of bribery 
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offenses is available in the Law Pages7, but the summaries provided are not as 
detailed as the US FCPA prosecution resources and do not provide the same 
level of insight into the corrupt networks and schemes. Therefore, US FCPA 
prosecution documentation was chosen over other resources. 
The key benefit of using past FCPA court cases for case studies is that they 
provide details of real-world corrupt agreements and this allows an empirical 
analysis of corruption. Laboratory-based experiments can provide insights into 
how individuals make decisions under controlled conditions, but external 
validity of such experiments and the extent to which they accurately capture 
the nature of corruption are uncertain. The FCPA court cases also reveal 
corrupt acts across the world, with prosecutions based on corrupt actions that 
have taken place in different countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, China and 
Argentina.  
The documents set out the facts, sighting evidence such as the content of 
emails exchanged between corrupt partners, and transfers of funds to pay the 
officials. The drawback of this source of information is that it is often incomplete 
or fragmented. For example, only the bribes that were discovered through 
investigations form part of the evidence used for prosecutions. There could be 
more payments that have been made that remained hidden. Some facts may 
also have been omitted from the documents, with the intention to bring 
additional charges against the company or its officers or agents in the future. 
Even in light of these limitations, the information provided in FCPA 
documentation allows the creation of case studies showing how corrupt 
networks were formed.  





7.3.2 Choices of court cases for case studies 
The case studies were developed based on the information contained in FCPA 
prosecution case documentation. The prosecution cases were selected from 
the list of the most recent cases available at the time the selection was made 
(beginning of 2015). Two years of cases were selected – these were the cases 
prosecuted in 2014 and 2013. Appendix D shows the list of cases. The cases 
are numbered, with the most recent one assigned number 1 (US v. Alstom S.A., 
et al) and the oldest considered case of 2013 (US v. Neal Uhl) assigned number 
44.  
Out of the 44 prosecution cases, only the cases containing corrupt schemes in 
infrastructure procurement processes were selected. Selecting cases that are 
based on corruption in similar industries and settings allows a more direct 
comparison of key features. The eight cases that were selected describe 
corrupt schemes related to bidding, design, engineering or construction of 
power grids or natural gas pipelines.   
Several prosecution cases are based on multiple corrupt schemes. For 
example, the prosecution case against Alstom (case 1) describes corrupt 
payments made in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Bahamas and Taiwan. 
Some of the cases are linked and, therefore, are considered jointly. So, for 
example, Hoskins (defendant in case 29), Pomponi (case 35), Pierrucci (case 
37) and Rothschild (case 38) were employees of Alstom (case 1), and the 
information detailed in these cases is incorporated into the summaries of the 
Alstom cases in Section 7.3.3. 
The FCPA cases selected for case studies are as follows. 
(1) Alstom (US v. Alstom S.A., et al) 
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This case documentation sets out multiple corruption cases related to the 
design, construction and provision of services related to power generation 
facilities, power grids and rail transportation in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Taiwan, Egypt and the Bahamas. Related cases are: 
(16) US v. Marubeni Corporation (2014) – consortium partner of Alstom in one 
of the projects (case study 1, Indonesia, Tarahan project). 
 (29) US v. Lawrence Hoskins (2013) - Senior Vice President of Alstom’s 
International Network, who oversaw efforts to obtain contracts with new 
customers. 
(35) US v. William Pomponi (2013) - Vice President of Regional Sales at Alstom 
Power US, who was responsible for obtaining boiler contracts. 
(37) US v. Frederic Pierrucci (2013) - Vice President of Alstom’s boiler line, who 
was assigned to Alstom Power US, overseeing efforts to obtain boiler contracts. 
(38) US v. David Rothschild (2013) - Vice President of Regional Sales at Alstom 
Power, who was responsible for obtaining boiler contracts. 
(17) US v. Asem M. Elgawhary (2014)  
Asem Elgawhary was an executive at Bechtel Corporation who provided 
confidential information and manipulated power projects awards in exchange 
for bribes in Egypt. Elgawhary was also one of the decision-makers in Alstom 
bribery schemes in Egypt. However, US v. Asem M. Elgawhary sets out corrupt 
schemes involving other companies and these are considered as a separate 
case study.  
(24) US v. Bilfinger SE 
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This was a corrupt scheme to pay bribes to Nigerian officials to obtain a project 
to build a natural gas pipeline. 
The case studies below use the same references to individuals as contained in 
the FCPA case documentation. For example, consultants used in corrupt 
agreements are not normally named, but are referred to as Consultants A, B, 
C, etc.  
The FCPA cases that were not selected for case studies are as follows: 
 Cosmetics sales (Avon, cases 2 and 3) 
 Aircraft maintenance contracts (Dallas Airmotive, Bizjet and several 
individuals, cases 4, 41, 42, 43 and 44) 
 Sales of medical equipment (Bio-Rad Laboratories, case 5) 
 Broker-dealer services (several individuals, cases 6, 7, 30, 32, 33 and 
34) 
 Computer Sales (Hewlett-Packard, cases 8, 9 and 10) 
 Mining permissions/ rights (several individuals, cases 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 
and 40) 
 Supply of raw materials (Alcoa World Alumina, case 18) 
 Oil services (several individuals, cases 19, 20 and 21) 
 VAT fraud (Archer Daniels Midland Company, Alfred C. Toepfer 
International, cases 22 and 23) 
 Oil equipment supplies (Weatherford International, cases 25 and 26) 
 ATM equipment contracts (Diebold, case 27) 
 Sales of high-voltage/ high-tension capacitors (Alain Riedo, case 28) 
 Oil and gas concessions (Total, case 31) 
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 Customs clearance of merchandise (Ralph Lauren Corporation, case 36) 
 Compliance with customs and tax laws (Parker Drilling Company, case 
39) 
Nine case studies were developed from the documentation supporting the 
selected eight prosecution cases: 
Case study 1: Alstom, Indonesia – Tarahan project 
Case study 2: Alstom, Indonesia – Muara Tawar project 
Case study 3: Alstom, Saudi Arabia – Shoaiba projects 
Case study 4: Alstom, Bahamas 
Case study 5: Alstom, Taiwan – Taipei metro-rail system 
Case study 6: Alstom, Egypt – transmission and distribution projects 
Case study 7: Alstom, Egypt – Nubaria and El Tebbin projects 
Case study 8: Bechtel, Egypt 
Case study 9: Bilfinger, Nigeria 
7.3.3 Summaries of case studies 
Alstom schemes overview  
As the majority of case studies (1 to 7) are developed from Alstom S.A. 
prosecution documents, a company overview and a summary of its corruption 
schemes are provided separately to the case studies. 
Alstom S.A. is a company headquartered in France. Its business is design, 
construction and provision of services related to power generation facilities, 
power grids, and rail transportation systems around the world. Its annual sales 
 175 
 
at the time of the events considered were €17bn, and it employed 75,000 
people in over 70 countries.  
Alstom S.A. operated through a number of subsidiaries, and a number of senior 
executives, including Hoskins, Pomponi, Pierrucci and Rothschild (who were 
also prosecuted separately, see Section 7.3.2) were in charge of obtaining 
contracts across the world, and overseeing compliance with international anti-
corruption standards in consultancy agreements. Henceforth, using the term in 
this thesis, these executives will be referred to as Representatives of the 
company. They designed corrupt schemes to obtain business for Alstom S.A. 
and authorised payments aimed to bribe foreign officials. For clarity of the 
description of the corrupt scheme, Alstom S.A. and its subsidiaries is 
represented as one organisation throughout this chapter.    
The Representatives of Alstom hired consultants to conceal and disguise 
payments to foreign officials as consultancy fees or commissions. The 
consultants passed a proportion of the funds they received to foreign officials 
as bribes.   
Alstom had accounting controls and internal policies in place aimed at 
preventing unlawful payments to foreign officials. However, these controls and 
policies were not adequately implemented and company Representatives did 
not comply with them. In accordance with Alstom’s internal policies, a number 
of red flags were raised when consultants were retained, but these were 
ignored. For example: 
1. Consultants had no expertise or experience in the industry sector in 
which Alstom looked to secure projects 
2. Consultants were located in countries other than the project country  
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3. Consultants were paid in currencies and to bank accounts based in 
countries different to the country the consultant was located in 
4. More than one consultant was hired for the same project, and to provide 
the same services 
5. Payments to consultants were made without the documentation showing 
the service provided to Alstom 
There was a lack of adequate controls for the approval of consultancy 
agreements. Additionally, Alstom policies were violated to pay consultants 
higher amounts and sooner than originally agreed. As per Alstom internal 
policies, consultancy agreements included provisions that prohibited unlawful 
payments, but this had no effect on the corrupt nature of the payments.  
Alstom Representatives maintained an unwritten policy to avoid making 
consultancy agreements that would bring Alstom’s practices under the 
jurisdiction of the US. There was a tendency to use consultants based outside 
the US, and payments were made in currencies other than US$ and into 
accounts based outside the US. This suggests that Alstom and its 
Representatives were aware that the corrupt schemes were in direct violation 
of the FCPA and looked to reduce their liability. 
Some of Alstom’s subsidiaries had headquarters in the US, which brought them 
under the scope of the FCPA. Alstom also issued shares of company stock on 
the New York Stock Exchange until 2004, which also meant that Alstom came 
under US jurisdiction for the purposes of the FCPA. 
Alstom carried out several corrupt schemes in Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Taiwan and the Bahamas. The company paid approx. $75 million in 
consultancy fees that were in part paid in bribes to foreign officials to secure 
$4bn in projects, with a gain to Alstom of approximately $296m.  
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Case study 1: Alstom, Indonesia – Tarahan project 
In 2002-2009 Alstom secured several power projects in Indonesia. One of such 
projects was the Tarahan project to provide power-related services to the 
citizens of Indonesia at approximately $118m. Perusahaan Listrik Negara 
(PLN), a state-owned and state-controlled electricity company in Indonesia, 
was responsible for sourcing the Tarahan Project. 
Marubeni Corporation was Alstom’s consortium partner in this project. 
Marubeni is headquartered in Japan and provides power generation services. 
At the time of the events considered, the company, its subsidiaries and joint 
ventures had trading transactions of approximately $74bn per year, with 24,000 
employees located in over 70 countries. 
In order to ensure that Alstom and Marubeni’s joint project bid won the Tarahan 
project, the two companies retained consultants to bribe the Indonesian 
officials. These officials are not named in the documentation, but are referred 
to as Officials 1, 2, 3 and 4. Official 1 was a member of the Indonesian 
Parliament with a parliamentary portfolio including the responsibility for power 
and energy. He had a well-established relationship with Official 2, who was the 
President Director of PLN. Official 1 was, therefore, in the position to exert 
influence on Official 2 and on the PLN’s board. Official 2 was in the position to 
influence PLN’s contract awards. Official 3 was a high-ranking member of the 
PLN evaluation committee for the Tarahan project with broad decision-making 
authority over the award of contracts. Official 4 was an engineer working on the 
Tarahan project.  
Although it is not clearly set out in the case documentation, email 
communications between Alstom Representatives included as evidence in US 
v. Marubeni Corporation8 suggest that Official 1 initially proposed to use his 
                                            
8  United States v. Marubeni Corporation. Court docket number 14-CR-00052-JBA 
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“representative company” for transferring bribes. This company may have been 
controlled by Official 1, in which case the transfers of bribes would have been 
direct from Alstom and Marubeni to Official 1. Representatives of Marubeni and 
Alstom were concerned about using this route, and decided to use Consultant 
A as an Intermediary. The name of this consultant is not provided, and the 
individual and his company are referred to jointly as Consultant A.  
Consultant A’s agent profile showed that it is a company in Baltimore, 
Maryland, US. As outlined in the summary above, Alstom’s unwritten policies 
were to avoid using US-based companies and bank accounts. Alstom 
Representatives exchanged emails expressing a preference to use an 
Indonesia-based company, but an exception was made in this case.   
Alstom and Marubeni initially retained Consultant A for the purpose of providing 
bribes to Official 1 and the PLN officials (Officials 2, 3 and 4). Consultant A was 
to receive 3% of the contract value (3% of $118m). Official 1 was content with 
using Consultant A as a conduit, but PLN officials were not. They did not trust 
Consultant A to transfer the promised amounts once they supported the Alstom 
and Marubeni’s bid, and thought that Consultant A would give them “pocket 
money” and disappear.  
This lack of officials’ trust in Consultant A was explained from different 
perspectives in the documentation supporting the cases against Marubeni, 
Alstom and its employees. First, Alstom and Marubeni considered that they 
required only marginal support of the officials to win the project. This suggests 
that Consultant A’s negotiations with the PLN officials reflected the 
assessments made by Alstom and Marubeni’s Representatives. In one of the 
emails, Consultant A told Pomponi that the PLN evaluation committee were 
unhappy about the amount of money they were receiving, further suggesting 






that Alstom and Marubeni dictated the sizes of bribes that were offered to the 
officials, rather than leaving this decision to Consultant A.  
Second, PLN officials thought that Consultant A was not willing to spend 
money. This could refer to the meeting between Consultant A and Officials 1 
and 2 in Europe. Consultant A looked to Alstom to finance the officials’ visit, 
which presumably meant offering entertainment and gifts for the officials. 
Again, although it is not clearly set out in the documentation, it could be inferred 
from the emails that Alstom and Marubeni expected Consultant A to finance 
the visit and be reimbursed after the project was secured, but Consultant A was 
not prepared to do so.  
Whatever the reason for the PLN officials’ lack of trust in Consultant A, Alstom 
and Marubeni decided to limit this consultant’s role to providing bribes to Official 
1 only, and retained another consultant, Consultant B, to bribe PLN officials. 
Consultant A’s agreement was amended to reduce the payments from 3% to 
1% of the project value. An agreement was made by Marubeni with Consultant 
B for 2% of the project value. Consultant B was then expected to provide bribes 
to Officials 2, 3 and 4.  
The case documentation shows some of the payments made by Alstom into 
Consultant A’s company’s account totalling $666,880, and the payments made 
by Marubeni totalling $357,794. The payments from Alstom to Consultant B 
detailed in the documentation totalled $1,267,072. Marubeni’s payments to 
Consultant B were not included in the case documentation. From over $1m 
paid to Consultant A, US v. Pierrucci and US v. Pomponi documentation shows 
that Official 1 received $360,000.  
Figure 16 shows the key organisations, actors and the corrupt transfers related 
to the Tarahan project. There were a number of Representatives in Alstom 
including Pomponi, Hoskins, Pierrucci and Rothschild. They fulfilled various 
roles in corrupt agreements, including retaining Consultants A and B, approving 
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their consultancy agreements and approving payments to these consultants. 
Their combined actions led to payments being made to the consultants and 
then to Indonesian government officials. In return, Alstom obtained the Tarahan 
project worth $118m.  
 
Figure 16 Corrupt agreements, case study 1: Alstom, Indonesia - 
Tarahan 
Case study 2: Alstom, Indonesia – Muara Tawar project 
Another project Alstom looked to secure with PLN was Muara Tawar Block 5 
Project to expand the existing Muara Tawar power plant and provide additional 
power-related services to the citizens of Indonesia, at approximately $260m. 
The same two consultants which were used in connection with the Tarahan 
project were retained to bribe the relevant officials – again, Officials 1, 2, 3 and 
4 – in connection with the Muara Tawar project. Based on Tarahan project, 
PLN officials refused to deal with Consultant A, so the bribes were mostly 
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negotiated by Consultant B. Where Consultant A was used, he was mostly 
fulfilling the functions of a cashier.  
Since Tarahan project, Alstom used its influence to promote Official 4 (an 
engineer in Tarahan project) so that he became a member of the procurement 
team in Muara Tawar project. Official 4 believed he was not fully compensated 
for his support of Alstom and Marubeni’s bid in Tarahan project, and threatened 
to negatively affect the outcome of Muara Tawar Block 5 bidding outcome.  
Nonetheless, Alstom was awarded the Muara Tawar Block 5 project, although 
the transfers to the officials and the bribe payments were not detailed in FCPA 
case documentation.  
Case 3: Alstom, Saudi Arabia – Shoaiba projects 
In late 1990s – early 2000s, Alstom bid for power projects in Saudi Arabia with 
the Saudi Electric Company (SEC), Saudi Arabia’s state-owned and state-
controlled electricity company. The projects were located at a site known as 
Shoaiba. These were a series of projects for construction of 14 steam power 
generating units. The first two stages of the Shoaiba Projects involved the 
construction of an oil-fired power plant with 11 power generating units, at the 
value of $3bn. 
Alstom retained at least six consultants in connection with the first two Shoaiba 
Projects, to bribe Saudi officials with the responsibility for the bidding stages of 
the projects. The consultants were referred to by their code names – ‘Mr 
Geneva’ (Consultant C), ‘Mr Paris’ (Consultant D), ‘London’ (Consultant E), 
‘Old Friend’ (Consultant F) and ‘Quiet Man’.  
‘Mr. Geneva’ (Consultant C) was a brother of a high-level official at the SEC 
who had the ability to influence the award of the Shoaiba Projects (Official 5). 
Mr Geneva was paid approximately $5m.  
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Consultant D, ‘Mr Paris’, was a close relative of another high-level official at the 
SEC with the ability to influence the award of the project (Official 6). Mr Paris 
was paid at least $4m. Alstom believed that Official 6 had 70% of the decision-
making power over the award of contracts by the SEC. In addition to the 
transfers made to Consultant D, $2.2 million was paid to a US-based Islamic 
education foundation associated with Official 6.  
Consultant E, ‘London’ received at least $30m in connection with the first two 
Shoaiba Projects. Consultants F (‘Old Friend’) was paid at least £10m. The 
case documentation does not provide information on what proportion of these 
transfers to consultants was then transferred to Saudi officials. However, the 
documents include emails exchanged between Alstom representatives about 
the cost of doing business in Saudi Arabia. One of the emails stated that it was 
a requirement under Saudi royal decrees that at least 10% of employees of 
companies working on construction projects like Shoaiba must be Saudi. Such 
employees are then recommended by the client (government officials), and 
these are likely to be friends and family of the officials. The costs of such 
employees was estimated to be as high as $100,000/year, and “zero 
productivity may be assumed”.  
After Alstom acquired the contracts, it required a certificate from the SEC to get 
paid for its work on Stage 1, Phase 2 of the Shoaiba Project. An Alstom 
Representative sent an email to his colleague saying that he is prepared to 
“show support” (provide bribes to the relevant officials) of €20,000 (payable half 
in Saudi Riyals and half in Euro).  




Figure 17 Figure 16 Corrupt agreements, case study 1: Alstom, Saudi 
Arabia - Shoaiba 
Case study 4: Alstom, Bahamas  
In 1999-2004 Alstom bid on a number of projects with the Bahamas Electricity 
Corporation (BEC). Consultant I was retained to pay bribes to the Bahamian 
government officials in connection with bidding for projects. Consultant I was a 
US citizen and a close friend of Official 8, who was a board member of BEC. 
Consultant I had no experience in the power industry, and his business was in 
the sales of furniture and leather products, export of chemical products and 
spare parts. Retaining of this consultant raised a number of red flags in 
accordance with Alstom’s compliance policies, which were ignored. 
The consultancy agreement sent to Consultant I included a clause that if he 
made corrupt payments to government officials, the agreement would be void. 
Consultant I initially refused to sign the agreement with these stipulations, and 
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asked for the agreement to be amended. Alstom employees could not amend 
the agreement to remove the provisions regarding unlawful payments.  
Consultant I was also required to open a bank account outside the US, in 
accordance with Alstom’s unwritten rule to avoid using US accounts to transfer 
bribes. Alstom made six payments into Consultant I’s account, totalling 
approximately $650,000. Consultant I then made six payments to Official 8, 
totalling roughly half of the amount he received. 
Case study 5: Alstom, Taiwan: Taipei’s metro-rail system 
In 2001-2008 Alstom bid for transport-related projects with a number of 
Taiwanese organisations responsible for the construction and operation of the 
metro-rail system in Taipei, including Taipei’s Department of Rapid Transit 
System (DORTS). DORTS’ command and control room (CCR) project had the 
value of $15m.  
Alstom entered into a consulting agreement with a Taiwanese company 
(Consultant J) in relation to the CCR project. The consultant did not have 
expertise in the transport sector, and his business was wholesale of cigarettes, 
wines and pianos. This raised red flags with the Alstom compliance personnel 
who inquired about the functions of Consultant J. Despite this, the consultant 
was retained. 
Consultant J was paid approximately $380,000 in total in connection with the 
CCR project. Another consultant was retained for the same project, but the 
transfers to this consultant are not included in the case documentation. 
Case study 6: Alstom, Egypt – transmission and distribution projects 
In 2002-2010, Alstom bid on a number of projects with the Egyptian Electricity 
Holding Company (EEHC), a state-owned and state-controlled electricity 
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company in Egypt, and the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company 
(EETC), a state-owned and state-controlled electricity transmission company 
in Egypt, to build electric grids. This included the Reactive Power 
Compensation (RPC) project, valued at $15m, and the Three Substations 
project, at $30m.  
The two projects were part-funded by the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID). One of the conditions of USAID projects was for Alstom 
to disclose whether they used consultants, and whether any commissions were 
paid in connection with the projects. Alstom submitted false certifications, 
omitting that they used consultants who were paid commissions.  
Alstom retained three consultants including Consultant H to pay bribes to the 
Egyptian officials with the ability to influence the award of the contracts. 
Consultant H’s commission was set at 1.5% of the value of the RPC project 
contract. Alstom also paid and provided gifts, travel and entertainment directly 
to Egyptian officials, including Official 7.  
A finance employee of Alstom at first refused to release the payments to 
Consultant H due to insufficient proof of services. The project manager warned 
her that discussing Consultant H can cause several people to be put in jail, and 
instructed her to delete emails regarding this consultant. 
Case study 7: Alstom, Egypt – Nubaria and El Tebbin projects 
In addition to the above transmission and distribution projects, in 2002-2011 
Alstom bid for several power stations projects with the Egyptian Electricity 
Holding Company (EEHC). EEHC had a number of projects to build power 
stations in Egypt, including the Nubaria power station project, with the value of 
$70m and the El Tebbin power station project, at $60m. EEHC outsourced the 




Alstom retained Consultant G to bribe Egyptian officials, including Asem 
Elgawhary who oversaw the bidding process. Asem Elgawhary was also 
charged under the FCPA (see Section 7.3.2).  
Alstom was awarded the projects, including Nubaria and El Tebbin. Alstom 
transferred funds to Consultant G – approximately €5m ($6.22m)9 in connection 
with these projects. Consultant G then transferred $3m to Elgawhary and 
another EEHC official.  
Case study 8: Bechtel, Egypt   
Bechtel is a company headquartered in San Francisco, California, US, and its 
business is engineering, construction and project management. EEHC 
(Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, see above) subcontracted with private 
companies and outsourced the project bidding processes to PGESCo (Power 
Generation Engineering and Services Company) a joint venture between 
Bechtel, EEHC and an international bank. PGESCo’s business was 
engineering, design and construction of power projects. It assisted EEHC in 
identifying subcontractors, carrying out the bidding processes and awarding 
contracts.  
In 1973-2011, Asem Elgawhary held a number of executive-level positions in 
Bechtel, and was a General Manager at PGESCo in 1996-2011. Elgawhary 
had access to confidential information that, if disclosed to one of the bidding 
companies, could provide an unfair advantage. He also had influence on the 
decision-makers at EEHC with the responsibility for selecting companies for 
projects.  
                                            





Several companies paid kickbacks to Elgawhary in return for a preferential 
treatment in the bidding and the award of contracts. Such preferential treatment 
included provision of confidential information about the competing companies 
and about the bidding process. For example, Elgawhary provided performance 
comparison to a consultant of a Japanese company relating to other power 
companies competing for the project. Elgawhary also influenced the timing of 
the bidding process, granting extensions to the Japanese company for two 
projects.  
Case study 9: Bilfinger, Nigeria 
Bilfinger SE is an international engineering and services company 
headquartered in Germany, which provides industrial services, power services, 
building and facility services and construction. Companies partly owned by 
Bilfinger provided engineering, construction and other services in the oil and 
gas industry. Bilfinger and its subsidiaries are referred to as one organisation 
in this section.  
The Eastern Gas Gathering System (EGGS) was a natural gas pipeline system 
in the Niger Delta designed to relieve the existing pipeline capacity constraints. 
The EGGS project was to construct a major natural gas pipeline system 
through a difficult terrain in the Niger Delta, and was divided into two phases. 
The first was to engineer, procure and construct the pipeline from the Soku Gas 
Plant to the Bonny Island Liquefied Natural Gas Plant. Phase 1 contained an 
optional scope of work to apply a Polyethylene-concrete coating to the pipeline 
to give it weight and protection (EGGS Coating). Phase 2 was also an optional 
scope of work to construct a second pipeline from the Gbaran/Ubie node to the 
Soku Gas Plant. The base scope’s value was $216.5m, the optional EGGS 
Coating scope’s price was $30m and the optional Phase 2 was valued at 
$141m. The combined value of the EGGS project was $387.5m. 
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Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was a government-owned 
company in charge of developing Nigeria’s oil and gas, and regulating the oil 
and gas industry. National Petroleum Investment Management Services 
(NAPIMS) was a subsidiary of NNPC that oversaw Nigeria’s investments in 
development projects. NNPC and a number of multinational oil companies, 
including Shell Petroleum Development Co of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC) entered into 
a Joint Venture to deliver the EGGS project. 
Bilfinger entered into a consortium agreement with Willbros International Inc. 
and its subsidiaries to jointly bid on the EGGS project. Willbros is a US 
company that provided construction, engineering and other services in the oil 
and gas industry. Bilfinger and Willbros promised over $6m in bribes to Nigerian 
officials, including an official in the executive branch of the Nigerian 
Government, officials of NNPC, NAPIMS and the dominant Nigerian Political 
Party, in order to obtain the EGGS project. The Bilfinger-Willbros consortium 
bid on and obtained the EGGS project, including the optional scopes of work.  
Bilfinger and Willbros inflated the price of their project bid by 3% to cover the 
cost of bribes to the Nigerian officials. Bilfinger employees referred to such 
bribe payments as ‘landscaping’ and Willbros employees called them 
‘commitments’. Bilfinger and Willbros submitted invoices to SPDC for payment, 
which were for inflated amounts that included the cost of bribe payments to 
Nigerian officials. Bilfinger employees were responsible for bribing officials from 
NNPC and NAPIMS, and Willbros provided bribes to officials from SPDC. 
Billfinger employees made payments in cash, which was mailed or flown to 
Nigeria from Germany. 
One of the NNPC officials was promised $150,000 in return for his help for the 
Bilfinger-Willbros consortium to secure the contract, which a Bilfinger employee 
delivered in cash. Several other NNPC and NAPIMS officials (between seven 
and nine individuals) were promised a total of $1m in return for helping the 
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consortium obtain the contract. One of these officials received $50,000 and 
another received between $30,000 and $50,000.  
7.3.4 Case studies discussion  
The case studies describe corrupt agreements made between the late 1990s 
and 2010 in connection with transport, power and gas projects in Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Bahamas, Taiwan and Nigeria. The projects varied in 
size and value. Table 5 summarises the key information in case studies: values 
of the projects, numbers of known consultants used as Intermediaries for 
corrupt payments, the amounts received by Intermediaries, and the amounts 
promised or paid to the officials.  
The information in the table is incomplete because the values of projects are 
not always specified in the documentation (project values are not known for the 
projects in the Bahamas, case study 4, and in Egypt, case study 8), and only 
some of the payments made to the consultants and the officials are listed. For 
example, Alstom paid at least 2.5% of the value of the CCR project to 
consultants (case study 5). There were at least two consultants, and the 
payments to one of them are not specified. In one case (Tarahan project, case 
study 1), however, the proportion of the project value transferred to the 
consultants is known from the emails between the company Representatives 
and the Intermediaries – 3%. Therefore, the values of corrupt payments in most 
cases can be treated as the minimum estimate. The exception is case study 7: 
€5m ($6.22m) transferred to Consultant G financed bribe payments in 
connection with several projects, including (but not limited to) Nubaria ($70m) 
and El Tebbin ($60m). Therefore, 4.8% is a high estimate of a proportion of the 
project value that was paid to consultants to obtain these projects. Around half 
of these transfers ($3m) are known to have been transferred to the Egyptian 




Table 5 Case studies summaries 
Project 






Amounts transferred to 
Intermediaries / proportion 




Command and Control Room, part of the 
Taipei metro-rail project  
(case study 5) 
$15m 2 At least $380,000 
(2.5%) 
Not known 
Reactive Power Compensation (RPC) and 
Three Substations projects 
(case study 6) 
$15m and 
$30m 
3 At least 1.5% of the RPC 
project 
Not known 








Tarahan project (case study 1) 
 
$118m 2 3% Not known 
Muara Tawar project  
(case study 2) 
$260m 2 Not known Not known 
Eastern Gas Gathering System project (case 
study 9) 
$387.5m None known - 
direct payments 
to officials 
N/A $6m  




Shoaiba projects  
(case study 3) 
$3bn At least 6 At least $51.2m (1.7%) Not known 
Power projects in the Bahamas  
(case study 4) 
Not known 1 $650,000 Around half of 
$650,000 
Projects in Egypt (case study 8) 
 
Not known Not known Not known Not known 
 192 
 
Table 5 shows that consultants were paid 1.5%-4.8% of the project value. At 
least half of these payments were transferred to officials (based on case studies 
4 and 7). Previous studies found the proportions of project values paid in bribes 
to be higher. In Pakistan, contractors reported paying 7% “commissions” 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1998). In the Iraqi Oil-for-Food contracts, such payments 
were termed “after sales service fees” and were fixed at 10% of the awarded 
contract value (Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-For-
Food Programme, 2005). Overall financial losses due to corruption have been 
estimated to range between 5% and 20% of construction costs (Wells, 2015). 
However, the payments made in the case studies above were aimed to 
influence the award of contracts only. Other bribe payments, such as payments 
to obtain planning permissions, to obtain supervising engineers’ quality of work 
certification, or to influence the design of the project are not included. The one 
exception is a mention of a potential payment of €20,000 to obtain the 
necessary certification for Alstom to receive payments for its work on Shoaiba 
projects. The values of bribe payments in the case studies, therefore, can be 
considered consistent with previous research, albeit they represent a smaller 
percentage of the projects, especially considering that the intermediaries 
retained a significant proportion. Past research rarely specifies the proportion 
of payments retained by the intermediaries. 
The information on the payments made by consultants to the government 
officials is not always available in the FCPA prosecution documents. In case 
study 7, the payments known to have been made by the consultant to the 
officials totalled $3m, which is around half of the funds transferred by Alstom to 
the consultant. In the FCPA documentation describing Alstom’s corruption 
scheme in the Bahamas (case study 4), it is explicitly stated that the consultant 
transferred around half of the funds he received to the government official. 
Although it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the amounts that 
Intermediaries in corrupt agreements retain for their services, the above two 
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case studies suggest that they might retain up to half of the fund they receive 
from companies. 
The bribes paid to officials are often aggregated to show the total value. Each 
project, however, has a number of decision makers key to the award of the 
project. For example, four officials with different roles and responsibilities for 
the project were bribed in case study 1: a politician (Official 1) and several 
employees of the state-owned electricity company – the President Director 
(Official 2), a member of the evaluation committee (Official 3) and an engineer 
(Official 4). The exact nature of Advantages provided by each official is not 
always specified, but included disclosing confidential information to the briber 
and influencing the timing of the bidding process (see case study 8). That is, 
the officials circumvented various institutional procedures designed to ensure 
the project bidding was carried out fairly, and that the best company was 
selected to carry out the project. The sizes of bribes can be expected to vary 
depending on the position of the decision maker and the level of their 
responsibility for the project. Examples of individual bribes paid are $360,000 
(Official 1, case study 1), half of $650,000 (Official 8, case study 4), $50,000 
and $150,000 (case study 9). 
The FCPA documentation on the Alstom Saudi corruption scheme (case study 
3) also reveals the practice of hiring officials’ relatives and friends with 
payments of up to $100,000 per year for zero productivity, in order to obtain 
projects. These funds could have been transferred to the officials. Alternatively, 
these friends and relatives could be the third-party Beneficiaries (see Section 
4.3.6) from the corrupt schemes. The officials (DMs) could also then derive 
some non-monetary benefit from these transfers, such as repayment in favours 
in other spheres.  
In most cases, Intermediaries (consultants) were used to transfer bribes to 
government officials for the purpose of obtaining projects. However, 
Representatives of Bilfinger gave bribes directly to the Nigerian officials in cash 
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(case study 9) and Alstom Representatives, in addition to using consultants, 
gave money and gifts directly to the Egyptian officials (case study 6).  
The values of gifts were not set out in the FCPA documentation. Case studies 
6 and 9 suggest that gifts were provided alongside bribes, and case study 1 
suggests that officials judged the consultants’ willingness to ‘spend money’ 
based on the entertainment and gifts they received.  
Case studies also show that the choice of an Intermediary in corrupt 
agreements is important to the success of the scheme, and both the DM and 
the Representative must have sufficient trust in the Intermediary. PLN officials 
did not trust Consultant A and thought he would disappear after giving them 
“pocket money” (case study 1). Intermediaries are sometimes chosen from a 
circle of friends and family members of government officials. In case study 2, 
two of the Intermediaries were relatives of the Saudi officials. Consultant I was 
a close friend of Official 8 (case study 4). The exact functions fulfilled by these 
consultants are not always known, and they could be limited to the functions of 
a cashier, transferring bribes to the officials. Nonetheless, the case studies 
show the importance of a pre-existing network connection and trust between 
the officials and the individuals acting as conduits for bribes.  
All 9 case studies present examples of organisational corruption, with well-
routed corrupt structures at the top of the organisations. Key positions in the 
companies were occupied by individuals willing to circumvent institutional 
procedures and to offer bribes in order to obtain business. Internal processes 
to prevent corruption were not effective, and the USAID compulsory checks did 
not affect the corrupt agreements in the transmission and distribution projects 
(case study 6). In cases where internal accounting processes were in place, 
the employees who flagged that the lack of proof of services by the consultants 
violated the company's processes, were silenced (case study 6). 
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In several cases, the consultants' business was not relevant to the project they 
purportedly consulted on. For example, Consultant I in case study 4 sold 
furniture and leather, but was recruited by Alstom to obtain a power project. A 
Taiwanese company (Consultant J) that sold cigarettes, wine and pianos, was 
retained to help Alstom obtain a project on the Taipei's metro-rail system. 
These obvious red flags were ignored and did not prevent the corrupt 
agreements.  
7.4 Application of the IAD framework to case studies 
Section 4.3 applied the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework to corruption in general terms, using the information from literature 
reviews (Chapter 2). This section uses this general application to analyse the 
case studies. 
This section is structured as follows. Section 7.4.1 summarises the actors, the 
positions they occupy and their actions. The types of corruption present in the 
case studies are reviewed in Section 7.4.2. The activities affected by corruption 
are discussed in Section 7.4.3, and the action situations are evaluated in 
Section 7.4.4. 
7.4.1 Positions, actors and actions 
The corrupt action situations took place in Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Taiwan, Nigeria and the Bahamas in late 1990s through to 2010. The first set 
of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indices available for all 
six countries is 201110. The perceived ability to control corruption ranged widely 
between the countries. Nigeria was in 143rd place out of 183 countries, where 
the first place means that a country can control corruption well. The Bahamas 
                                            





scored much better and was in 21st place. The other countries were placed 
between the two: Taiwan was in 32nd place, Saudi Arabia – 57th, Indonesia – 
100th and Egypt – 112th. Therefore, the countries varied widely in the perceived 
ability to control corruption.  
The Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index 2011 (Transparency 
International, 2011) surveyed business executives to ascertain the prevalence 
of companies headquartered in different countries to engage in bribery. The 
companies in the case studies were headquartered in France (Alstom), Japan 
(Marubeni), USA (Bechtel and Willbros) and Germany (Bilfinger). Out of 28 
countries considered by Transparency International, Germany and Japan 
ranked joint 4th, USA ranked 10th and France ranked 11th. Therefore, the 
country origins of the companies are not associated with particularly high risks 
of bribery according to Transparency International.  
There are four main positions occupied by actors in the case studies – a 
Candidate, a Representative, an Intermediary and a Decision-maker (DM). The 
DMs had different functions in the infrastructure projects bidding processes and 
held positions in the government, were members of the evaluation committees 
or worked as engineers supporting the projects. They provided different 
Advantages to the Candidates, circumventing the institutional processes that 
were designed to ensure fairness of the process, and that the best company 
was selected to execute the project. Any individual DM did not have a monopoly 
power over the bidding process, and the combined actions of a number of DMs 
resulted in projects being allocated to Candidates through corrupt means.  
The Candidates were the companies competing for infrastructure projects. The 
FCPA case documentation detailed the bribery schemes only of the companies 
and individuals who were prosecuted. It is possible that other companies 
competing for these projects attempted to bribe the officials, but these actions 
were not detailed in the documents. This raises the question of the criteria that 
were used by the officials in selecting the Candidates. On the one hand, the 
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DMs’ actions can be reduced to the provision of Advantages in exchange for 
bribes. On the other hand, the DMs could have collectively decided on the 
company they wished to select, and worked to improve the chances of the 
preferred company. If this were the case, the criteria for selection could have 
included the companies’ past track records, the perceived ability to successfully 
deliver the project, as well as the possibility for DMs’ self-enrichment. If the 
chosen Candidate refused to cooperate and pay the bribes, the DMs had the 
power to manipulate the processes and award the contract to another company 
willing to pay bribes. The DMs then allowed the inflated bids (that incorporated 
the values of the bribes) to be selected, and authorised the payments.   
The Representatives occupied senior positions in companies bidding for 
projects, and worked to ensure their Candidate (their company) received the 
project contract. Similarly to the DMs’ institutions and organisations, the 
Representatives’ companies had processes in place to prevent corrupt 
practices. These included internal checks on the consultants employed and the 
checks by the project financing organisations (e.g. USAID) on the conduct of 
the companies. These processes were only superficial, and the 
Representatives ignored the red flags. The Representatives circumvented the 
rules and procedures, and arranged the corrupt schemes.  
The Intermediaries were the consultants recruited to negotiate, offer and 
transfer bribes. Multiple Intermediaries were used to transfer bribes to different 
DMs working on the same project. This could have been done to make it harder 
for corruption investigation authorities to trace the payments and connect them 
to the projects. Family and friends of the DMs were used to transfer the bribes 
in some cases. Their role can be that of an Intermediary. Alternatively, they 
could be third-party Beneficiaries (discussed in Section 4.3.5). The DM in this 
case could have been interested in the third-party Beneficiary’s welfare and 
obtained an indirect benefit if the payments were made to this party. Where 
family and friends of Saudi DMs were hired by the Candidate (case study 3), 
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this could have been either a method of transferring bribes (in which case 
further transfers would have followed to the DMs), or the DM could have been 
interested in promoting the interests of the third-party Beneficiary (in which 
case no further transfers were made).   
7.4.2 Types of corruption  
The case studies show examples of grand corruption, involving politicians and 
large bribes in millions of US$. Additionally, there is an example of petty 
corruption in case study 3, where a Representative was prepared to authorise 
the payment of $20,000 to obtain the necessary certification.  
The case studies show organisational corruption that involved violations of 
organisational rules which were laid down to enable the organisation to meet 
its goals (Hodgson and Jiang, 2007) (see Section 2.2.2). In case of the DMs, 
the rules of the organisations they held positions in were aimed at ensuring that 
the best company was selected to undertake infrastructure projects through a 
competitive and fair process. In case of the Representatives, the Candidate 
companies’ rules aimed to ensure fair participation in bidding processes.  
The Representatives’ actions describe CO-type corruption (Corrupt 
Organisation) (Pinto et al., 2008) (Section 2.3.5). The individuals acted in 
consort for the benefit of the organisation (the Candidate). The DMs’ actions 
have some characteristics of OCI-type corruption (Organisation of Corrupt 
Individuals). DMs were the main beneficiaries of corruption, obtaining bribes in 
exchange for circumventing organisational rules. However, their actions were 
not uncoordinated. Each individual Advantage provided to the Candidates was 
part of a larger scheme to ensure the overall aim was achieved and that the 
project was awarded to the organisation that paid the bribes.  
The actions of the DMs provide examples of systemic corruption – organised 
sales of influence over the decision-making processes (Kaufmann, 1998) 
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(Section 2.2.2). That is, corruption relied on a well-functioning machinery 
underpinned by complex networks. These complex networks between officials 
are not described in detail in the FCPA documentation, but there are a few 
examples suggesting the underlying coordination between the DMs. For 
example, Official 1 had a well-established relationship with Official 2 (case 
study 1), and Asem Elgawhary had influence on the decision-makers at the 
organisation responsible for allocating infrastructure projects (case studies 7 
and 8). 
Social and family networks were also used to establish corrupt networks to 
enable bribe payments. In case studies 3 and 4, family members and friends 
of officials fulfilled the roles of Intermediaries to deliver bribes to the officials in 
Saudi Arabia and the Bahamas. This suggests a culture based on 
particularised trust and reciprocity discussed in Section 2.4.7. These cultures 
are characterised by mistrust of strangers, and religious or ethnic cues are used 
to ascertain who can be trusted. Particularised reciprocity also means a 
preference to maintain resources within a particular group (Persson et al., 
2013). As the case studies show, family members and friends were used as 
trustworthy corrupt partners to establish corrupt networks. A proportion of the 
transfers to the Intermediaries were kept by them, meaning that these networks 
enabled the enrichment of the DMs’ chosen corrupt partners as well as 
benefitting the DMs. 
7.4.3 Activities affected by corruption  
Section 4.3.2 in this thesis discusses the types of activities affected by 
corruption. The nature of the activity in the case studies is bidding for 
infrastructure projects. The bidding process can be interpreted as a 
constitutional-level activity, with Candidates (companies) competing for the 
position of a government contractor, to deliver the project. This places the 
action situation in the context that frames the actions as political or grand 
corruption (see Table 3).  
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Otherwise, if the bidding stage of projects were interpreted as a process of 
allocating some resource (project contract), this type of activity would belong 
to the operational level, with corrupt activities then described as petty or 
bureaucratic corruption (as shown in Table 3). However, the sums of money 
involved were large, in millions of US$, and often politicians and high-level 
executives were involved in the bribery schemes, which are not characteristic 
of petty corruption.  
Therefore, the processes involved are better attributed to the constitutional 
level. Activities at this level determine who is eligible to participate in collective-
choice activities. Collective-choice level of activities in the IAD framework refers 
to activities that develop rules of how resources are distributed at the 
operational level of activities. If the ultimate resources in the case studies are 
energy, transportation and gas, then the infrastructure delivery process can be 
interpreted as the process determining resource availability to the population, 
and its reliability. Constitutional-level activities, then, determine which 
companies are part of this process of designing the infrastructure and 
participating in its construction.  
In the IAD framework, the rules guiding the constitutional-level activities change 
at the slowest pace compared to the rules guiding the other two levels of 
activities. Even though the project bidding stage can be structured as different 
types of auctions and can be designed differently for each project, the 
underlying principles, and the criteria against which companies are assessed 
tend to change infrequently. If the willingness to pay a bribe is the guiding 
principle, it can take a long time to redesign the bidding process, and re-define 
the responsibilities to prevent corrupt officials from having control over the 
bidding, in order to change the corrupt nature of the process.  
Multiple DMs provide different Advantages and it is the sum of their actions that 
results in the corrupt award of the project. This points to the importance of 
separating the corrupt Advantages provided by DMs from the ultimate award 
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of infrastructure projects in the analysis of corruption. It shows more clearly 
which processes were circumvented. If the bidding process is to be reviewed 
and changed to prevent future corrupt occurrences, this will involve a shakeup 
of every organisation involved in the process, including the political institutions, 
not just the organisation or the government department responsible for the 
bidding stage of the project. 
7.4.4 Evaluation of the action situations 
Table 1 in Section 4.2 sets out the criteria for evaluating action situations. This 
section evaluates the actions of the DMs and the Representatives that affected 
the constitutional-level activities and sets out the possible institutional changes 
to improve the outcomes in future infrastructure project bidding.  
The states of the world resulting from action situations can be evaluated 
according to the criteria of economic efficiency, fiscal equivalence, equity or 
sustainability. However, there is insufficient information contained in the FCPA 
documentation to evaluate the outcomes according to these criteria. That is, 
the outcomes of the corrupt schemes are provided – the companies who paid 
bribes obtained the projects – but the ways in which the projects themselves 
were affected are not detailed. Presumably, the criteria of economic efficiency 
were not met, as the projects costed more because the bids included the 
economic rents distributed to the Intermediaries and the DMs. However, a full 
analysis and evaluation of the outcomes is not possible. 
An alternative method of evaluating action situations using the IAD framework 
is by considering the sets of actions taken, and evaluating these against the 
criteria of legitimacy, accountability or conformance to the relevant norms or 
values. Accountability refers to the extent to which individuals can be held 
responsible for their actions. Legitimacy means the extent to which actions 
conform to legal or normative rules. Finally, conformance to norms or values is 
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a test of whether the actions met the commonly held norms or values (see 
Table 2). 
The actions of the DMs and the Representatives in the case studies constituted 
corruption, and the functions of the Intermediaries were to facilitate it. 
International organisations and their member countries have devoted 
significant efforts to prevent these practices. Organisations such as the OECD 
set out recommendations for member countries to improve public integrity 
(OECD, 2017), provide good practice guidance to companies for prevention of 
corruption in international transactions (OECD, 2010) and monitor countries’ 
progress in adopting and implementing the recommendations for corruption 
reduction (OECD, 2011a). Therefore, the case studies show actions that are 
generally considered illegitimate.  
The FCPA court cases show that the companies and some of their employees 
were prosecuted for their actions, and received penalties in the form of fines or 
imprisonment. The identities of the DMs and the Intermediaries are not 
disclosed in the documentation, and it is more difficult to ascertain whether they 
were held accountable for their actions. There are a few examples of the 
prosecutions of the DMs. One of the DMs, Asem Elgawhary (case studies 7 
and 8) was prosecuted in the USA under the FCPA. Additionally, the 
Indonesian press shows that one of the officials involved in the corrupt scheme 
in Indonesia (case study 1), Emir Moeis (Official 1) was prosecuted in 
Indonesia11. There are no known  prosecutions of the Intermediaries who 
fulfilled crucial roles in the corrupt networks. 
From the point of view of morality or conformance to the generally-accepted 
norms and values, the actions of the DMs, Intermediaries and the 
Representatives can be evaluated from two points of view. As outlined above, 
                                            





the international community looks to curb corrupt practices. However, 
corruption in infrastructure projects remains prevalent. In such a high-
corruption environment, norms against corruption may be weak, despite the 
attempts to institute systems of checks and balances to prevent future 
corruption. Accepting a bribe can also be seen as culturally acceptable in such 
an environment (Section 6.2.4).    
Assuming that action situations are evaluated against the international 
community’s view that corruption is unacceptable, the actions of the DMs, 
Intermediaries and the Representatives do not meet the criteria of conformity 
to the relevant norms and values. According to the IAD framework, institutional 
changes to prevent future occurrences of corruption can be made by re-
formulating the rules of the action situation. These rules are discussed in 
Section 4.2 and set out, for example, which actors can participate in the 
activities. Making institutional changes can mean, for example, preventing 
companies or officials that engaged in corruption from participating in future 
project bidding processes. However, in cases of organised corruption 
described above, the problem is not limited to a few bad apples, but is systemic. 
Excluding a few of the individuals or companies from the bidding process may 
not be effective. 
The rules of the organisations need to incorporate systems to prevent corrupt 
practices. As Alstom case studies demonstrate, anti-corruption checks were in 
place, but these were superficial, and were not implemented effectively. As 
noted in Section 7.4.3, project bidding processes can be classed as 
constitutional-level activities and the rules guiding such activities take a long 
time to change. Institutional culture also changes slowly, and individuals may 
collude to sustain the system of implementation of unspoken rules (Section 
6.2.5). 
Anti-corruption guidelines and recommendations created by organisations 
such as the OECD would, therefore, need to be built into the institutional rules 
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and processes over a period of time, and these will take time to take effect. 
Attempts to change corrupt practices by simply setting out the new rules of the 
institutions without developing the rules in coordination with those who are 
expected to implement them can be ineffective, as individuals continue to follow 
the focal points (rules of thumb) of behaviour. 
Individuals internalise and adopt organisational rules if they agree with them 
and perceive them as legitimate (Sections 2.4.6 and 6.2.5). Therefore, anti-
corruption rules and processes need to be consistent with the culture of the 
organisation, developed with impartiality, and allow an appropriate level of 
discretion to those who are expected to apply them.  
A combination of organisational controls and collective action methods of 
corruption reduction would be needed to effectively change the corrupt culture 
of organisations (Sections 2.4.6 and 2.4.7). The organisational controls 
methods are training, communication of organisational values and 
reinforcement of expected behaviour, combined with vigilance controls and 
encouragement of constructive deviance and whistleblowing. Collective action 
methods are aimed at fostering trust and improving collective monitoring. Such 
methods include formal agreements between governments and private 
companies to refrain from corruption (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). Such 
agreements rely on the transparency of systems, and the processes of 
infrastructure delivery would, therefore, require increased transparency. 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presented case studies of corruption in infrastructure projects. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the infrastructure sector is particularly vulnerable to 
corruption because of the complexity of the projects and because the 
infrastructure procurement processes are often not transparent. The projects 
often have multiple phases, and the systems of sufficient oversight can be 
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difficult to establish. New projects are created infrequently and at irregular 
intervals, meaning that the financial viability of companies working in the sector 
may heavily rely on winning the project.  
The case studies presented focused on the bidding stage of infrastructure 
projects in several countries - the Bahamas, Indonesia, Egypt, Taiwan, Saudi 
Arabia and Nigeria. The information contained in the documentation filed to 
support prosecutions under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 was 
used to create the case studies. The FCPA documentation does not 
systematically provide the same details, and omits some of the information. For 
example, the project values and the bribe sizes are not always known. 
However, each case study provides a different insight into the corrupt schemes. 
The case studies show that multiple consultants are often used as 
Intermediaries to transfer funds for bribes to foreign officials to obtain 
government projects. Intermediaries sometimes have pre-existing connections 
with government officials, and can be their family members or friends. Where 
corruption is the chosen method for infrastructure companies to gain projects, 
the internal company checks designed to prevent corrupt practices are not 
effective, and the red flags associated with, for example, retaining consultants 
from sectors other than the project sector, are ignored.  
Corruption in infrastructure projects involves multiple officials across several 
organisations, including political institutions. Therefore, institutional changes to 
prevent corruption require time to implement successfully, and the rules 
designed to prevent corruption need to be perceived as legitimate to be 
effective. A combination of organisational controls and collective action 
methods of corruption reduction would be required to shift the well-established 






The analytical tools and methods used in this thesis, and, in particular, the 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework, belong to the organisational 
or meso-level approach of studying social phenomena. According to this 
approach, individual behaviour is seen as the product of organisational culture 
(see Section 2.3.5). However, the organisational-level approach also allows the 
analysis to take into consideration micro-level causes of corruption such as 
individual bad character (Section 3.4), and the methods used in this thesis 
analysed behaviour as being the product of both autonomous decision making 
and the organisational or societal norms. The proposed methods of corruption 
reduction in this thesis are focused at changes at institutional or organisational 
levels.  
This chapter evaluates the contributions of this thesis. The application of the 
IAD framework to corruption in this thesis offered a number of insights, and 
brought the focus on the factors that received less attention in past literature. 
These insights are discussed in Section 8.2. The assumptions underlying the 
models presented in this thesis are evaluated in Section 8.3. A conclusion is 
made that assumptions prevalent in past literature may be more applicable to 
petty corruption, and do not fit corruption in the bidding phase of infrastructure 
procurement. The insights offered by case studies into the anti-corruption 
enforcement actions are summarised in Section 8.4. The proposed methods of 
corruption reduction based on the case study analysis are presented in Section 
8.5 and Section 8.6 concludes.  
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8.2 Methods of analysing corruption in this thesis 
This thesis analyses corruption at organisational level. The Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework is used to identify the main components 
of corruption. This reveals a number of factors that have not been widely 
discussed in past literature. For example, the analysis makes a distinction 
between the corrupt acts and the underlying activities that are affected by 
corruption (Section 4.3.2). The analysis of the case studies then shows that the 
infrastructure bidding process can be analysed as a constitutional-level activity 
with companies being chosen for the position of a government contractor, and 
the rules guiding these activities change at a slow pace (Section 7.4.3). 
Therefore, any anti-corruption proposals in this sphere need to take into 
account that any change can only be gradual and takes time to take effect.  
The separation between corrupt Advantages and the underlying objective for 
corruption showed that multiple officials from various organisations may be 
bribed in exchange for a favourable decision, and the sum of these actions 
produces the outcome of the company winning the project. This approach to 
analysing corruption can reveal more clearly which processes are 
circumvented. Corruption reduction requires a review of the processes in 
multiple organisations, including political institutions, and should not be limited 
to the organisation directly responsible for overseeing the bidding for projects. 
The separation between the two corrupt actions, bribe acceptance and the 
reciprocation with a favourable decision, led to the analysis of the different 
considerations underlying the two actions. Model 2 was developed based on 
this analysis (Chapter 6). The possibility of being denounced to authorities for 
attempted bribery is relatively common in past models of corruption. The 
possibility of the official reneging on the promise of a favourable decision is 
considered less often. Model 2 suggests that if this possibility is considered, 
the likelihood of a corrupt offer being accepted increases (the simulated 
rejections of bribes decreased from 273 to 193 out of 1000 when the decision 
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of whether to renege on the promise was introduced into the simulations in 
Section 6.4). Therefore, the two actions and the motivations behind them 
should be considered separately, and future studies can focus on the 
motivations behind providing an unfair advantage separately from bribe 
acceptance.  
Intermediaries play an important role in corrupt networks and they allow the 
briber and the bribe-taker to distance themselves from each other. Their 
functions have been discussed in past literature, but the criteria for selecting 
an agent to act as a corrupt Intermediary have attracted less attention. Model 
1 in Chapter 5 is based on the beliefs of the bribe giver that the agent he/she 
considers recruiting as an Intermediary is trustworthy and competent. These 
beliefs in the model are based on the pre-existing network connection between 
the bribe-giver and the agent. The model suggests that a social connection 
fostering goodwill trust between the two is necessary for the Intermediary to be 
recruited in highly corrupt environments.  
Model 1 also moves away from the conventional payoff-maximising 
assumptions of the game theory models. Such assumptions may not be 
applicable when modelling behaviour driven by norms. Version 1 of the model 
considers objective-driven behaviour, with the bribe-giver comparing different 
methods of corrupt offer delivery to maximise the perceived chances of a 
successful corrupt agreement. However, game theory techniques may not be 
the most suitable method of representing objective-driven behaviour guided by 
norms. Version 1 of Model 1 produced functions that could not be reduced, and 
provided little insight into the strategic choices of corrupt offer frames. Version 
2 of the model then introduced payoffs, but the resulting equations were difficult 
to manage. 
Therefore, simulation modelling was used in Model 2 to analyse the decision 
making processes of an official offered a bribe. The model explores the norms 
of behaviour triggered in corrupt agreements and proposes a method of 
 209 
 
analysing social norms conflict and its resolution. The model also shows how 
monetary payoffs and the costs associated with breaking social norms can be 
represented within one model. Model 2 can be classed as a simulation model 
representing objective-driven behaviour. That is, determinants of behaviour 
such as group norms and social expectations form the basis of the model. 
However, the agent cannot meet every objective, and the weights of the factors 
determining behaviour are assessed and the decisions are made based on the 
strongest motivations. 
8.3 Validity of model assumptions 
As with all models, the results of the models presented in this thesis heavily 
rely on the accuracy and the validity of the underlying assumptions. For 
example, Model 1 is based on the notion that the bribe-giver decides on 
whether the Intermediary is used to deliver the bribe. Model 2 sets out the 
norms of behaviour that are assumed to guide the decisions of the bribe-takers. 
This section assesses the key assumptions of the thesis models. 
The actions constituting corruption set out in Section 4.3.4 are consistent with 
the actions set out in anti-bribery legislation. For example, under the UK Bribery 
Act 2010, it is sufficient to request, agree to receive or accept a bribe to have 
committed a bribery offence12. This corresponds to the first of the two corrupt 
actions by a DM set out in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.8). It is also sufficient to 
offer a bribe to have committed an act of bribery, even if the offer is not 
                                            
12 Bribery Act 2010 c. 23 Section 2 (2) “Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or 
accepts a financial or other advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or 




accepted13. The Bribery Act 2010 recognises that a bribe does not have to be 
provided to the official, but can be given to a third-party Beneficiary14. 
Although there are variations in the phrasing of legal statutes, a common 
understanding is that an official who accepts a bribe and reciprocates with 
some illicit service for the briber would be considered to have acted corruptly. 
Generally, it is thought that the two actions must be linked (OECD, 2008, p.37). 
That is, the official accepts a bribe intending, in return, to perform some illicit 
service. An example where this link is particularly important is in the 1990’s 
legislation of Chile. In 1990’s, accepting a payment by an official was not a 
criminal offense in Chile, unless it was accompanied by other illegal activities 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2010b, Hepkema, 1997). This suggests that if an official 
accepts a bribe intending to then renege on the deal, it may not constitute 
corruption according to some views. As discussed above, in more recent legal 
definitions of corruption, such as the UK Bribery Act 2010, acceptance of a 
bribe can by itself constitute a criminal act. Therefore, the corrupt acts set out 
in Chapter 4 and represented in models in Chapters 5 and 6 are consistent with 
the more recent interpretations of what it means to act corruptly.  
Models 1 and 2 in Chapters 5 and 6 are based on the assumptions common to 
models in past literature. For example, Model 1 assumes that there is one 
official with a monopoly power over a process, and if they provide an unfair 
Advantage, this leads to the project being allocated to the briber. This 
assumption is common in past studies, and can be typical in cases of petty 
corruption. The case studies, however, show that in large infrastructure project 
bidding processes there are multiple decision makers, and it is the sum of their 
actions that ensures that companies retain contracts. Future models, therefore, 
                                            
13 Bribery Act 2010 c.23 Section 1 (2) Case 1 is where – (a) P offers, promises or gives a 
financial or other advantage to another person, and (b) P intends the advantage – (i) to induce 
a person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity”.  
 
14 Bribery Act 2010 c.23 Section 1 (4) In case 1 it does not matter whether the person to whom 
the advantage is offered, promised or given is the same person as the person who is to perform, 
or has performed, the function or activity concerned”. 
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could consider more complex corrupt networks, with multiple advantages being 
sold.  
Model 1 also assumes that the choice of a frame of a corrupt offer, a bribe or a 
gift, is made strategically by the bribe-giver. The assumption is made based on 
past research (Søreide, 2007). This, again, can be more representative of petty 
corruption. Case studies suggest that in large infrastructure projects gifts can 
be used to show the willingness and the ability to pay bribes, and to secure the 
officials’ trust. Therefore, gifts may be given alongside bribes, not instead of 
them.  
An assumption is made in Version 2 of Model 1 that the value of the contract is 
given exogenously, and the company bidding for the project does not 
manipulate the project value. However, case study 9 shows that project values 
can be inflated to incorporate the bribes distributed to the officials. The values 
of large infrastructure projects are, therefore, better represented within formal 
models as a function of the bribes given. Additionally, Intermediaries can retain 
a large proportion of the sums transferred to them. Future models could explore 
the payoffs of the Intermediaries in more detail. 
Model 1 considers the importance of the network connection between the bribe-
giver and the Intermediary. However, the case studies show that often the 
connection between the official and the Intermediary is key to a successful 
corrupt agreement. A possible area of future work is to analyse how officials 
decide on which intermediary is used in corrupt networks, and the importance 
of trust between the official and the intermediary. 
The prevalence of corruption, however, can determine whether an intermediary 
is used. The results of Model 1 suggest that in high-corruption environments 
bribe-givers could be more likely to establish a direct corrupt agreement, and 
pay bribes directly to the official. This is based on the assumption that in high 
corruption environments, acceptance of a bribe is already highly likely. A 
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successful corrupt agreement, then, relies less on the function of the 
intermediary in increasing the likelihood of bribe acceptance. Case study 9 
shows an example of an environment perceived to be highly corrupt (Nigeria 
ranked the lowest of the countries considered according to the ability to control 
corruption, Transparency International’s CPI). The choice of a direct corrupt 
offer can have several reasons. In high-corruption environments, corruption is 
a well-established norm of behaviour, and moral costs associated with 
accepting bribes can be low. Therefore, one of the functions of the 
intermediaries of reducing these moral costs might not be important. Case 
study 9 also shows that the payments were made in cash. Using consultancy 
companies and paying in cash could be substitutes in corrupt agreements, and 
cash may be used in more corrupt environments.  
Therefore, the assumptions of past models may not be directly applicable to 
the infrastructure sector. Case studies provide useful insights into how corrupt 
networks operate in this sector. Future work can analyse other cases to gain 
further insight into decisions made by the individuals, and how the environment 
shapes their choices.  
The outputs of the models are determined by the assumptions made. As shown 
above, several assumptions did not fit the infrastructure sector setting. The 
case studies also did not reveal how, for example, the sizes of bribes and gifts 
vary across settings and with varying social connections between the corrupt 
agents. A larger dataset would be required to carry out a full validation of these 
model results.  
8.4 Case studies insights into enforcement actions 
There are several objectives that can be fulfilled by corruption in infrastructure 
procurement, and any stage of a project can be affected (Section 7.2). 
However, the FCPA prosecution cases reviewed in Chapter 7 are all based on 
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corruption that occurred at the bidding stage. Financial rewards from individual 
acts of corruption are highest at the early phases of project cycles (Hawkins, 
2013) (Section 7.2), and this could be the reason these cases are prevalent in 
FCPA prosecutions. As the companies’ gains from corruption in the bidding 
processes were high, the fines that can be levied or disgorgements imposed 
on companies can also be high. The US government can, therefore, receive 
large amounts from companies found guilty, and this can finance the high costs 
of corruption investigations.  
This can mean that only corruption schemes in large projects and only in certain 
infrastructure project phases attract investigations and prosecutions. Smaller 
schemes could go unpunished, and the effectiveness of the systems of 
monitoring and punishment would vary across project types and project stages. 
Nonetheless, there have been over 500 prosecutions under the FCPA with 
fines of up to $772m (Stanford Law School, 2018) (Section 7.3.1) which can 
have a deterrent effect on companies from engaging in corrupt schemes.  
FCPA prosecutions target the bribe-paying companies and its officers (TRACE 
International, 2016), but foreign government officials are outside the statute’s 
scope. Asem Elgawhary was prosecuted as an officer of the company hired to 
oversee the bidding processes on behalf of an Egyptian government 
organisation. Therefore, the countries where infrastructure projects are carried 
out are left to establish and enforce the systems of corruption monitoring and 
punishment to hold public officials to account. The FCPA court cases 
considered also do not disclose the identity of the consultants who facilitated 
bribe negotiations and transfers, and it is not known whether these individuals 
were prosecuted. 
The case studies considered all relate to the actions of large companies in the 
bribery schemes. How the money is then laundered and hidden in jurisdictions 
that keep the beneficiaries of companies secret is the topic that has attracted 
public attention since 2015. Paradise papers and Panama papers were leaks 
 214 
 
of documents showing companies holding vast amounts of money, based in 
jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands and the Seychelles, and connected 
to politicians (Antony Seely, 2017, O'Donovan et al., 2018).  
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists15 (ICIJ) is one of the 
organisations working to identify the possible schemes used to launder the 
proceeds of corruption. Figure 18 shows an example of a network of companies 
connected to a Nigerian politician, James Ibori. He was a governor of Nigeria’s 
oil-rich Delta State from 1999 to 2007. Ibori and his family members were the 
beneficiaries of a number of companies including Julex Foundation based in 
Panama. The network of companies was used to launder $75m out of Nigeria 
to purchase 6 houses in London, a fleet of luxury cars and a jet. Ibori pled guilty 
in London to charges of corruptly obtaining and laundering $75m, but the size 
of the funds embezzled are thought to be as high as $250m16.  








Figure 18 Companies connected to James Ibori, Nigeria’s politician. 
Source: ICIJ17 
These investigative efforts disclose the connections between multi-million 
dollar companies and the politicians controlling them, to help identify possible 
cases of corruption and embezzlement. However, this information is not proof 
                                            




of corruption, and the disclaimer on the ICIJ website states that the companies 
are thought to be legitimate, and there is no suggestion that they have been 
used to commit crime. Nonetheless, these revelations can lead to 
investigations to ascertain the sources of wealth.  
Additionally, opaque company structures that hide who owns, controls or 
benefits from companies and their assets can enable the corrupt officials to 
launder proceeds of corruption. There is pressure on jurisdictions that keep the 
identities of the beneficial owners of companies hidden to improve 
transparency of their corporate systems. For example, Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF)18 set out the recommendations to prevent money laundering, 
including a recommendation to improve transparency of companies. FATF 
Member countries are periodically evaluated against the criteria set by the 
FATF. 
As shown by the case of Ibori, prosecutions may be undertaken against the 
corrupt officials in countries other than the ones where projects were based. 
The efforts of civil society organisations such as ICIJ can also lead to 
investigations of corruption and money laundering around the world. However, 
it is also important to set out mechanisms to prevent corruption, and this is the 
topic of the next section. 
8.5 Corruption reduction measures 
Although the models developed in this thesis were based on assumptions that 
could better fit petty corruption rather than grand corruption of the infrastructure 
sector bidding processes, the analysis using the IAD framework carried out in 





Section 7.4 provided useful insights into possible measures to reduce 
corruption (Section 7.4.4).  
The efforts to reduce corruption often involve instituting top-down controls. The 
international community and the organisations such as OECD can create 
pressure on countries and international companies to reduce corruption 
through creating institutional checks to identify red flags of possible corruption. 
However, the effectiveness of such measures are varied across countries 
(Persson et al., 2013). As the case studies in Chapter 7 demonstrate, 
companies might implement anti-corruption measures only superficially.  
The analysis of the case studies using the IAD framework in Section 7.4.4 
suggests that the rules guiding the infrastructure bidding processes can take a 
long time to change. That is, the corrupt practices used by both the public 
officials and the bidding companies can be resilient to change, and for anti-
corruption measures to be effective, substantive changes are required. 
Multiple governmental and political institutions are involved in the process of 
project awards and determine the allocation of projects. Corruption in such 
settings is not characterised by the existence of just a few bad apples. 
Successful corrupt schemes require networks of individuals in the positions of 
power for a coordinated sale of advantages. Focusing efforts on preventing 
corruption in the institution directly involved in the award of the contracts may 
not be effective overall. An analysis of all the favourable decisions made in 
exchange for bribes can aid in determining which practices were circumvented, 
and re-designing multiple institutions including political organisations may be 
necessary for anti-corruption measures to be effective. 
In companies competing for projects in the case studies, the institutional 
processes were in place to detect possible corrupt practices. However, senior 
executives had no doubt that the practices they engaged in constituted 
corruption, and the red flags did not have a deterrent effect. This suggests that 
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the executives did not subscribe to the anti-corruption norms, and did not 
perceive the institutional rules aimed at preventing corruption as legitimate 
principles of doing business.  
This shows that for anti-corruption rules to be accepted and internalised, 
individuals who are expected to apply them have to agree with them. They must 
be perceived as legitimate and right. Designing institutional rules that aim to 
change corrupt culture requires consistency with the wider organisational 
culture, impartiality and the appropriate level of discretion in rule application. A 
change in culture is a process that can happen only gradually, and institutional 
changes require a phased-in approach. Otherwise, the corrupt behaviour rules 
of thumb may prevail and the changes would not be effective. 
The infrastructure sector is characterised by high competitive pressures, and 
winning a project can determine the financial viability of the company. In such 
environments, the principles of integrity and fairness can be hard to instil. A 
combination of organisational and collective-action approaches to reduce 
corruption may be required. The organisational approaches of anti-corruption 
training, reinforcement of expected behaviour, creation of vigilance controls 
and encouragement of whistleblowing are important, but may not be effective 
by themselves. Collective-action approaches propose creation of systems of 
collective monitoring. These methods rely on all parties to subscribe to the 
notion that preventing corruption can lead to a better outcome for all parties.  
Formal agreements to avoid corruption between governments and the 
companies competing for infrastructure processes could foster trust between 
the parties. All parties would need to perceive these agreements as worthwhile, 
and the rules underlying the procurement processes need to be perceived as 
legitimate. For collective monitoring to be effective, the infrastructure processes 
need to be more transparent. The public, the governments and the 
infrastructure sector companies can then monitor behaviour and this can create 
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trust in the infrastructure processes and this can drive the sector towards a 
fairer environment.  
8.6 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed key insights and contributions of the thesis. The 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework applied to corruption yielded 
useful insights that then formed the basis of the models developed. Although 
the assumptions of the models were based on past literature, and better fit petty 
rather than grand corruption prevalent in large infrastructure projects, the 
models provide new methods of analysing corrupt behaviour.  
The models represent agents as rule- or objective-driven. Model 1 shows that 
game theory may not be the best framework within which to represent rule-
driven behaviour. However, Model 2, developed as a simulation model was 
more successful. The model shows how social norm conflict can be 
represented, and how this conflict can be resolved. The model enables the 
analysis of behaviour in the presence of opposing motivations, where the 
strongest motivation prevails.  
The case studies provided insights into corrupt networks in infrastructure 
procurement processes. The IAD framework was applied to case studies based 
on FCPA documentation. The proposed methods of reducing corruption are 
then based on organisational and collective-action methods such as creation 
of organisational controls, combined with collective monitoring, trust-building, 
improvements in perceived legitimacy of infrastructure processes and 




9 Conclusions, recommendations and further research 
This thesis set out to develop a concept within which different factors 
associated with corruption can be gathered and linked, and then to apply this 
concept to the bidding phase of infrastructure procurement. The literature 
review of past research on corruption helped to identify several research gaps 
and three research questions were identified for this thesis: 
1. What strategies do bribe-givers use to achieve successful corrupt 
contracts? 
2. How do social norms affect bribe-takers’ choices? 
3. What are the characteristics of corruption specific to the infrastructure 
sector and what measures of corruption reduction can be effective in this 
sector? 
After considering the different approaches used in past corruption research 
across several disciplines, and in light of the research questions, the 
organisational level of study was adopted for the development of the concept 
of corruption. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework was 
selected as the toolkit to aid the creation of the concept within which particular 
aspects of corruption can be analysed more closely. The focus of this work was 
on the individuals, their actions and the setting in which corruption occurs. 
The concept was then used to develop two micro-level models of corrupt 
behaviour, to address the first two research questions. Chapter 5 focused on 
the bribe-givers’ strategies to address the first question. Past literature 
discussing strategies of the bribe givers was reviewed and a game-theory 
model was developed representing a bribe-giver with the objective of 
maximising the chances of securing a successful corrupt agreement.  
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This game theory model moved away from the conventional payoff-maximising 
assumptions and considered behaviour as objective-driven. The model showed 
that game theory techniques may not be suitable to analyse behaviour in the 
contexts where norms play an important part. In addition, several underlying 
assumptions of the model were shown through case studies to be not 
altogether applicable to the specific scenario of the bidding phase of 
infrastructure projects. Nonetheless, the model provides several insights into 
the possible strategies of the bribe-givers, and suggests that in high-corruption 
environments bribe-givers could be more likely to seek to establish a direct 
corrupt agreement, and to pay bribes directly to the officials rather than using 
a third party to broker the deal. 
The second model of the thesis, developed in Chapter 6, moved away from 
game theoretic methods and turned to social simulation to analyse social norms 
of behaviour in the context of corrupt agreements, to address the second 
question of this thesis. Decisions of bribe-takers are represented in this model 
as driven by both self-interest (greed) and social norms. The model shows 
decision making processes of autonomous agents, but with norms and 
organisational rules also framing behaviour. The content of the relevant norms 
was explored through reviewing past theoretical literature on social norms, as 
well as evidence from past experimental studies of corruption.  
Different motivations can produce an internal conflict for a decision maker, and 
the model captures how this conflict can arise, and how it can be resolved. The 
model results draw attention to the importance of separating the different 
actions of the bribe-takers, and studying them independently. This approach 
produces insights into the possible reasons for opportunistic behaviour of the 
bribe-takers, and how the minimum acceptable bribe levels could vary in 
different contexts.      
The developed concept of corruption was then applied to case studies in 
Chapter 7. The source used to develop the case studies was the 
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documentation submitted in support of prosecutions under the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 1977. This proved to be a useful source of information, 
offering detailed, albeit fragmented, accounts of corrupt schemes carried out 
by several companies in countries including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and 
Nigeria. It specified the amounts paid in bribes, the types of infrastructure 
projects that were affected, the numbers of intermediaries used to broker the 
corrupt deals, and the different methods used for bribing government officials. 
The case studies showed that intermediaries can play an important part in 
creating corrupt agreements, and can retain significant proportions of bribe 
payments transferred to them. The intermediaries appear to be more closely 
associated with the bribe-takers than the bribe-givers, and can be government 
officials’ friends or family members.  
The case studies also provided insights into the way corruption in bidding for 
infrastructure projects manifests itself. In the cases considered, corruption was 
a systemic problem, and multiple high-ranking officials across several 
government organisations were bribed in exchange for the ultimate award of 
the contract. This suggests a high level of coordination between the officials 
and a systematic selling of favourable decisions. Each official had a certain 
decision-making role in the process, but none had the overall monopoly in the 
award of the contract.  
Case studies also showed that the companies bidding for infrastructure projects 
had established systems of red flags and checks to prevent corruption. 
However, these appeared to be only superficial and were circumvented by the 
senior executives who created and authorised methods of bribe payments to 
government officials.  
Recommendations 
This thesis offers a number of insights and recommendations for the 
practitioners responsible for physical infrastructure procurement, the policy 
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makers looking to develop effective systems of corruption prevention, and 
scholars across different disciplines looking to better understand corruption in 
the infrastructure sector.  
The recommendations for scholars are to draw on the insights from different 
disciplines in approaching the subject of corruption; to consider alternatives to 
payoff-maximising assumptions in developing models of corrupt behaviour; and 
to revisit the underlying assumptions prevalent in past studies to assess their 
applicability to the infrastructure sector, and the bidding processes in particular.  
Corruption is often either analysed in general terms, or a specific type of 
corruption is considered, to study certain aspects of corrupt behaviour. An 
analysis of corruption at the level of organisations enables for the research to 
incorporate insights from different disciplines, and this provides a broader view 
of corruption, and its underlying causes. This then enables the researcher to 
better assess the specific characteristics of the corruption phenomenon under 
investigation and to provide more focused recommendations for corruption 
prevention. For example, the characteristics ascribed to corruption in 
infrastructure procurement in past literature may better fit petty corruption, 
whereas the analysis in this thesis shows that grand corruption is a better 
representation of corruption in this setting. 
Payoff maximising assumptions may not be appropriate for modelling corrupt 
behaviour. The traditional economic methods do not provide sufficient flexibility 
for the incorporation of important aspects of behaviour such as normative 
considerations. An alternative offered in this thesis is a representation of 
individuals within a social simulation model as driven by both self-interest and 
the norms and rules of society and organisations. This allows the consideration 
of motivations other than self-interest, and produces insights into the ways 
behaviour can be shaped by the context in which it occurs. Therefore, scholars 
could benefit from exploring such methods in future research. 
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One of the key assumptions in past studies of corruption is that officials’ 
monopoly powers are a prerequisite for corrupt behaviour. However, in 
infrastructure procurement each corrupt official is shown in this thesis to act in 
cohort with other officials, across several organisations, to ensure that the 
contract is awarded to the bribe-payer. Although, collectively, this group of 
officials can be thought of as holding a monopoly over the process, the 
incentives behind their individual actions can be different, and each one 
provides a different type of an advantage that overall results in the corrupt 
contract award. The disaggregation of this cohort of individuals within formal 
models, then, can reveal to the scholars the different strategies used by the 
bribe-taking officials for corrupt sales of infrastructure contracts. 
The recommendations for the practitioners are to be alert to the possibility that 
coordinated sales of contracts are taking place in infrastructure procurement; 
to design the procurement processes in light of the potential well-rooted culture 
of corruption; and to consider whether officials’ friends and family members are 
used as conduits for corrupt exchanges. 
If the tendering processes are vulnerable to corruption, the problem may not lie 
in a few ‘bad apples’ interfering with the process. It can take the form of a 
coordinated sales of favours across multiple organisations. Therefore, any 
changes to the procurement process the practitioners look to introduce to tackle 
the problem may need to address the interconnected nature of the sales of 
advantages and favours that result in a corrupt contract allocation. Focusing on 
the organisation responsible for the contract award alone may be insufficient to 
reduce corruption in this sector, and may not have a long-lasting effect. 
For the detection of corruption, the practitioners need to better understand the 
role of the corrupt intermediaries. Where bribe-taking among the suspected 
corrupt officials cannot be identified, the attention could be turned to the 




The recommendations for the policy makers are to recognise that a review and 
reshaping of the processes in multiple organisations may be required to reduce 
corruption in the infrastructure sector; that new anti-corruption regulations can 
result in superficial systems of checks being implemented; that these 
regulations need to be developed with the wider culture in mind, and should be 
accompanied by anti-corruption training; and that transparency in infrastructure 
procurement is an important component in building trust in the processes and 
the sector.   
In developing policies to prevent corruption, due consideration should be given 
to the multiple organisations involved in the allocation of infrastructure projects. 
The focus, therefore, should not only rest on the contract awarding 
organisation, but should include other institutions, including political structures, 
to identify the scope of the policy change required. 
Where regulations are being designed to prevent corruption, these can result 
in only superficial compliance mechanisms being established in companies 
bidding for infrastructure projects. The rules being developed need to take into 
consideration the pre-existing culture, and need to be designed with 
impartiality, allowing an appropriate level of discretion to the individuals 
expected to apply them.  
Changing the corrupt culture takes a long time to achieve, and requires a 
gradual phased-in approach to take effect. The new requirements need to be 
accompanied by organisation-level anti-corruption training, reinforcement of 
expected behaviour, and the creation of vigilance controls and whistleblowing 
systems.  
Collective monitoring, involving public engagement, is also an important aspect 
of the development of trust in the procurement processes. This requires further 
transparency of the infrastructure sector, to improve the perceived legitimacy 




The analysis of the court cases prosecuted under the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 1977 produced useful insights into the nature of corruption in 
infrastructure projects. Future research can analyse a larger sample of cases. 
Such research can reveal more strategies used by the bribe-givers. It can also 
provide further insights into whether, for example, cash bribe payments are 
substitutes for using intermediaries in high-corruption environments.  
The social norms-based simulation model presented in this thesis can be 
further developed to analyse the public officials’ decision-making processes. 
This work can focus on the motivations behind providing unfair advantages, 
besides monetary interests. Past research presented a number of possible 
answers to why officials reciprocate with an unfair advantage following the 
receipt of a bribe. For example, the bribe-givers could engage in hostage 
taking, threatening the officials’ or their families’ wellbeing. In such cases, 
protections can be offered to officials who decide to blow the whistle on a 
corrupt deal. However, the case studies in this thesis did not suggest that this 
was the case. Other motivations guided the choices to provide unfair 
advantages. Future work can explore further explanations of this behaviour, 
and analyse how the motivations and the choices may differ if a longer period 
of time lapses between the bribe receipt and the choice of whether to provide 
an unfair advantage.  
This thesis analysed a number of corrupt networks. As coordination of public 
officials is key to the award of the project to the bribe-giver in the infrastructure 
sector, further research can focus on the operation of the networks of public 
officials. Such work can reveal how these networks operate and how they 




Appendix A. Corruption Definitions 
1. “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997) 
2. “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency 
International, 2009) 
3. “the abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain” (Norad) (Disch et al., 
2009) 
4. “the illicit use of one’s position or power for perceived personal or 
collective gain” (Ashforth et al., 2008) 
5. “the abuse of public or private office for private gain” (OECD, 2008) 
6. “abuses of public office or entrusted power for private gain” (Kaufmann 
and Vicente, 2011) 
7. “pollution of the public by the private” (Thompson, 2013) 
8. “the illegitimate use of public roles and resources for private benefit, 
where ‘private’ often refers to large groups such as political parties” 
(Bicchieri and Duffy, 1997) 
9. “Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967, p.419) 
10. “Corruption is behaviour of public officials which deviates from accepted 
norms in order to serve private ends.” (Huntington, 2002, p. 253) 
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11. “corruption is the wilful subversion (or attempted subversion) of a due 
decision-making process with regard to the allocation of any benefit”. 
(Sole, 2005) 
12. “the intentional non-compliance with the arm’s-length principle aimed at 
deriving some advantage for oneself or a related individuals from this 
behaviour” (Tanzi, 1996) 
13. “the sale of government property for private gain” (Aidt, 2009) 
14. “the sale by government officials of government property for personal 
gain” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) 
15. “private exchange between two parties (the ‘demander’ and the 
‘supplier’) which: (1) has an influence on the allocation of resources 
either immediately or in the future, and (2) involves the use or abuse of 
public or collective responsibility for private ends” (Macrae, 1982, p.678) 
16. “By definition, organizational corruption involves at least two agents, X 
and Y, where at least Y occupies at least one designated role that is 
attached to a particular organization. The organizational role obliges Y 
to follow an established set of ethical rules, at least some of which are 
consistent with the goals of the organization. X consciously intends an 
action, which is deliberately designed to cause or persuade Y to breach 
at least one of these goal-consistent ethical rules, of which X and Y are 
both aware. With the option of acting otherwise, Y violates this rule in 
accord with the wishes of X.” (Hodgson and Jiang, 2007, p.1053) 
17. “corruption is not at bottom simply a matter of law; rather it is 
fundamentally a matter of morality” (Miller, 2005) 
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18. Institutional corruption: “note that an infringement of a specific law or 
institutional rule does not in and of itself constitute an act of institutional 
corruption. In order to do so, any such infringement needs to tend to 
have an institutional effect, eg to defeat the institutional purpose of the 
rule, to subvert the institutional process governed by the rule, or to 
contribute to the despoiling of the moral character of a role occupant qua 
role occupant.” (Miller, 2014) 




Appendix B. Simplifications of equations in Chapter 5 
B1. Re-arranging and simplifying equation E5.4.3: 
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ ൫(𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵൯ + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵)  (E5.4.3) 
𝑃(𝐴) ∗ ൫(𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵൯ + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵) ≥ 0 
𝑃(𝐴) ∗ ൫(𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵൯ ≥ −൫1 − 𝑃(𝐴)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵) 
𝑃(𝐴) ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵) ≥ −(𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵) 
𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵 ≥ −𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝐵 + 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵 
Cancelling 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵 from both sides, 













          (E5.4.4) 
B2. Re-arranging and simplifying equation E5.4.12: 
൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ ((𝑃(𝑆) + 𝛽) ∗ 𝐶 − 𝐵) + 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0    (E5.4.12) 
൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ ((𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝛽𝐶) − 𝐵) + 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0 
𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵 − 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝑃(𝑅)𝛽𝐶 + 𝑃(𝑅)𝐵 + 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0 
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𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵 − 𝑃(𝑅)𝛽𝐶 + 𝑃(𝑅)𝐵 ≥ 0 
𝛽𝐶൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ − 𝐵൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0 
 (𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵)൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0 
(𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵)൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ≥ −𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 
























        (E5.4.13) 
B3. Re-arranging and simplifying equation E5.4.19: 
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵) + ൫1 −
𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵)    (E5.4.19) 
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯
∗ (𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵 + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵 − 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶
+ 𝑃(𝐴)𝐵) 
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ ∗ (𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵) 
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𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 + 𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵 − 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 − 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝑆)𝐶
+ 𝑃(𝑅)𝐵       
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 − 𝐵 − 𝑃(𝑅)𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 + 𝑃(𝑅)𝐵       
𝜋௕ = 𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 ∗ ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ − 𝐵൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 
𝜋௕ = (𝑃(𝐴)𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵) ∗ ൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅)൯ + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶     (E5.4.20) 
B4. Re-arranging equation E5.4.23 to make 𝜷 the 
subject: 
(𝑃(𝐴௕)𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵)(1 − 𝑃(𝑅௕)) + 𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 ≥ 0      (E5.4.23) 
(𝑃(𝐴௕)𝛽𝐶 − 𝐵)൫1 − 𝑃(𝑅௕)൯ ≥ −𝑃(𝑆)𝐶 





























Appendix C. Model 2 Matlab scripts 












    w1(i)=1-(2+exp(-a*p1(i)+5)).^(-1)*2; 
    w2(i)=(log(p2(i)+b)/c +1); 
    w3(i)=(log(p3(i)+d)/g +1); 
    w4(i)=(((2+exp(-h*p4(i)+5)).^(-1)))*2; 
 pays1(i)=w1(i)-w2(i); 
 pays2simple(i)=-w1(i)+w2(i); 
 if pays1(i)>=pays2simple(i) 
    reject(i)=1; 
 elseif pays2simple(i)>=pays1(i) 










scatter(p1acc, p2acc, '*', 'b'); 
hold on 
scatter(p1reject, p2reject, 'o', 'r') 
xlabel('Proportion of DMs accepting bribes, p1'); 




plot (p1ind, p2ind, 'color', 'b'); 
legend('Bribe Accepted', 'Bribe Rejected', 'MAB') 
set(gca,'FontSize',15) 
 














  w1(i)=1-(2+exp(-a*p1(i)+5)).^(-1)*2; 
    w2(i)=(log(p2(i)+b)/c +1); 
    w3(i)=(log(p3(i)+d)/g +1); 




if pays1(i)>=pays2(i)  
        reject(i)=1; 
      advantage(i)=0; 
elseif pays2(i)>=pays3(i) 
     reject(i)=0; 
     advantage(i)=1; 
 elseif pays3(i)>=pays2(i) 
     reject(i)=0; 







  p1reject=p1.*reject; 
     p2reject=p2.*reject; 
   p1reject(p1reject==0)=nan; 
    scatter(p1reject,p2reject, 'o', 'r'); 
    xlabel('Proportion of DMs accepting bribes, p1'); 
ylabel('Size of bribe, p2'); 


























legend('Bribe Rejected', 'Bribe Accepted, Advantage Provided', 









Appendix D. Case studies selection 
Number Case Sector Corruption case summary Selected 
Y/N 
2014 




Multiple cases related to design, construction and provision 
of services related to power generation facilities, power 
grids and rail transportation in countries including 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Bahamas. 
Y 
2 US v. Avon 
Products, Inc. 
Cosmetics Provided gifts and bribes to Chinese officials to obtain a 
direct selling license 
N 
3 US v. Avon 
Products (China) 
Co. Ltd. 
Cosmetics Provided gifts and bribes to Chinese officials to obtain a 
direct selling license 
N 




Provided gifts and bribes to officials in Brazil, Argentina 






Payments of bribes to officials in Russia in sales of 









6 US v. Benito Chinea Finance Payment of bribes to an official in Venezuela’s state 
economic development bank to direct financial trading 
business to a Wall Street broker-dealer 
N 
7 US v. Joseph 
Demeneses 
Finance Payment of bribes to an official in Venezuela’s state 
economic development bank to direct financial trading 
business to a Wall Street broker-dealer 
N 
8 US v. Hewlett-




Bribes and gifts to Polish government officials to obtain 
contracts with Poland’s national police agency 
N 




Bribing Russian government officials to secure a hardware 
and software contract with the federal prosecutor’s office 
N 
10 Hewlett-Packard 






Bribes to a Mexican government official to obtain IT 





11 US v. Dmitri Firtash Mining Racketeering conspiracy to bribe state and central 
government officials in India to allow mining of titanium 
minerals 
N 
12 US v. Suren 
Gevorgyan 
Mining Racketeering conspiracy to bribe state and central 
government officials in India to allow mining of titanium 
minerals 
N 
13 US v. Andras Knopp Mining Racketeering conspiracy to bribe state and central 
government officials in India to allow mining of titanium 
minerals 
N 
14 US v. Gajendra Lal Mining Racketeering conspiracy to bribe state and central 
government officials in India to allow mining of titanium 
minerals 
N 
15 US v. Periasamy 
Sunderalingam 
Mining  Racketeering conspiracy to bribe state and central 
government officials in India to allow mining of titanium 
minerals 
N 




Related to case 1, US v. Alstom S.A., et al. 
Payment of bribes to Indonesian government officials to 









Related to case 1, US v. Alstom S.A., et al. 
Vice president of Bechtel Corp – engineering, construction 
and project management. Overseeing competitive bidding 
process and selecting companies to perform 
subcontracting work. Laundered the proceeds of a 
fraudulent scheme  
Y 
18 US v. Alcoa World 
Alumina LLC 
Mining Kickback payments to officials in Bahrain to secure 
contracts to supply raw materials to a state-controlled 
aluminium smelter 
N 
19 US v. Joseph 
Sigelman 
Oil Bribes to Colombia’s official to secure oil services contract 
with state-owned oil company 
N 
20 US v. Gregory 
Weisman 
Oil Bribes to Colombia’s official to secure oil services contract 
with state-owned oil company 
N 
21 US v. Knut 
Hammarskjold 
Oil Bribes to Colombia’s official to secure oil services contract 
with state-owned oil company 
N 
2013 
22 Archer Daniels 
Midland Company 










VAT fraud Bribes to Ukrainian government to obtain VAT refunds N 
24 US v. Bilfinger SE Gas Bribe payments to Nigerian officials to obtain a project to 
build a natural gas pipeline 
Y 
25 US v. Weatherford 
International Ltd 
Oil Bribe payments to government officials in several 
countries, including payments to Iraqi Ministry of Oil in 
exchange for a contract to provide oil drilling and refining 
equipment 
N 
26 US v. Weatherford 
Services, Ltd 
Oil Bribe payments to Angolan officials to establish oil well 
screen manufacturing operations 
N 
27 US v. Diebold, Inc. ATM Bribe payments to government officials in China and 






28 US v. Alain Riedo Manufacturing Corrupt payments to Chinese officials to sell high-
voltage/high-tension capacitors to Chinese government-
controlled companies at a marked up price 
N 




Related case 1, US v. Alstom S.A., et al.  
Payment of bribes to Indonesian government officials to 
secure a power generation project 
Y 
30 US v. Ernesto Lujan Finance Payment of bribes to an official in Venezuela’s state 
economic development bank to direct financial trading 
business to a Wall Street broker-dealer 
N 
31 US v. Total, S.A. Oil Corrupt payments to Iranian government officials to obtain 
oil and gas concessions 
N 
32 US v. Maria de los 
Angeles Gonzales 
de Hernandez 
Finance Payment of bribes to an official in Venezuela’s state 
economic development bank to direct financial trading 
business to a Wall Street broker-dealer 
N 
33 US v. Jose 
Alejandro Hurtado 
Finance Payment of bribes to an official in Venezuela’s state 
economic development bank to direct financial trading 





34 US v. Tomas 
Alberto Clarke 
Bethancourt 
Finance Payment of bribes to an official in Venezuela’s state 
economic development bank to direct financial trading 
business to a Wall Street broker-dealer 
N 




Related to case 1, US v. Alstom S.A., et al.  
Payment of bribes to Indonesian government officials to 
secure a power generation project 
Y 




Clothing Corrupt payments to Argentinian government officials to 
obtain customs clearance of merchandise 
N 




Related to case 1, US v. Alstom S.A., et al.  
Payment of bribes to Indonesian government officials to 
secure a power generation project 
Y 




Related to case 1, US v. Alstom S.A., et al.  
Payment of bribes to Indonesian government officials to 
secure a power generation project 
Y 




Corrupt payments to influence the decisions of a Nigerian 
government panel reviewing the company’s adherence to 





40 US v. Frederic Cilins Mining A mining company paid bribes to win lucrative mining 
rights in the Republic of Guinea. 
N 
41 US v. Peter Dubois Aircraft 
maintenance 
Executives of Lufthansa subsidiary Bizjet paid bribes to 
Latin American government officials to secure aircraft 
maintenance, repair and overhaul services 
N 
42 US v. Jald Jensen Aircraft 
maintenance 
Executives of Lufthansa subsidiary Bizjet paid bribes to 
Latin American government officials to secure aircraft 
maintenance, repair and overhaul services  
N 




Executives of Lufthansa subsidiary Bizjet paid bribes to 
Latin American government officials to secure aircraft 
maintenance, repair and overhaul services  
N 
44 US v. Neal Uhl Aircraft 
maintenance 
Executives of Lufthansa subsidiary Bizjet paid bribes to 
Latin American government officials to secure aircraft 
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